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ABSTRACT & KEYWORDS 
 
This thesis examines the current state of the criminal law’s interaction with mentally ill 
persons, with a specific interest in this interaction during pre-trial phases such as arrest 
and bail. It argues that the current provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada that allow 
for limited instances of pre-trial mental health assessments for adults are insufficient. The 
current options, including assessments to determine “not criminally responsible for 
reasons of mental disorder” or “fitness”, are not applicable in many situations. Other 
options available to accused outside of the Criminal Code are also lacking, as they are 
limited to the Mental Health Act, and the efforts of the sparsely situated mental health 
courts across the country. The focus for this paper is the resulting gap which leaves 
mentally ill persons untreated in their illness for longer than is necessary, thus increasing 
their chance of re-offending or breaching their court-imposed order – if they are given 
bail at all. This paper explores other potential options to assist mentally ill offenders who 
are in need of psychiatric intervention. One such option will be a comparison to the 
section 34 assessment option under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for those under 18 
years of age. This discussion compares relevant legislation, leading case law, theoretical 
foundations and doctrinal legal scholarship with a hope of providing guidance for future 
legislation.  
 
 
INDEX TERMS: bail, bail hearing, show cause, show cause hearing, grounds for 
detention, primary grounds, secondary grounds, tertiary grounds, pre-trial stage, mental 
health, mental illness, mental disorder, depression, major depression, major depressive 
disorder, anxiety, bi-polar, schizophrenia, psychosis, psychotic, personality disorder, 
suicidal ideation, accused, accused person, not criminally responsible, not criminally 
responsible for reason of mental disorder, unfit, fitness, young person, section 34 
assessment, assessment, mental health assessment 
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Part	1	
	
Introduction	to	Mental	Health	Considerations	and	Bail		“Providing	opportunities	to	receive	treatment,	not	imposing	punishment,	is	the	just	and	appropriate	response…	The	need	for	treatment	rather	than	punishment	is	rendered	even	more	acute	by	the	fact	that	the	mentally	ill	are	often	vulnerable	and	victimized	in	the	prison	setting,	as	well	as	by	changes	in	the	health	system	that	many	suggest	result	in	greater	numbers	of	the	mentally	ill	being	caught	up	in	the	criminal	process.”	1			-Justice	McLachlin	(as	she	then	was)	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada			Mental	 illness	 and	 the	 criminal	 law	have	 been	 intertwined	 for	 centuries.	 The	 two	have	 shared	a	 confusing	 and	often	difficult	 relationship.	But	 in	 the	 last	 century,	 it	can	be	argued	that	efforts	have	been	made	to	better	that	relationship.			Since	 at	 least	 1991,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 has	 been	 hearing	 litigation	involving	mentally	 ill	 accused	 persons,2	often	 requiring	 Parliament	 to	 reassess	 its	treatment	of	mentally	ill	persons	involved	in	the	criminal	justice	system.	As	just	one	example,	Swain	resulted	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	forcing	the	government	to	abandon	its	former	regime	dealing	with	mentally	ill	persons	incapable	of	having	the	
mens	 rea3	to	 commit	 their	 alleged	 crime	 due	 to	 their	 mental	 disorder.	4	Striking	down	 its	 former	 regime	 required	 the	 government	 to	 reconsider	how	 it	 dealt	with	persons	 who	 were	 too	 mentally	 ill	 to	 understand	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	otherwise	 criminal	 behavior.	 This	 dialogue	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 Part	 XX.1	 of	 the	
Criminal	Code,5	a	Part	dealing	with	mental	disorder.	It	includes	the	provision	of	“not	criminally	responsible	for	reason	of	mental	disorder”	(“NCR”),	which	addressed	the																																																									1	Winko	v	British	Colombia	(Forensic	Psychiatric	Institute),	[1999]	SCJ	No	31¶41	[Winko].		2	R.	v	Swain,	[1991]	1	SCR	933	[Swain].	3	In	order	to	be	found	guilty	of	a	crime,	an	accused	person	must	have	both	the	necessary	actus	reus	[physical	act],	and	mens	rea	[mental	intention]	of	the	requisite	offence	with	which	they	are	charged.	If	one	of	these	elements	is	missing,	the	accused	person	cannot	be	found	guilty	of	the	crime.		4	Swain,	supra	note	2,	¶150.		5	Criminal	Code,	RSC	1985,	c	C-46	[the	Criminal	Code].	
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courts	 concerns	 in	 Swain.6	It	 also	 codified	 the	 ability	 for	 an	 assessment	 to	 be	ordered	where	the	accused	person	is	presenting	as	incapable	of	understanding	the	proceedings	 against	 them	 on	 account	 of	 their	 mental	 disorder.	 This	 latter	 test	 is	often	referred	to	as	a	“fitness”	assessment.	Some	other	options	also	exist,	but	are	so	sparse	as	 to	not	 fully	 respond	 to	 the	 issue.	For	example,	mental	health	courts	and	the	Mental	Health	 Act	 offer	 some	 promise	 for	 those	 who	 find	 themselves	 in	 the	system,	 but	 neither	 is	 consistent.	 As	 we	 will	 explore,	 the	 options	 open	 to	 adult	accused	are	lacking.		For	 its	 part,	 Parliament	 has	 recognized	 the	 importance	 of	 adequately	 addressing	mental	health	concerns.	One	such	example	is	the	allowance	for	assessments	under	section	 34	 of	 the	 Youth	Criminal	 Justice	Act.7	This	 legislated	 assessment	 option	 is	commendable.	 It	 allows	 for	 young	 persons8	to	 be	 assessed	 for	 issues	 relating	 to	mental	 health,	 often	 leading	 to	 a	 care	 plan	 being	 put	 in	 place	 to	 address	 any	concerns	explored	through	the	process.	To	qualify	for	a	section	34	assessment,	the	young	 person	 simply	 needs	 to	 consent	 to	 the	 assessment	 together	 with	 the	prosecutor,	or	one	of	three	conditions	must	be	present:	(i) the	 court	 has	 reasonable	 grounds	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 young	 person	may	 be	 suffering	 from	 a	 physical	 or	 mental	 illness	 or	 disorder,	 a	psychological	disorder,	an	emotional	disturbance,	a	learning	disability	or	a	mental	disability,		(ii) the	young	person’s	history	indicates	a	pattern	of	repeated	findings	of	guilt…;	or		 (iii) the	 young	 person	 is	 alleged	 to	 have	 committed	 a	 serious	 violent	offence.9		Of	 interest	 is	 the	 ability	 for	 courts	 to	order	 these	 assessments	 at	 any	point	 in	 the	proceedings	–	including	pre-trial	phases,	like	bail.10																																																										6	Ibid,	Part	XX.1.		7	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act,	SC	2002,	c.1,	section	34	[YCJA].	8	The	YCJA	deals	exclusively	with	young	persons,	defined	as	those	who	are	twelve	years	old	or	older,	but	less	than	eighteen	years	old.	Ibid,	s.	2.		9	Ibid,	s.	34(1)(b)	
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	In	addition	to	the	section	34	assessment	tool	provided	by	the	YCJA,	young	persons	also	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 assessed	 for	 fitness	 or	 NCR	 considerations	 under	 the	
Criminal	Code.	 Conversely,	 while	 adult	 accused	 persons	 have	 the	 NCR	 and	 fitness	assessment	regimes,	they	have	few	other	options	available	to	them	to	explore	their	mental	health	issues	and	to	create	a	plan	of	treatment.		This	 thesis	will	 explore	 the	 resulting	 gaps	 left	 for	 adult	 accused	persons	 suffering	from	 mental	 health	 issues,	 caused	 by	 the	 limited	 options	 provided	 under	 the	
Criminal	 Code	 and	 any	 other	 potentially	 relevant	 legislation.	 It	 will	 argue	 that	opportunities	are	being	missed	at	earlier	stages	of	the	criminal	process	to	help	those	suffering	from	mental	health	issues,	leaving	them	more	likely	to	re-offend	while	out	on	bail	–	if	they	are	even	granted	bail.	The	treatment	options	available	to	mentally	ill	persons	is	already	scant,	and	becomes	even	more	fleeting	for	those	caught	up	in	the	criminal	justice	system.	It	will	be	argued	that	more	money	and	resources	are	spent	in	 justice	 system	 processes	 like	 investigations,	 re-arrests,	 court	 proceedings,	 and	detention	 of	 accused	 persons,	 than	 if	 the	 system	 simply	 offered	 treatment	 at	 an	earlier	stage	of	the	process.	Treatment	of	mental	health	issues	could	instead	avoid	re-offending	by	those	dealing	with	such	problems.		While	sentencing	offers	some	other	options	 for	additional	assistance,	waiting	until	the	accused	person	has	been	found	guilty	is	not	ideal	either.	It	means	often	waiting	months,	 and	 sometimes	 years,	 before	 they	 are	 treated.	 While	 this	 respects	 the	principle	of	innocence	until	proven	guilty,	it	ignores	the	reality	that	63%	of	charges	result	in	findings	of	guilt.11	It	also	ignores	the	fact	that	the	accused,	who	is	suffering	in	real	time,	is	left	untreated	with	the	underlying	behavior	causing	their	criminality.	To	be	sure,	 this	 thesis	does	not	argue	 that	every	mentally	 ill	person	 is	necessarily																																																																																																																																																																						10	Bail	is	the	ability	of	an	accused	person	to	stay	out	of	custody,	often	on	terms	and	conditions,	while	awaiting	the	disposition	of	their	criminal	proceedings.	11	Statistics	Canada,	Adult	Criminal	Court	Statistics	in	Canada,	2013/2014,	(Ottawa:	StatCan,	28	September	2015)	at	3.		
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guilty	of	the	crime	they	have	been	charged	with.	Instead,	 it	recognizes	that	we	can	still	 respect	 the	 right	 to	 be	presumed	 innocent	 by	maintaining	 their	 rights	 to	 bail	and	 trial,	 while	 being	 proactive	 about	 treatment	 opportunities	 for	 those	who	 are	arguably	the	most	vulnerable.	Such	an	approach	to	mentally	ill	accused	persons	has	the	 additional	 benefit	 of	 treating	 those	who	will	 ultimately	 not	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	their	alleged	crime,	but	nevertheless	betters	their	future	prospects	all	the	same.		Jill	Presser	and	Anita	Szigeti	are	two	leading	Ontario	criminal	defence	lawyers	in	the	area	of	mental	disorders.	They	have	written	that	“[m]entally	disordered	accused	are	often	 among	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 and	 the	 most	 marginalized	 people	 in	 our	society.”12	With	 this	 notion	 in	 mind,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 we	 must	 extend	 the	concepts	 of	 rehabilitation	 and	 treatment,	 as	 discussed	 by	 Justice	 McLachlin	 in	
Winko,	to	all	accused	persons	suffering	from	mental	health	disorders.	To	accomplish	this,	 legislation	 is	 suggested	 for	 the	 Criminal	Code	 that	 mirrors	 section	 34	 of	 the	
YCJA.13			
1.1	A	Roadmap:	
	Found	next	in	our	discussion,	Part	2	will	set	the	context	for	our	discussion	–	bail.	As	the	John	Howard	Society	has	written,	“[w]e	have	a	bail	problem	in	Ontario”.14	Bail	is	often	 the	 first	 interaction	 between	 an	 accused	 person	 and	 the	 criminal	 justice	system.	It	 is	a	crucial	 interaction,	and	one	that	allows	opportunity	for	 intervention	early	 on	 in	 the	 process.	 Exploring	 the	 current	 state	 of	mental	 health	 assessments	will	assist	our	bail	 system	and	accused	persons	alike,	and	so,	we	will	 start,	with	a	doctrinal	review	of	the	laws	on	bail.																																																											12	Anita	Szigeti	and	Jill	Presser,	“The	Responsible	Approach	to	the	Issue	of	Criminal	Responsibility”,	For	the	Defence	32:5	(3	July	2011)	26.		13	Supra,	note	7	s.	34.	14	The	John	Howard	Society,	“Reasonable	Bail?”	(2013)	The	Centre	of	Research,	Policy	and	Program	Development.	
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Part	 3	 will	 then	 explore	 in	 depth	 the	 current	 options	 available	 to	 adult	 accused	persons	 for	mental	health	assessments.	NCR	and	 fitness	assessments	are	 the	main	options,	but	it	will	be	seen	that	these	options	suffer	from	a	“timing”	issue,	as	well	as	the	 need	 for	 the	 accused	 to	 be	 suffering	 in	 the	 specific	 way	 of	 not	 being	 able	 to	understand	the	consequences	of	their	actions.15	The	remaining	instances	of	mental	health	 interacting	with	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 like	 the	Mental	Health	Act	 and	specialty	courts,	do	not	provide	a	consistent	approach.	We	will	review	some	of	these	responses	to	the	issue,	and	critique	each	in	turn.	Because	each	option	has	significant	limitations,	it	is	argued	that	they	are	insufficient	given	the	prevalence	of	mentally-ill	accused	persons	appearing	in	court.			In	Part	4,	we	will	look	to	the	YCJA.	This	will	include	a	review	of	section	34	in	more	detail,	including	its	drawbacks	and	potential	for	fine-tuning.	This	will	allow	us	then	to	flow	into	a	comparative	analysis,	which	will	be	completed	in	Part	5.	There,	we	will	consider	whether	a	section	34	assessment	option	could	work	 in	 the	adult	context.	We	will	 consider	 the	 reasons	 for	 reform	 to	our	 current	 system,	and	 the	argument	will	be	made	that	as	a	society,	we	have	an	ethical	responsibility	to	better	deal	with	our	mentally	ill.	Consideration	is	given	to	what	such	a	legislated	option	should	look	like,	and	also	the	potential	resistance	to	such	an	option.			The	 overarching	 theme	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 that	 a	 better	 assessment	 option	 is	needed	in	the	adult	context	in	order	to	help	remedy	the	bail	problem	described	by	the	John	Howard	Society.	As	one	jurist	offered:	“…the	people	who	suffer	mental	disorders	are	the	ones	who	are	at	the	bottom	of	the	 heap,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 services	 being	 provided	 by	 the	 provincial	government.”16		Section	 92	 of	 the	 Constitution	 Act17	leaves	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 and	 the	management	 of	 hospitals	 to	 the	 provincial	 government.	 Therefore,	 requiring	 the																																																									15	Supra,	note	5	s.	16(1).	16	Janet	Leiper,	“Cracks	in	the	Façade	of	Liberty:	The	Resort	to	Habeas	Corpus	to	Enforce	Part	XX.1	of	the	Criminal	Code”	(2009)	55	CLQ	134	at	page	14.		
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provincial	government	to	complete	assessments	and	offer	treatment	to	mentally	ill	offenders	is	a	solution	that	has	likely	been	thought	of	by	more	jurists,	practitioners,	and	 scholars	 than	 necessary.	 Yet	 despite	 how	 obvious	 this	 proposition	 is,	 we	continue	 to	 go	 without	 the	 solution.	 This	 solution	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 fix	 so	many	of	the	gaps	found	in	our	system	–	arguably	both	in	the	criminal	and	medical	spheres.	 We	 cannot	 wait	 for	 a	 case	 to	 make	 it	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 before	Parliament	 is	 forced	 to	respond;	change	can	and	should	come	 from	the	 legislature	and	our	provincial	governments	as	soon	as	practicable	–	much	like	the	rate	in	which	we	should	be	responding	to	mental	health	concerns.	Justice	McLachlin’s	comments	in	Winko,	reproduced	at	the	outset	of	this	chapter,18	were	made	in	the	context	of	the	NCR	 and	 fitness	 regime	 in	 the	 Criminal	Code.	 It	 is	 argued	 here	 that	 it	 is	 time	 to	extend	this	promise	to	our	vulnerable	and	mentally	ill	by	providing	the	dignity	and	treatment	they	deserve	at	every	stage	in	which	they	interact	with	our	system.		
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																					17	Constitution	Act,	1867	(UK),	30	&	31	Vict,	c	3,	reprinted	in	RSC	1985,	App	II,	No	5.	18	Winko,	supra	note	1:	“Providing	opportunities	to	receive	treatment,	not	imposing	punishment,	is	the	just	and	appropriate	response…	The	need	for	treatment	rather	than	punishment	is	rendered	even	more	acute	by	the	fact	that	the	mentally	ill	are	often	vulnerable	and	victimized	in	the	prison	setting,	as	well	as	by	changes	in	the	health	system	that	many	suggest	result	in	greater	numbers	of	the	mentally	ill	being	caught	up	in	the	criminal	process.”	
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1.2	An	Illustration:	Mental	Health	Assessment	Options		
for	Adult	&	Youth	Accused		The	following	chart	provides	a	visual	representation	of	the	issue	this	thesis	seeks	to	explore.		
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Part	2	
	
Setting	the	Context:	Bail	Law	in	Canada	
	“In	Ontario	today,	we	spent	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	detaining	legally	innocent	people	every	year.	Our	provincial	jails	are	overcrowded	and	at	capacity;	prisoners,	mostly	on	remand,	sleep	two	to	three	to	a	cell	designed	for	one,	at	times	on	a	mattress	on	the	floor.	At	the	same	time,	crime	rates	are	lower	today	than	ever.	There	is	something	wrong	with	this	picture.”19		-The	John	Howard	Society		Bail	 is	 a	 term	 most	 individuals	 recognize	 and	 can	 understand	 from	 the	 various	depictions	 of	 the	 process	 presented	 in	 popular	 media.	 Interestingly	 though,	 in	Canada,	 “bail”	 is	 not	 the	 true	 name	 of	 the	 proceedings	 under	 the	 Criminal	 Code.	Instead,	 the	 release	 of	 an	 accused	 person	 from	 custody	 is	 called	 “judicial	 interim	release”,20	while	the	process	to	determine	release	is	called	a	“show	cause	hearing”.21	Despite	its	technical	name,	“bail”	is	still	the	most	common	term	for	this	process,	and	even	 the	Charter	 refers	 to	 it	 as	 such	when	 it	 guarantees	 the	 right	 to	 “reasonable	bail”.22	Thus,	 it	 is	 the	 term	 we	 will	 continue	 to	 employ	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	discussion.		The	concept	of	bail	is	one	that	seems	relatively	straight-forward:	pre-trial	detention	is	to	be	used	with	restraint.23	Not	only	is	this	guaranteed	by	the	Charter	via	section	11(e),24	but	also	by	the	Criminal	Code.25	In	section	515(1)	of	the	Code,	this	plays	out	as	an	instruction	to	courts	to	release	the	accused	on	their	giving	of	an	undertaking,	without	conditions,	unless	the	Crown	can	show	cause	why	that	is	not	justified.26																																																										19	Supra,	note	13.		20	Criminal	Code,	supra	note	5	Part	XVI	broadly,	and	section	515	specifically.	21	Ibid,	s.	515(5).	22	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	Part	I	of	the	Constitution	Act,	1982	being	Schedule	B	to	the	Canada	Act	1982	(UK),	1982,	c	11	at	section	11(e).	23	Ibid.		24	Ibid.	25	Criminal	Code,	supra	note	5.	26	Ibid,	s.	515(1)	and	(3).	
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	Justification	can	be	found	by	courts	in	one	of	three	grounds	provided	under	section	515(10)	of	the	Code.27	The	primary	ground,	and	arguably	the	ground	that	should	do	the	majority	of	the	work,	considers	whether	the	accused	is	likely	to	return	to	court	do	deal	with	their	charges.28	The	secondary	ground	considers	whether	protection	or	safety	of	 the	public	 is	needed,	 including	the	 likelihood	of	whether	the	accused	will	commit	 a	 criminal	 offence	 or	 interfere	 with	 the	 administration	 of	 justice.29	This	ground	 is	 largely	 speculative,	 and	 therefore	 problematic.	 We	 will	 explore	 these	issues	as	we	move	through	our	review.	The	tertiary	ground,	and	the	least	commonly	invoked	of	 the	three,	 is	 the	newest	ground.	 It	 is	employed	to	detain	those	accused	whose	release	would	cause	a	loss	of	confidence	in	the	administration	of	justice.30			While	 this	may	seem	simple	enough,	our	bail	processes	are	anything	but	 straight-forward.	Provisions	within	the	Criminal	Code	reduce	the	presumption	of	condition-less	bail.	For	examples	of	 this	proposition,	consider	 the	provisions	requiring	more	formal	 processes	 for	 those	 crimes	 falling	 within	 section	 469	 like	 murder,31	that	reverse	 the	 onus	 to	 the	 accused	 person	 for	 certain	 types	 of	 offences,32	and	 allow	Courts	to	require	accused	to	 follow	conditions,	which	can	 include	the	requirement	of	sureties	(or	jailers	in	the	community),	in	order	for	the	accused	to	be	released.33		These	 exceptions	 to	 the	 otherwise	 presumptive	 rule	 of	 bail	 has	 led	 to	 increased	levels	of	condition-filled	bail	orders,	and	worse	–	detention.	A	literature	review	on	this	subject	paints	a	persuasive	picture	of	the	prevalence	of	this	problem.34	Many	of																																																									27	Ibid	s.	515(10).		28	Ibid	s.	515(10)(a).	29	Ibid	s.	515(10)(b).	30	Ibid	s.	515(10)(c).	31	Ibid	ss.	515(1)	and	515(11).		32	Ibid	ss.	515(6)	and	524(9).	33	Ibid	s.	515(2).	34	For	just	a	few	examples,	see:			Allan	Manson,	“Pre-Sentence	Custody	and	the	Determination	of	a	Sentence	(Or	how		to	make	a	mole	hill	out	of	a	mountain)”	(2004)	49	CLQ	292;				
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these	 contributions	 to	 the	 discussions	 will	 be	 considered	 in	 more	 detail	 as	 we	proceed.		While	 the	current	state	of	bail	 in	Canada	 is	 troublesome,	 it	 is	not	 that	bail	 laws	 in	Canada	have	really	ever	been	exemplary.	We	have	experienced	an	ongoing	battle	to	balance	 competing	 principles	 of	 safety	 of	 the	 public	 with	 individual	 rights	 to	freedom	and	liberty.	Mentally	ill	accused	have	consistently	presented	challenges	for	bail	 courts.	 Understanding	 this	 history	 is	 important	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	current	state	of	the	law,	and	so	we	begin	with	a	historical	review	of	the	law	on	bail.		
2.1	A	Brief	History	of	Bail	Law	
2.1.i	The	English	Influence	Like	much	of	Canada’s	legal	history,	we	look	to	England	as	the	starting	point	of	bail	law.	 Bail	 is	 likely	 an	 impossible	 concept	 to	 pinpoint	 to	 a	 particular	 piece	 of	legislation,	 a	 specific	 case,	 or	 a	 movement	 which	 brought	 it	 about.	 Instead,	 bail	
																																																																																																																																																																					Christopher	Sherrin,	“Excessive	Pre-Trial	Incarceration”	(2012)	75	Saskatchewan		Law	Review	55-96;					Daniel	Kiselbach,	“Pre-Trial	Criminal	Procedure:	Preventative	Detention	and	the		Presumption	of	Innocence”	(1988)	31	CLQ	168;				Don	Stuart,	“St.	Cloud:	Widening	the	Public	Confidence	Ground	to	Deny	Bail	will		Worsen	Deplorable	Detention	Realities”	(2015)	10	CR	(7th)	337;			James	Stribopolous,	“The	Forgotten	Right:	Section	9	of	the	Charter,	Its	Purpose	and		Meaning”	(2008)	40	SCLR	(2d)	211-248;			Jane	B.	Sprott	and	Nicole	M.	Myers,	“Set	Up	to	Fail:	The	Unintended	Consequences	of		Multiple	Bail	Conditions”	(2011)	53	Canadian	Journal	of	Criminology	and		Criminal	Justice	4;		Jane	B.	Sprott	and	Allan	Manson,	“	YCJA	Bail	Conditions:	“Treating”	Girls	and	Boys		Differently”	(2017)	22	Canadian	Criminal	Law	Review	77;			Martin	L.	Friedland,	“The	Bail	Reform	Act	Revisited”	(2012)	16	Canadian	Criminal		Law	Review	315;			Nicholas	Bala,	“Changing	Professional	Culture	and	Reducing	Use	of	Courts	and		Custody	for	Youth:	The	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act	and	Bill	C-10”	(2015)	78		Saskatchewan	Law	Review	127	–	180;	and		The	John	Howard	Society,	“Reasonable	Bail?”	(2013)	The	Centre	of	Research,	Policy		and	Program	Development.	
		
	
11	
appears	 to	 be	 “as	 old	 as	 the	 law	 of	 England	 itself...	 explicitly	 recognized	 by	 our	earliest	 writers”.35	Justice	 Trotter,	 a	 Jurist	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 Ontario	considered	to	be	the	leading	authority	on	bail,	writes	about	bail	being	the	result	of	the	inability	to	keep	detainees	alive	and	the	frequency	of	escapees	in	12th	and	13th	century	 England,36	as	 opposed	 to	 “any	 love	 of	 an	 abstract	 liberty”.37	This	 led	 to	 a	system	much	like	that	still	seen	today	in	the	United	States,38	where	family	or	friends	secure	 the	 release	 of	 the	 accused	 into	 their	 care	 by	 putting	 up	 some	 form	 of	 a	financial	assurance.39	During	this	earliest-documented	phase	of	bail	in	England,	the	process	was	already	being	criticized	for	being	ill-defined,	for	the	sheriffs	in	charge	of	detainees	having	discretion	that	was	too	wide-ranging,	and	for	corruption	amongst	the	sheriffs	which	allowed	for	bribes.40			From	1275	onwards,	for	roughly	550	years,	bail	was	dealt	with	under	the	Statute	of	
Westminster,	I.41	This	Act	formalized	the	process	to	bring	definition	and	order	to	the	proceedings,	 and	 created	 “bailable”	 and	 “non-bailable”	 offence	 categories.42	If	 the	offence	was	bailable,	subject	to	a	sufficient	surety,	the	sheriff	would	have	to	release	the	 accused	 person.	 Justice	 Trotter	 discussed	 the	 categorization	 of	 offences	 as	seemingly	being	influenced	by	“the	seriousness	of	the	offence;	the	likelihood	of	the	
																																																								35	Sir	J.F.	Stephen,	A	History	of	the	Criminal	Law	of	England,	Vol.	1	(New	York:	Burt	Franklin,	1883)	at	233.		36	Gary	T.	Trotter,	The	Law	of	Bail	in	Canada,	3d	ed	(Toronto:	Thomson	Reuters	Canada,	2018)	at	1-3.	37	F.	Pollock	and	F.	Maitland,	The	History	of	the	English	Law,	Vol.	2.	(Cambridge:	University	Press,	1953)	at	584.	38	This	is	not	to	say	that	cash	deposits	are	not	still	seen	in	Canada.	In	certain	situations,	a	cash	deposit	may	be	required	to	secure	release	of	the	accused.	See	s.	515(2)(d)	&	(e)	of	the	Criminal	Code.	However,	this	system	has	largely	been	replaced	with	pledges	of	money	instead,	either	from	the	accused,	or	from	their	surety.	Conversely,	money	deposits	are	still	a	prevalent	form	of	bail	in	most	states	in	the	United	States,	and	are	criticized	and	written	about	extensively	by	American	theorists.		39	Supra,	note	36	at	1-3.		40	Ibid.	41	Statute	of	Westminster,	I,	1275	(UK),	3	Edw	1,	c	15.		42	Supra,	note	36	at	1-4.	
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accused’s	 guilt;	 and	 the	 ‘outlawed’	 status	of	 the	 accused.”43	The	main	bail	 concern	during	this	period	of	time	was	the	continued	abuse	of	the	system	by	sheriffs	due	to	their	discretion	in	determining	the	suitability	of	a	proposed	surety.44	This	led	to	the	powers	of	bail	being	transferred	to	justices	who	were	seen	to	be	more	objective	and	better	versed	in	the	law.45		1826	 to	 1848	 saw	 a	 gradual	 shift	 in	 the	 concerns	 set	 out	 in	 the	 legislation	when	considering	the	question	of	bail.	First,	the	Criminal	Justice	Act,	182646	eradicated	the	distinction	between	bailable	and	non-bailable	offences.	This	allowed	 for	bail	 to	be	sought	 on	 all	 charges.	 Then,	 England’s	 Parliament	 amended	 and	 extended	 the	provisions	of	 this	act	 to	create	a	new	statute47	which	articulated	the	main	concern	for	 bail	 as	 being	 the	 attendance	 in	 court	 of	 the	 accused.48	Further	 emphasis	 on	attendance	at	court	as	the	main	bail	consideration	was	seen	with	the	introduction	of	the	 Indictable	 Offences	 Act,	 1848.49	This	 act	 sought	 sufficient	 sureties	 to	 ensure	attendance.	 This	 shift	 meant	 that	 the	 19th	 century	 bail	 laws	 of	 England	 became	“solely	 concerned	 with	 ensuring	 the	 accused	 attended	 in	 court	 for	 trial…	 Other	criteria	for	release	developed	much	later.”50		
2.1.ii	The	Canadian	System	Pre-Confederation,	we	borrowed	the	English	system	of	bail51	where	bail	was	a	right	with	 respect	 to	 misdemeanors,	 but	 discretionary	 for	 felony	 offences.52	With																																																									43	Ibid.	44	Ibid,	at	1-5.	45	Ibid;	supra,	note	31	at	243;	Civil	Procedure	Act,	1330	(UK),	4	Edw.	3,	c.1;	Justices	of	
the	Peace	Act,	1361	(UK),	34	Edw.	3,	c.1.	46	Criminal	Justice	Act,	1826,	1826	(UK),	7	Geo.	4,	c.	64.	47	Criminal	Justice	Act,	1826,	1835	(UK),	5	&	6	Will.	4,	c.	33.	48	Supra,	note	36	at	1-5.	49	Indictable	Offences	Act,	1848,	1848	(UK),	11	&	12	Vict.,	c.	42.	50	Supra,	note	36	at	1-6.	51	M.	Phelps,	“The	Legal	Basis	of	the	Right	to	Bail”	(1970-71),	4	Man.	L.J.	143	at	144;	and	P.K.	McWilliams	“The	Law	of	Bail”	(1966-67),	9	CLQ	21	at	23.	52	In	present	day	Canada,	misdemeanors	and	felonies	are	no	longer	the	terms	used	to	distinguish	between	offences.	A	distinction	now	is	made	between	summary	
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legislation	 titled	An	Act	Respecting	the	Duties	of	Justices	of	the	Peace,	Out	of	Sessions,	
in	Relation	to	Persons	Charged	with	Indictable	Offences,53	bail	was	 changed	 in	 1869	and	made	discretionary	for	all	offences.	It	allowed	for	discretion	from	the	justice	or	judge,	and	persisted	for	over	100	years.54			The	 early	 considerations	 in	 Canadian	bail	 law	were	 also	 focused	 on	 the	 accused’s	attendance	in	court.55	To	make	this	decision,	factors	like	seriousness	of	the	offence,	severity	of	 the	penalty,	strength	of	 the	evidence,	and	the	accused’s	standing	 in	 the	community	 were	 all	 considered.56	The	 other	 grounds	 for	 detention	 were	 not	enumerated	until	the	English	case	of	R.	v	Phillips	influenced	the	Canadian	system.	57																																																																																																																																																																															In	Phillips,	the	court	criticized	his	pre-trial	release	in	coming	to	their	decision	about	the	 appropriateness	 of	 his	 sentence.	 They	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 he	committed	a	number	of	offences	while	on	bail,	and	highlighted	that	“housebreaking”	was	a	crime	likely	to	be	repeated	while	on	bail,	especially	by	someone	with	a	record	of	committing	this	crime.58	They	wrote:	“To	 turn	such	a	man	 loose	on	society	until	he	had	received	his	punishment	for	 an	undoubted	offence,	 an	offence	which	was	not	 in	dispute,	was,	 in	 the	view	 of	 the	 Court,	 a	 very	 inadvisable	 step.	 They	wish	 the	magistrates	who	release	on	bail	young	housebreakers,	such	as	the	applicant,	 to	know	that	 in	nineteen	cases	out	of	twenty	it	is	a	mistake.”59		There	 were	 two	 factors	 in	 Phillips	 that	 require	 special	 consideration	 –	 the	seriousness	of	the	crime,	and	the	strong	evidence	against	the	accused.	Yet,	despite	
																																																																																																																																																																					offences,	and	indictable	offences.	The	original	terms	of	misdemeanor	and	felonies	are	still	used	in	the	United	States,	however	England	no	longer	uses	them	either:	see	
Criminal	Law	Act,	1967,	1967	c.	58.		53	An	Act	Respecting	the	Duties	of	Justices	of	the	Peace,	Out	of	Sessions,	in	Relation	to	
Persons	Charged	with	Indictable	Offences,	SC	1869,	c	30.	54	Supra,	note	36	at	1-7.	55	Ibid.	56	Ibid.	57	R.	v	Phillips	(1947),	32	CR	App	Rep	47	(CCA)	[Phillips].	58	Ibid,	¶	48.	59	Ibid,	¶	49.	
		
	
14	
its	 distinguishable	 features,	 Justice	Trotter	 argues	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 decision	has	outgrown	the	intended	purpose.			The	 impact	 of	 Phillips	 was	 felt	 in	 Canada,	 where	 Crowns	 began	 relying	 on	 the	English	example	to	seek	detention	of	accused	persons	to	prevent	the	commission	of	further	 offences.	 In	 R.	 v	 Samuelson,60	a	 case	 involving	 breaking	 and	 entering	 by	accused	 persons	with	 records	 for	 similar	 offences,	 our	 courts	 –	 at	 least	 at	 first	 –	disagreed	 with	 Phillips.	 Samuelson	 saw	 this	 type	 of	 detention	 as	 preventative,	 a	concept	that	was	without	authority,	and	therefore	“disturbing”.61			Eventually,	 the	 Canadian	 courts	 accepted	 the	 “preventative”	 approach	 in	 various	cases,	 including	 assault	 causing	 bodily	 harm,62	theft,63		 and	 non-capital	 murder.64	Despite	 the	early	 criticism	of	Phillips	by	Canadian	 jurists,	 the	additional	 ground	of	detention	known	as	“prevention”	became	part	of	the	legislation.65		By	 the	 1960’s,	 research	 was	 being	 conducted	 that	 showed	 the	 bail	 system	 to	 be	fraught	 with	 difficulties,	 including	 a	 major	 concern	 that	 many	 accused	 were	suffering	 unnecessarily	 in	 pre-trial	 detention.66	Professor	 Martin	 Friedland	 was	particularly	critical	of	the	current	system,	and	completed	an	empirical	study	of	the	bail	procedures	in	the	Toronto	Magistrates’	Court.67		His	primary	concerns	were	that	attendance	 of	 accused	 persons	 could	 be	 secured	 by	 less	 intrusive	means,68	and	 a	concern	that	it	was	unfair	to	require	security	in	advance	as	a	condition	precedent	to	
																																																								60	R.	v	Samuelson	(1953),	109	CCC	253	(Nfld	TD).	61	Ibid,	at	256.	62	R.	v	Travers	(1963)	42	CR	21	(Que	QB).	63	R.	v	Lagus	(1964)	42	CR	288	(Sask	QB).	64	R.	v	Moses,	[1969]	4	CCC	307	(NWT	Terr	Ct).	65	Supra,	note	36	at	1-10.	66	Daniel	Kiselbach,	“Pre-Trial	Criminal	Procedure:	Preventative	Detention	and	the	Presumption	of	Innocence”	(1988)	31	CLQ	168	at	2.	67	M.L.	Friedland,	Detention	Before	Trial:	A	Study	of	Cases	Tried	in	the	Toronto	
Magistrates’	Courts	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1965).	68	Ibid,	at	43-44.	
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release.69	Most	concerning	was	the	“disturbing	relationship”	he	found	between	pre-trial	detention	and	the	outcome	of	trial.	As	Justice	Trotter	summarized	it:		 “…[Professor	 Friedland’s]	 study	 found	 that	 a	 detained	 accused	 was	 more	likely	 than	 his	 or	 her	 bailed	 counterpart	 to	 be	 convicted	 of	 the	 offence	charged.	 Furthermore,	 a	 detained	 person	 was	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 a	custodial	sentence.	Simply	put,	accused	persons	who	were	denied	bail	received	
more	jail,	more	often.”	(emphasis	is	mine)		Soon	 after	 Professor	 Friedland’s	 research,	 a	 report	 was	 created	 by	 the	 Canadian	Committee	 on	 Corrections,70	calling	 for	 a	 reduction	 in	 judicial	 discretion	 on	decisions	 of	 bail.	 Recommendations	 were	 also	 being	 offered	 by	 the	 Royal	Commission	 following	 their	 criticisms	 contained	 in	 their	 report. 71 	These	recommendations	were	accepted	and	 included	 in	 the	Criminal	Code,72	as	 the	result	of	Bill	(C-218)	which	came	into	force	in	1972	as	the	Bail	Reform	Act.73				The	Bail	Reform	Act	was	seen	as	a	complete	overhaul	and	codification	of	the	law	of	bail.74	In	 keeping	 with	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 and	 the	Canadian	Committee	on	Corrections,	a	number	of	changes	were	made.	Powers	were	given	 to	 police	 to	 release,	 avoiding	 unnecessary	 arrest	 and	 detention.75	Cash	deposits	 were	 restricted	 in	 use.76	Following	 the	 case	 law	 precedent	 first	 seen	 in	
Phillips,	a	“secondary	ground”	was	enumerated,	allowing	for	detention	in	the	public	interest	 and	 to	 prevent	 further	 offending.77	The	 onus	 of	 justifying	 detention	 was	
																																																								69	Ibid,	at	110.	70	C.M.	Powell,	“Arrest	and	Judicial	Interim	Release”	in	Addresses	Delivered	at	Seminar	by	the	Canadian	Bar	Association	at	the	Queen	Elizabeth	Hotel,	August	26,	1972	(Toronto:	Canada	Law	Book	Ltd.,	1973)	at	45.	 71	Royal	Commission	(Ontario),	Inquiry	into	Civil	Rights	(1968),	Vol.	2	(Chief	Justice	McRuer,	Commissioner).	72	Criminal	Code,	R.S.C.	1970,	c.	C-34:	now	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	C-46 	73	Bail	Reform	Act,	S.C.	1970-71-72,	c.	37	[the	“Bail	Reform	Act”].	74	Supra,	note	36	at	1-12.	75	Supra,	note	73	section	449-456.	76	Ibid,	section	457(2)(d).	77	Ibid,	section	457(7).		
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placed	on	the	prosecutor.78	Further,	procedures	were	codified	for	the	process	of	bail	hearings,79	bail	reviews,80	and	bail	pending	appeal.81	An	amended	version	of	the	Bail	
Reform	 Act	 came	 about	 four	 years	 later,82	shifting	 the	 onus	 of	 proof	 regarding	release	onto	the	accused	in	a	number	of	situations,83		and	also	expanding	the	scope	of	the	secondary	ground.84		The	 Bail	 Reform	Act	 has	 largely	 remained	 the	 law	 on	 bail	 in	 Canada,	 with	 some	exception.	One	exception	comes	from	the	amendments	made	to	offer	courts	a	“menu	of	conditions…	[which]	has	made	it	more	difficult	to	obtain	bail	and	has	resulted	in	more	stringent	 release	orders.”85	This	 trend	 is	 said	 to	have	 followed	 the	anti-gang	amendments	to	the	Criminal	Code,	as	well	as	the	legislation	that	followed	the	events	of	 September	 11,	 2001.86	The	 “tough	 on	 crime”	 trend	 in	 these	 amendments	 has	arguably	eroded	the	presumption	of	condition-less	bail,	initially	sparked	by	the	Bail	
Reform	Act	in	the	1970’s.87			In	terms	of	legislation,	two	further	pieces	should	be	considered.	First,	the	Canadian	
Bill	of	Rights88	specifically	addresses	bail	 in	section	2(f)	and	calls	 for	both	the	right	to	 be	 presumed	 innocent	 until	 proved	 guilty,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 “reasonable	 bail	without	just	cause”.89	Despite	being	legislation	that	still	remains	in	force,	the	Bill	of	
Rights	 does	 not	 get	 a	 lot	 of	 exercise	 in	 the	 courts.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 the	 second	remaining	legislation	that	deserves	recognition,	and	perhaps	the	most	litigated:	the	
																																																								78	Ibid,	section	457(1).	79	Ibid,	section	457.2	and	457.3.	80	Ibid,	section	457.5,	457.6,	and	680.	81	Ibid,	section	679.	82	Criminal	Law	Amendment	Act,	1975,	SC	1974-75-76,	c	93.	83	Ibid,	section	457(5.1).		84	Ibid,	section	457(7)(b).	85	Supra,	note	36	1-13.	86	Ibid.		87	Ibid,	at	1-14.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							88	Canadian	Bill	of	Rights	S.C.	1960,	c.	44	89	Ibid,	section	2(f).	
		
	
17	
Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms.90	Because	of	the	Charter,	courts	have	held	that	it	would	be	inappropriate	to	reassess	or	re-interpret	the	Bill	of	Rights.91			The	Charter	explicitly	protects	the	right	to	bail	in	section	11(e):			 “s.	11		 Any	person	charged	with	an	offence	has	the	right…		 	 …(e)	not	to	be	denied	reasonable	bail	without	just	cause.”92		Despite	its	express	promise,	the	Charter	was	initially	approached	with	caution	as	it	related	to	bail	because	of	the	heavy	lifting	thought	to	have	been	done	already	by	the	
Bail	 Reform	 Act.93	By	 the	 early	 1990’s,	 however,	 the	 courts	 were	 beginning	 to	acknowledge	the	potential	for	continuing	reform	that	the	Charter	could	offer.			In	a	group	of	cases	out	of	Quebec,94	courts	were	beginning	to	hear	and	apply	Charter	considerations	 with	more	 interest.	 One	 of	 these	 cases	 was	 taken	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	R.	v	Morales,95	which	 in	 combination	with	R.	v	Pearson,96	gave	 the	Court	its	first	opportunity	to	consider	section	11(e).	Led	by	Chief	Justice	Lamer,	the	Court	 provided	 a	 framework	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 bail	 and	 the	 Charter.	 His	decision	focused	on	the	presumption	of	innocence	as	the	most	important	feature	of	section	 11(e).	 The	 Court	 was	 required	 to	 consider	 this	 presumption	 against	 the	backdrop	of	the	facts	of	Pearson,	where	the	accused	was	being	detained	pursuant	to	a	 reverse-onus	 provision	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 section	 515(6)(d).	 Reverse-onus	provisions	 shift	 the	 onus	of	 showing	 cause	why	bail	 is	 justified	 to	 the	 accused,	 as																																																									90	Charter,	supra	note	22.	91	R.	v	Cornell	(1988),	40	CCC	(3d)	385	(SCC)	at	391-392;	R.	v	Beauregard	(1986),	30	DLR	(4th)	481	(SCC)	at	506;	and	R.	v	Lauzon	(1992),	73	CCC	(3d)	52	(Ont	CA)	at	58-59.		92	Charter,	supra	note	22	section	11(e).	93	Supra,	note	36	at	1-18.	94	R.	v	Lamothe	(1990),	58	CCC	(3d)	530	(Que	CA);	R.	v	Gervais	(1988)	42	CCC	(3d)	352	(Que	SC);	R.	v	Perron	(1989),	51	CCC	(3d)	518	(Que	CA);	R.	v	Morales	(February	1,	1991),	(Que	SC)	[unreported].		95	R.	v	Morales	(1992),	17	CR	(4th)	74	(SCC)	[Morales].	96	R.	v	Pearson	(1992),	17	CR	(4th)	1	(SCC)	[Pearson].	
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opposed	to	requiring	the	Crown	to	show	cause	why	bail	is	not	justified.	In	Pearson,	the	 majority	 held	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 section	 515(6)(d)	 was	 to	 dilute	 the	 basic	entitlement	to	bail.	They	found	the	same	applied	to	section	515(6)(a)	in	Morales.97	Two	considerations	were	delineated	 in	Pearson:98	that	 the	 restriction	on	 the	basic	entitlement	to	bail	is	permissible	if	two	conditions	are	present.	Firs,	bail	must	only	be	 denied	 in	 a	 narrow	 set	 of	 circumstances.	 Second,	 the	 denial	 of	 bail	 must	 be	necessary	 to	 promote	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	 bail	 system,	 and	 is	 not	undertaken	 for	 any	 purpose	 extraneous	 to	 the	 bail	 system.	 Applying	 this	 to	 the	reverse	onus	provisions,	it	was	held	that	they	did	not	infringe	section	11(e),	as	the	effect	of	the	provision	was	to	“…establish	a	set	of	special	bail	rules	in	circumstances	where	the	normal	bail	process	is	incapable	of	functioning	properly.”99			Of	interest	is	the	minority	decision	in	Pearson,	written	by	Justice	McLachlin	(as	she	then	 was).	 Her	 decision	 was	 concurred	 with	 by	 Justice	 La	 Forest.	 The	 facts	 of	
Pearson	had	the	Court	considering	reverse-onus	provisions	relating	to	the	charge	of	drug	 trafficking.	 Justice	McLachlin	 dissented,	 finding	 that	 the	 provision	was	 over-broad	 as	 it	 captured	 both	 large-scale	 traffickers,	 and	 small-time	 dealers	 alike.100	Because	 of	 its	 overbreadth,	 she	 found	 it	 was	 not	 saved	 by	 section	 1.101	This	dissenting	 opinion	 is	 of	 particular	 note	 because	 nearly	 thirty	 years	 later,	 reverse	onus	provisions	are	still	contained	in	the	Criminal	Code	today,	despite	the	passage	of	time,	 continued	 opposition	 to	 these	 provisions,	 and	 opportunity	 for	 others	 to	 re-litigate	the	issue.102			The	second	case	we	noted,	Morales,	was	significant	 for	 its	own	reasons.	The	Court	had	to	consider	the	provision	under	section	515(10)(b)	of	the	Criminal	Code,	which																																																									97	Morales,	supra	note	95	at	103.	98	Pearson,	supra	note	96	¶	60.	99	Ibid.	100	Ibid,	¶	68-72.	101	Ibid,	¶	72.	102	There	have	been	some	legislated	amendments	to	these	provisions:	see	SC	1997,	c	18.	
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allows	 for	pre-trial	detention	 that	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 “public	 interest”	because	of	 a	concern	 that	 the	 accused	may	 commit	 further	 offences	while	 on	 bail.	 This	 idea	 of	detention	 in	 the	public	 interest,	often	referred	to	as	preventative	detention,	 is	one	that	 will	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 our	 discussions	 relating	 to	 the	 intersection	 of	mental	 health	 and	 bail.	 Therefore,	 a	 review	 of	 Morales	 and	 the	 path	 that	preventative	bail	has	taken	is	warranted.		
2.1.iii	Detention	Necessary	in	the	Public	Interest		
Morales	 required	 the	 Court	 to	 employ	 the	 two-factor	 test	 from	 Pearson	 in	determining	 whether	 section	 515(10)(b),	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 detain	 in	 the	 “public	interest”,	was	constitutional.	The	Court	in	Morales	considered	11(e)	as	it	related	to	the	use	of	the	term	“public	interest”	in	section	515(10)(b).	While	the	Court	split	on	this	 analysis,	 Chief	 Justice	 Lamer	 for	 the	majority	 ruled	 that	 it	was	 impermissibly	vague,	and	could	not	be	saved	by	Section	1.	As	such,	the	Court	severed	the	words	“or	in	 the	 public	 interest”	 from	 the	 section,	 and	 declined	 to	 strike	 down	 the	 entire	paragraph.103		The	Court	was	unanimous	in	agreeing	that	the	section	was	otherwise	constitutional,	as	 it	 engaged	 the	 “just	 cause”	 component	 of	 section	 11(e)	 of	 the	 Charter.	 In	considering	the	first	factor	in	Pearson,	the	Court	found	that	section	515(10)(b)	only	allowed	bail	 to	be	denied	 in	 specific	 circumstances	because	of	 the	 requirement	of	there	 being	 a	 “substantial	 likelihood”	 of	 the	 accused	 committing	 an	 offence.104	Perhaps	more	surprisingly,	in	their	analysis	of	the	second	Pearson	factor,	the	Court	found	that	the	rule	was	consistent	with	the	objectives	of	the	bail	system	as	it	focused	on	 preventing	 pre-trial	 criminal	 conduct.105	This	 was	 thought	 by	 many	 to	 be	unsettling,	as	“[t]he	Court	was	not	troubled	by	the	fragility	of	predictions	of	further	criminality…”.106																																																										103	Morales,	supra	note	95	at	102-103.	104	Ibid,	at	98.	105	Ibid,	at	99.	106	Supra,	note	36	at	1-23.		
		
	
20	
	Five	years	after	Morales,	Parliament	amended	section	515(10)	in	1997	in	such	a	way	that	 it	had	the	effect	of	reintroducing	“the	public	 interest”	ground	for	detention.107	Instead	of	re-adding	it	to	the	secondary	ground,	Parliament	gave	it	its	own	ground,	which	 has	 since	 become	 known	 as	 the	 “tertiary	 ground”	 for	 detention.108		 At	 the	time,	the	section	read	as	follows:		 s.	515(10)	For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	the	detention	of	an	accused	is		justified	only	on	one	or	more	of	the	following	grounds…		…	 (c)	 on	 any	other	 just	 cause	being	 shown	and	without	 limiting	 the	generality	of	the	foregoing	where	the	detention	is	necessary	in	order	to	maintain	confidence	in	the	administration	of	justice,	having	regard	to	 all	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 including	 the	 apparent	 strength	 of	 the	prosecution’s	 case,	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence,	 the	circumstances	 surrounding	 its	 commission	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 a	lengthy	term	of	imprisonment.			This	 new	 ground	 for	 detention	 provided	 for	 renewed	 litigation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	“public	interest”,	and	made	its	way	back	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	again	in	R.	
v	Hall.109		
Hall	 was	 about	 a	man	 charged	with	 the	 second	 degree	murder	 of	 a	 relative.	 The	victim	was	 stabbed	 37	 times,	 and	 there	were	 signs	 of	 attempted	 decapitation.	He	was	 detained	 following	 a	 show	 cause	 hearing	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 tertiary	 ground	found	in	section	515(10)(c).	In	coming	to	this	conclusion,	the	bail	Judge	considered	the	brutality	of	the	crime,	the	strength	of	the	evidence	against	Hall,	and	the	fear	in	the	community,	coming	mostly	from	the	victim’s	family.110		
																																																								107	Criminal	Law	Improvement	Act,	1996,	SC	1997,	c	18,	s	59.	108	The	“primary	ground”	is	found	in	section	515(10)(a),	and	considers	whether	the	accused	will	appear	for	court.	The	“secondary	ground”	is	found	in	section	515(10)(b),	which	considers	whether	there	is	a	substantial	likelihood	of	the	accused	reoffending.	Thus,	section	515(10)(c)	is	referred	to	as	the	“tertiary	ground”.	109	R.	v.	Hall	(2002),	167	CCC	(3d)	449	(SCC)	[Hall].	110Supra,	note	36	at	1-28.	
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The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada’s	consideration	of	Hall	required	them	to	look	at	this	new	provision	to	determine	whether	it	withheld	Pearson	scrutiny.	The	majority,	led	by	 Chief	 Justice	 McLachlin,	 held	 that	 certain	 phrases	 within	 the	 provision	 were	invalid,	 but	 the	 remainder	 was	 constitutional.	 Specifically,	 they	 invalidated	 the	phrase	 “any	 other	 just	 cause”,	 as	 it	 was	 seen	 to	 confer	 an	 open-ended	 judicial	discretion	 to	refuse	bail,	 and	as	such	was	unconstitutional.111	The	phrase	 “without	limiting	the	generality	of	the	foregoing”	was	also	found	to	be	unconstitutional,	and	severed	this	too	from	the	rest	of	the	section.	The	remaining	wording	was	allowed	to	stand	 on	 its	 own.112	Justice	 McLachlin	 was	 careful	 to	 point	 out	 that	 section	515(10)(c)	 was	 not	 a	 “catch-all”	 for	 cases	 where	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	grounds	 had	 failed.	 She	 found	 it	 to	 be	 its	 own	 distinct	 ground.113	The	 majority	decision	in	Hall	gave	the	impression	that	the	Supreme	Court	was	moving	towards	a	less	liberty-friendly	approach	to	bail.				Justice	 Iacobucci	 dissented	 vigorously,	 and	 would	 have	 struck	 down	 the	 entire	provision.	His	position	was	that	the	heart	of	a	free	and	democratic	society	included	the	right	to	the	bail,	thus	respecting	the	presumption	of	innocence.		He	did	not	agree	that	 the	 tertiary	 ground	 respected	 these	 basic	 concepts.	 In	 his	 dissent,	 he	 quoted	from	 the	 large	 body	 of	 empirical	work	 that	 confirmed	 the	 disturbing	 relationship	between	 pre-trial	 detention	 and	 conviction	 that	 we	 have	 previously	 discussed.114	Justice	 Iacobucci	 found	 that	 both	 Pearson	 factors	 were	 not	 satisfied	 by	 the	 new	provision.	 He	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 previous	 five	 years	 since	 the	 Court	 had	 struck	down	 the	 “public	 interest”	 portion	 of	 section	 515(10)(b)	 had	 not	 seen	 any	 new	indications	 that	 the	 current	 bail	 system	 was	 inadequate.115	In	 addition	 to	 Justice	Iacobucci’s	 disagreement	with	 the	majority	 decision,	Hall	 has	 also	 been	 criticized	harshly	by	academic	commentators,	with	Professor	Don	Stuart	going	as	far	as	to	call	
																																																								111	Hall,	supra	note	109	at	456.	112	Ibid,	at	467.	113	Ibid,	at	462.		114	Ibid,	at	469-472.	115	Ibid,	at	479.	
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it	 “deeply	 disappointing”. 116 	Concerns	 were	 raised	 that	 it	 would	 cause	 a	disproportionate	 impact	 on	 visible	 minorities	 and	 the	 poor.	 This	 is	 because	 the	broad	wording	allowed	for	racist	and	discriminatory	views	to	be	hidden	under	the	language	of	a	tertiary	ground	detention	order,	despite	the	majority’s	finding	that	the	section	was	not	overly	broad.117	In	other	words,	there	is	great	concern	among	many	in	 the	 legal	community	 that	 the	Supreme	Court	got	 it	wrong	 in	Hall.	Arguably,	 the	impact	 of	 the	 tertiary	 ground’s	 impact	 has	 also	 been	 felt	 by	 mentally	 ill	 accused	resulting	 from	 arbitrary	 detention	 for	mental	 health	 concerns	 disguised	 as	 public	interest.	 As	we	will	 explore	 later,	 the	 answer	 to	 these	 concerns	 can	 be	 remedied	without	the	need	for	detention.		Section	515(10)(c)	has	since	been	revisited	once	more	in	R.	v	St-Cloud.118	Here,	the	Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 clarified	 aspects	 of	 its	 previous	 ruling	 in	Hall.	 Notably,	they	explained	 that	 “detention	may	be	 justified	only	 in	rare	cases”	did	not	mean	a	bail	court	must	make	a	finding	that	the	case	before	them	is	“rare”	in	order	to	detain	on	 the	 tertiary	 ground.	 Instead,	 St.	 Cloud	 explained	 the	 reference	 to	 “rare”	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	application	of	section	515(10)(c)	itself,	meaning	very	few	cases	should	or	would	have	a	tertiary	ground	detention	component.	It	is	likely	that	this	is	a	distinction	without	a	difference.			The	 evolution	 of	 our	 bail	 grounds	 has	 allowed	 for	 “preventative”	 detention.	 This	concept	 of	 preventative	 detention	 has	 been	 explored	 by	 many	 theorists.	 It	 is	 a	problematic	concept,	one	which	we	will	explore	below.	Its	impact	in	cases	involving	mentally	ill	persons	is	also	concerning.	This	is	because	mentally	ill	persons	are	more	likely	 to	 be	 seen	 by	 bail	 courts	 as	 unreliable	 and	 unpredictable,	 which	 leads	 to	arguments	 often	 being	 made	 by	 Crown	 Attorneys	 that	 the	 accused	 should	 be	
																																																								116	Don	Stuart,	Charter	Justice	in	Canadian	Criminal	Law,	5th	ed	(Toronto:	Carswell,	2010)	at	447.	117	Ibid,	at	449-450.	118	R.	v	St-Cloud	(2015),	321	CCC	(3d)	307	(SCC)	[St-Cloud].	
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detained	 for	 preventative	 reasons	 under	 the	 secondary	 and	 sometimes	 tertiary	grounds.119	As	such,	we	turn	now	to	a	discussion	of	preventative	detention.		
2.2	Preventing	Future	Crime	through	Pre-Trial	Detention	In	the	days	since	the	Bail	Reform	Act,	there	are	certainly	positive	advances	that	have	been	made	to	our	bail	system.	As	just	one	obvious	example,	Canada	does	not	suffer	from	 the	 discriminatory	 and	 harshly	 criticized	 money	 bail	 system	 seen	 in	 many	states	 in	 the	United	States.120	Cash	deposits	 for	bail	have	been	studied	extensively	there,	 and	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 disproportionately	 affect	 the	 poor,	 and	 racialized	minorities.121	We	also	no	longer	suffer	from	the	broad	discretion	of	courts	at	the	bail	level	 that	 was	 allowed	 under	 the	 former	 system,	 which	 lacked	 a	 mechanism	 to	review	 those	 decisions.	 The	 right	 to	 review	 a	 bail	 decision	 has	 now	 been	 a	consistent	 right	 of	 accused	 persons,	 and	 ensures	 that	 bail	 courts	 are	 held	accountable	 for	 their	 decisions	 in	 a	 way	 that	 requires	 reasoned	 principles	 for	detention.			Canada’s	current	bail	system	is	not	worthy	of	all	praise	though.	In	fact,	despite	the	efforts	 and	 good	 intentions	 of	 the	 Bail	 Reform	 Act,	 our	 bail	 system	 remains	significantly	 challenged,	 criticized,	 and	 in	need	of	 repair.	 It	 has	been	described	by	many	 in	 negative	 terms,	 such	 as	 “broken”,	 “failing”	 and	 “inequitable”.122	There																																																									119	The	unreliability	of	some	mentally	ill	persons	is	also	referenced	by	Crown	Attorneys	in	bail	court	to	try	and	secure	detention	under	the	primary	ground.	120	For	a	few	examples	of	critiques	of	the	American	system,	see:	Justine	Olderman,	“Fixing	New	York’s	Broken	Bail	System”	(2012)	16	CUNY	Law		Review	9;		Jocelyn	Simonson,	“Bail	Nullification”	(2017)	115	Michigan	Law	Review;		Cynthia	Jones,	“Give	Us	Free:	Addressing	Racial	Disparities	in	Bail	Determinations”		(2013)	301	Articles	in	Law	Reviews	&	Other	Academic	Journals;		Curtis	E.	Karnow,	“Setting	Bail	for	Public	Safety”	(2008)	13	Berkeley	Journal	of		Criminal	Justice	1;	and		Patricia	A.	Reed,	“Pretrial	Bail:	A	Deprivation	Of	Liberty	Or	Property	With	Due		Process	of	Law”	(1983)	40	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	1575.	121	Ibid.	122	See:		
		
	
24	
remains	 consistent	 call	 for	 reform	 to	 our	 current	 bail	 system,	 with	 many	 critics	viewing	risk	aversion	as	an	ongoing	plague	in	our	system.123	The	main	complaint	of	many	of	 these	 critics	 is	 this	 concept	 of	 preventative	 justice,	 the	 idea	 of	 bail	 being	denied	because	of	the	speculative	fear	that	they	may	commit	future	offences.			Preventative	justice	means	that	legally	innocent	persons	are	at	risk	of	being	held	in	custody.	 The	 idea	 of	 preventative	 justice	 has	 been	widely	 studied.	 Those	who	 are	advocates	 for	 this	 kind	 of	 justice	 argue	 that	 specific	 complainants	 or	 victims,	 and	society	 in	 general,	 are	 better	 off	when	 an	 accused	 is	 incapacitated	 such	 that	 they	cannot	commit	further	offences.124	Problems	with	this	argument	include	that	not	all	accused	are	charged	with	violent	crime,	and	that	at	the	bail	stage,	the	state	has	not	yet	proven	they	are	even	guilty	of	anything.		These	 concerns	 become	 even	 more	 intensified	 when	 one	 remembers	 that	 the	standard	 for	 proof	 of	 a	 crime	 is	 only	 “beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt”.	 Because	 our																																																																																																																																																																						John	Howard	Society	of	Ontario,	Reasonable	Bail?,	(Toronto,	2013);		Department	of	Justice	Canada,	"Broken	Bail"	in	Canada:	How	We	Might	Go	About		
Fixing	It,	(Ottawa,	2015);		Ontario,	Ministry	of	the	Attorney	General,	Bail	and	Remand	in	Ontario,	Raymond		Wyant	auth.	(Toronto,	2016);		Canadian	Civil	Liberties	Association	and	Education	Trust,	Set	up	to	Fail:	Bail	and	the		
Revolving	Door	of	Pre-Trial	Detention,	(2014);		Martin	L.	Friedland,	"The	Bail	Reform	Act	Revisited"	(2012)	16:3	Can.	Crim.	L.	Rev.		315;		Legal	Aid	Ontario,	A	Legal	Aid	Strategy	for	Bail,	(Toronto,	2016);		Nicole	Myers,	"Shifting	Risk:	Bail	and	the	Use	of	Sureties"	(2009)	21:1	Current		Issues	in	Crim.	J.	127;		Benjamin	L.	Berger	&	James	Stribopoulos,	"Risk	and	the	Role	of	the	Judge:	Lessons		from	Bail",	in	Benjamin	Berger,	Emma	Cunliffe	&	James	Stribopoulos	eds.,	To	
Ensure	that	Justice	is	Done:	Essays	in	Memory	of	Marc	Rosenberg	(Toronto:	Thompson	Reuters,	2017).	123	Cheryl	Marie	Webster,	Anthony	N.	Doob,	and	Nicole	M.	Myers,	"The	Parable	of	Ms.	Baker:	Understanding	Pre-Trial	Detention	in	Canada"	(2009),	21	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	79.	124	Frederick	Schauer,	“The	Ubiquity	of	Prevention”	in	Andrea	Ashworth	et	al,	eds,	
Prevention	and	the	Limits	of	the	Criminal	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013)	10	at	12.		
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standard	of	proof	 is	not	one	of	 certainty,	people	will	 find	 themselves	 convicted	of	crimes	who	have	not	necessarily	committed	one.	The	standard	is	even	less	exacting	at	 the	bail	 stage,	 and	 thus,	more	problematic	as	 it	 relates	 to	detaining	 legally,	 and	potentially	factually,	innocent	persons.	As	RA	Duff	has	written,	“…pre-trial	remand	is	pre-emptive	rather	than	defensive;	it	coerces	a	defendant	before	he	has	the	chance	to	 decide	whether	 to	 abscond	 or	 otherwise	 offend.”125	These	 kinds	 of	 speculative	detentions	should	not	be	allowed.			Preventing	 future	 crime	 is	 a	 laudable	 goal.	 Most	 people	 agree	 that	 crime	 is	 not	something	 we	 want	 in	 our	 community.	 The	 real	 challenge,	 though,	 comes	 from	knowing	how	to	prevent	 it,	 since	most	of	us	do	not	have	 the	ability	 to	predict	 the	future.	 Bail	 judges,	 sadly,	 are	 not	 immune	 to	 this	 shortcoming.	 Innocent	 persons	become	entangled	in	the	system	despite	their	innocence.	For	those	who	are	in	fact	guilty	of	 their	charges,	 the	system	 is	doing	 little	 to	address	 the	root	cause	of	 their	criminality.	In	cases	of	mentally	ill	offenders,	this	becomes	increasingly	challenging.	Whether	 it	 is	a	personality	disorder,	mood	disorder,	or	addiction	disorder,	mental	health	is	precarious,	making	it	difficult	to	predict.	When	courts	are	asked	to	assess	the	 likelihood	 of	 future	 criminality	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	mentally	 ill	 accused,	 they	 are	often	being	asked	to	determine	whether	someone	is	releasable	while	knowing	very	little	information	about	their	disorder	-	if	it	has	even	been	diagnosed	at	all.	They	are	asked	whether	a	plan	can	be	fashioned	that	is	strong	enough	to	safe-guard	from	the	chances	of	the	person	continuing	their	alleged	criminality.	To	add	to	the	difficulties,	they	are	asked	to	do	all	of	this	without	the	power	or	authority	to	order	any	further	assessments	or	 treatment	 for	 the	accused	–	even	where	 the	accused	 is	 sometimes	begging	for	help	and	would	consent	to	such	an	order.			Let	us	return	to	the	primary	ground	for	a	moment.	We	must	also	remember	that	bail	courts	are	concerned	about	the	ability	of	an	accused	person	to	get	back	to	court	for																																																									125	RA	Duff,	“Pre-Trial	Detention	and	the	Presumption	of	Innocence”	in	Andrea	Ashworth	et	al,	eds,	Prevention	and	the	Limits	of	the	Criminal	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013)	115	at	119.	
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their	appearances.	 In	 this	way,	knowing	more	about	 their	 illness	 is	also	helpful	 to	satisfy	 the	 primary	 grounds.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 person	 has	 challenges	 with	remembering	dates	on	account	of	their	mental	disorder,	then	the	Court	will	want	to	be	 assured	 that	 there	 is	 some	 way	 they	 will	 remember	 their	 future	 court	 date.	Perhaps	 keeping	 a	 calendar	 is	 the	 simple	 answer,	 or	 if	 the	 person	 has	 a	 support	worker	 in	 the	 community,	 the	 concern	 can	 be	 mitigated.	 The	 primary	 ground	concerns	 are	 undoubtedly	 affected	 by	 the	 mental	 health	 of	 the	 accused	 person	before	 the	 court.	 	 Arguably,	 though,	 the	 risk	 of	 re-offending	 is	 where	 most	 bail	courts	 will	 be	 concerned	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 mentally	 ill	 accused	 persons,	 and	 so	understanding	 the	 context	 in	 which	 we	 currently	 view	 preventative	 detention	 is	helpful.		
2.2.i	The	Presumption	of	Innocence	is	Not	Absolute	Situations	other	 than	bail	 considerations	have	required	our	courts	 to	consider	 the	liberty	interests	of	Canadian	citizens.	For	example,	in	the	context	of	mandatory	jail	sentences	 for	 absolute	 liability	 offences,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 found	 in	
Reference	 Re:	 BC	Motor	 Vehicle	 Act126	that	 individual	 rights	 had	 to	 be	 considered	against	the	claim	for	the	greater	good.127	The	Court	held:	“It	has	from	time	immemorial	been	part	of	our	system	of	laws	that	the	innocent	not	be	punished.	This	principle	has	long	been	recognized	as	an	essential	element	of	a	system	for	the	administration	of	justice	which	is	founded	upon	a	belief	in	the	dignity	and	worth	of	the	human	person	and	on	the	rule	of	law.”			Through	protection	of	individual	rights,	this	decision	ensured	the	greater	good.128	Scholars,	like	Professor	Martin	Friedland,	have	also	provided	insight	into	the	importance	of	liberty,	stating	that	"the	law	should	abhor	any	unnecessary	deprivation	of	liberty	and	positive	steps	should	be	taken	to	ensure	that	detention	before	trial	is	kept	to	a	minimum.129																																																										126	Re	B.C.	Motor	Vehicle	Act,	[1985]	2	SCR	486	(SCC)	[Reference].	127	Supra,	note	66	at	5.	128	Ibid.	129	See:	R.	v	Zarinchang,	2010	ONCA	286.	
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In	the	context	of	bail	rights,	courts	are	constantly	reminded	of	 the	presumption	of	innocence	as	the	backdrop	for	their	decision.	The	right	to	be	secure	from	detention	prior	 to	 conviction	 is	 concentrated	 on	 the	 accused’s	 status	 as	 a	 legally	 innocent	person.130	Legal	innocence	must	be	kept	squarely	in	focus.	The	person	may	well	be	guilty	of	the	offence,	but	the	court	must	still	treat	them	as	if	they	are	innocent	when	determining	bail	–	and	for	good	reason.	The	research	is	clear	about	the	real	impact	that	pre-trial	detention	can	have	on	an	accused	person,	 including	 loss	of	 their	 job,	stigmatization,	 an	 inability	 to	prepare	 their	 case,	 and	also	a	 troubling	 incentive	 to	plead	 guilty	 instead	 of	 waiting	 for	 trial.131	Jocelyn	 Simonson	 has	 written	 that	“[s]tudies	 have	 shown	 time	 and	 time	 again	 that	 pretrial	 detention	 increases	 the	chances	 of	 a	 conviction,	 extends	 the	probable	 length	of	 a	 sentence,	 and	decreases	the	 chance	 that	 the	 charges	 will	 be	 dismissed	 altogether.”132	The	 presumption	 of	innocence	must	therefore	be	central	to	the	question	of	bail	so	to	avoid	the	damaging	consequences	of	pre-trial	detention	in	the	event	the	accused	is	actually	innocent.			The	United	States	has	also	struggled	with	this	issue,	seen	predominantly	in	the	case	of	United	States	v	Salerno.133	Dealing	with	 a	 less-than	 sympathetic	 accused	person,	the	 court	was	 required	 to	 determine	whether	Mr.	 Salerno	 –	 an	 alleged	New	York	mafia	boss	–	should	be	granted	bail.	 In	a	split	decision,	the	minority	held	that	pre-trial	 detention	 for	 a	 “preventative”	purpose	was	punitive,	 and	 that	 it	 violated	due	process.	 They	 felt	 that	 preventative	 detention,	 as	 a	 justification	 to	 deny	 bail,	 lost	sight	of	the	fact	that	a	charge	is	only	evidence	that	the	person	will	be	tried	–	not	that	they	have	done	anything	criminal,	or	as	evidence	of	their	likelihood	to	do	something	criminal	again	if	released.134	The	majority,	however,	justified	preventative	detention	as	 a	 regulatory	 necessity,	 not	 as	 a	 punitive	 function.	 They	 focused	 on	 crime																																																									130	Ibid.	131	Ibid,	at	16;	see	also	Christopher	Sherrin,	“Excessive	Pre-Trial	Incarceration”	(2012)	75	Saskatchewan	Law	Review	55-96	at	1;	and	Jocelyn	Simonson,	“Bail	Nullification”	(2017)	115	Michigan	Law	Review	at	585	and	589.	132	Simonson,	ibid	at	589.	133	United	States	v	Salerno,	107	S.	Ct.	2095,	95	L	Ed	2d	697	(1987)	[Salerno].	 	134	Supra,	note	66	at	2.		
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prevention	as	a	 legitimate	aim	of	 the	 law,	 and	 thus	allowed	detention	 to	 continue	occurring	on	this	ground.	The	majority	may	have	erroneously	concentrated	on	the	particular	background	of	 this	 accused,	Mr.	 Salerno.	 It	 is	 an	 interesting	question	 to	posit	whether	their	decision	would	have	been	the	same	were	the	accused	person	a	more	palatable	individual.	The	result,	regardless	of	the	characteristics	of	Mr.	Salerno	himself,	 was	 the	 ongoing	 pervasiveness	 of	 a	 culture	 of	 risk-aversion	 and	 crime	prevention	 now	 being	 applied	 to	 all	 accused	 persons	 –	 even	 those	 who	were	 far	from	being	a	mafia	boss.		
Salerno	was	decided	in	1987,	at	a	time	when	the	Canadian	courts	had	not	yet	been	required	to	consider	the	issue	as	it	related	to	our	own	similar	ground	for	detention.	Despite	 the	 acknowledgment	 by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 that	 the	 U.S	Constitution	and	the	Charter	are	materially	different	at	times,135	it	 is	 interesting	to	realize	 that	Canada	has	 continued	 to	uphold	 the	 secondary	 ground	 -	 a	 ground	 for	detention	very	similar	to	that	considered	in	the	United	States.		It	was	shortly	after	Salerno,	 in	1992,	 that	Canada	saw	the	secondary	ground	come	under	scrutiny	in	the	Morales136	case	that	we	have	already	explored.	Under	section	515(10)(b),137	detention	 is	allowed	 if	 the	accused	poses	a	substantial	 likelihood	of	committing	 a	 new	offence.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 secondary	 ground,	 like	 the	 ground	under	which	Salerno	was	detained	in	the	American	context,	is	to	disallow	the	release	of	an	accused	out	of	fear	that	they	will	commit	another	crime	–	even	if	that	crime	is	simply	breaching	the	court’s	bail	order.			The	secondary	ground	has	led	to	a	watering	down	of	the	presumption	of	innocence.	This	dilution	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	is	the	position	that	is	advanced	by	the	minority	 in	 Salerno.	 Because	 at	 least	 some	 Justices	 in	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	Court	could	see	this	argument,	 it	 is	surprising	that	not	even	one	Supreme	Court	of																																																									135	R.	v.	Smith	(1987),	34	C.C.C.	(3d)	97	at	141.	 	136	Morales,	supra	note	95.		137	Supra,	note	5	s.	515(10)(b).	
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Canada	 Justice	 dissented	 on	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 tertiary	 ground	 provision	after	 removal	 of	 the	 words	 “in	 the	 public	 interest”	 in	Morales.	 Instead,	 all	 of	 the	Justices	of	the	Canadian	court	agreed	that	it	was	a	legitimate	aim	of	the	legislature	to	prevent	crime	 -	much	 like	 the	majority	 found	 in	Salerno.	 In	 the	end,	 it	has	 left	 the	provincial	 bail	 courts	 with	 an	 unenviable	 task:	 how	 to	 determine	 when	 one	 is	“substantially	likely”	to	reoffend.		As	alluded	 to	earlier,	 this	 task	 is	difficult	because	of	 the	problems	associated	with	predicting	future	criminal	activity.	In	the	context	of	mentally	ill	persons,	it	has	been	said	 that	 “[m]ental	 health	 professionals	 erroneously	 predict	 dangerousness	 up	 to	95%	of	the	time.	Judges	are	unlikely	to	be	better	predictors.”138	In	R.	v	Lyons,139	the	court	 recognized	 that	 psychiatric	 evidence	 can	 be	 notoriously	 inaccurate	 in	 its	attempt	 to	 forecast	 future	 violent	 behavior.	 The	 Court	 in	Morales	 was	 confronted	with	the	argument	that	it	is	difficult	to	predict	future	behavior,	but	still	did	not	find	the	secondary	ground	resultantly	problematic.	They	held	that	“the	 impossibility	of	making	exact	predictions	does	not	preclude	a	bail	system	which	aims	to	deny	bail	to	those	who	will	likely	be	dangerous.”140	Instead,	they	contented	themselves	with	the	review	provisions	provided	in	the	bail	process	for	those	who	are	ordered	detained.			
2.2.ii	Is	Substantial	Likelihood	Measurable?	So	then,	how	do	we	measure	“substantial	likelihood”	under	the	secondary	ground?	Not	surprisingly,	the	Courts	struggled	with	this	in	early	days.	They	defined	the	term	by	 substituting	 other	 words	 like	 “real”	 likelihood.141	They	 have	 revisited	 the	question	several	 times,	 including	a	recent	pronouncement	 in	R.	v	Young142	in	2010	that:	 “…the	likelihood	of	a	particular	risk	materializing	cannot	be	looked	at	in	the	abstract.	Rather,	it	must	be	weighed	against	the	gravity	of	the	harm	that	will																																																									138	Supra,	note	66	at	8.	139	R.	v.	Lyons,	[1987]	2	SCR	309	at	99.	140	Morales,	supra	note	95	at	108.	141	R.	v	Moore	(1973),	16	CCC	(2d)	286	(Ont	Dist	Ct)	at	291.		142	R.	v	Young,	2010	ONSC	4194	[Young].	
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ensue	if	the	risk	comes	to	pass.	For	example,	even	a	very	grave	risk	that	an	incorrigible	petty	thief	will	shoplift	again	if	granted	bail	is	one	that	the	court	might	be	willing	to	 take	when	balanced	against	 the	accused’s	constitutional	right	 to	 reasonable	 bail.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	where	 the	 anticipated	 harm	 is	very	 grave,	 a	 more	 remote	 risk	 may	 be	 sufficient	 to	 meet	 the	 test	 of	substantial	likelihood.”143		Justice	Trotter	points	out	that	a	standard	that	is	too	low	will	fail	to	satisfy	the	“just	cause”	requirement	under	the	Charter	that	bail	can	only	be	denied	in	a	narrow	set	of	circumstances.	 If	 the	standard	 is	held	 too	high,	 it	would	undermine	 the	 finding	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	that	our	inability	to	predict	future	behavior	is	not	an	issue	 to	 worry	 ourselves	 about.	 Instead,	 he	 suggests	 the	 proper	 and	 accepted	approach	to	be	the	“enhanced	balance	of	probabilities	standard”.144				
2.2.iii		Making	Bail:	A	Laddered	Approach	Despite	the	fact	that	the	three	grounds	of	detention	have	been	in	existence	in	their	current	 format	 for	 years	 now,	 our	 courts	 continue	 to	 struggle	with	 this	 at	 a	 very	practical	 level.	 The	 concept	 of	 reasonable	 bail	 may	 seem	 straight-forward	 when	discussed	 in	 the	 abstract,	 but	 it	 becomes	 complicated	 in	 application	 to	 a	 real-life	accused	person	standing	before	the	court.	This	is	because	every	accused	person	will	present	with	unique	challenges,	different	backgrounds,	varied	charges,	and	differing	abilities	 to	put	 together	a	bail	plan.	The	variables	are	endless,	 and	 therefore,	 each	bail	decision	is	a	fact-driven	inquiry.		To	 assist	 with	 this	 exercise,	 there	 are	 different	 levels	 of	 bail	 plans	 available	 to	accused	 persons.	 The	 levels,	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 “rungs	 on	 a	 ladder”,145	become	increasingly	 onerous.	 This	 is	 in	 keeping	 with	 section	 515(3),	 which	 requires	 the	court	to	release	the	accused	person	on	the	least	onerous	form	of	release	unless	the																																																									143	Ibid,	¶	21.	144	Supra,	note	36	at	3-15.	See	also	R.	v	Quick,	[1984]	OJ	No	1364	(HC)	¶	27;	R.	v	Link	(1990),	105	AR	160	(CA);	R.	v	Braun	(1994),	91	CCC	3(d)	237	(Sask	CA)	at	253;	and	
R.	v	Le	(2006),	240	CCC	(3d)	130	(Man	CA)	at	138.	145	R.	v	Antic,	2017	SCC	27	[Antic]. 	
		
	
31	
Crown	 can	 show	why	 that	 should	 not	 be	 the	 case.146	Starting	with	 a	 Summons	 to	appear,	 issued	without	 conditions	by	police,	 all	 the	way	up	 to	a	 residential	 surety	bail	 with	 house	 arrest	 requirements,	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 liberty	 afforded	 to	accused	persons	can	vary	greatly.	This	variation	allows	courts	to	have	the	flexibility	needed	 to	 fashion	 bail	 terms	 that	 address	 the	 three	 potential	 grounds	 of	 bail	concerns.	The	following	diagram	is	illustrative	of	these	increasingly	onerous	rungs:		
			From	time	to	time,	it	seems	bail	courts	need	a	reminder	that	bail	terms	are	to	be	the	least	onerous	necessary	to	meet	the	concerns	raised	by	either	of	the	three	grounds.	Most	 recently,	 these	 reminders	 have	 come	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 R.	 v	 Antic147	from	 the	
																																																								146	Ibid,	¶	4.	147	Ibid.	
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Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 in	 2017,	 and	R.	v	Tunney148	from	 the	 Superior	 Court	 of	Ontario	in	2018.			In	Antic,	 the	Court	dealt	with	an	accused	charged	with	drug	and	gun	offences,	who	had	been	denied	bail.	Because	he	was	resident	in	Ontario,	and	within	200	kilometers	of	the	court	that	had	jurisdiction	of	his	charges,	he	was	not	able	to	put	down	a	cash	deposit	to	help	secure	his	bail	by	virtue	of	section	515(2)(e).	The	bail	court	had	held	that	 if	 a	 cash	 deposit	 and	 a	 surety	 recognizance	 were	 available,	 Mr.	 Antic	 would	otherwise	 have	 been	 releasable.	 In	 the	 lower	 appeal	 courts,	 he	 was	 able	 to	successfully	argue	that	section	515(2)(e)	was	unconstitutional	as	it	denied	him	bail	when	 it	 would	 otherwise	 be	 available	 to	 others	 who	 met	 the	 geographical	conditions.	 The	 Supreme	Court	 of	 Canada	 held,	 instead,	 that	 they	 did	 not	 need	 to	consider	the	constitutionality	of	section	515(2)(e),	as	the	error	came	from	the	bail	court	 misapplying	 the	 bail	 provisions.	 The	 Court	 reminded	 us	 that	 a	 surety	Recognizance	with	a	monetary	pledge	is	one	of	the	highest	forms	of	release,	which	was	one	version	of	the	plan	offered	to	the	bail	court	in	Mr.	Antic’s	case.	As	such,	bail	was	appropriate	in	his	circumstances	without	the	need	to	deposit	the	money.	Antic	reminded	us	of	two	important	principles:	first,	that	requiring	cash	deposits	creates	unfairness;149	and	 second,	 that	 the	 ladder	 principle	 must	 be	 applied	 consistently	across	 Canada,	 emphasizing	 again	 the	 need	 for	 bail	 courts	 to	 always	 consider	 the	least	onerous	terms	necessary.150		Less	than	a	year	after	Antic,	Tunney	was	released	by	Justice	DiLuca.	It	seemed	that,	yet	again,	bail	courts	were	having	to	be	reminded	that	bail	 is	 to	be	granted	on	the	least	onerous	terms	possible	unless	the	Crown	can	show	cause	otherwise.	In	a	well-researched	 and	 persuasive	 decision,	 Justice	DiLuca	 pointed	 out	 that	 there	was	 an	over-reliance	on	sureties,	likening	surety	bail	to	the	requirement	of	cash	deposits	as	
																																																								
148 R.	v.	Tunney,	2018	ONSC	961	[Tunney].		149	Antic,	supra	note	145	¶	4.	150	Ibid,	¶	6.	
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the	 new	way	 of	 holding	 persons	 in	 custody.151	Quoting	 from	 Professor	 Friedland,	Justice	DiLuca	criticized	the	culture	of	nearly	automatic	reliance	on	sureties:	“The	present	system	is,	however,	not	working	well	in	Ontario.	The	pendulum	has	 swung	 too	 far	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 requiring	 sureties	 rather	 than	 using	release	on	one's	own	recognizance.	In	England,	sureties	are	required	in	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	cases.	About	two	thirds	of	those	who	appear	for	a	bail	hearing	in	Toronto	today	are	required	to	find	sureties	and	only	about	half	of	this	number	are	actually	released.	The	other	half,	 it	appears,	 could	not	 find	acceptable	 sureties.	 Less	 than	 10%	held	 for	 a	 bail	 hearing	 are	 released	 on	their	own	undertaking	or	recognizance.”152		If	we	continue	to	properly	employ	the	laddered	approach	to	bail,	then	it	is	possible	our	system	may	come	under	less	criticism.	It	has	been	said	that	the	ladder	principle	strikes	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 competing	 interests	 of	 public	 safety	 and	 the	presumption	 of	 innocence.	 For	 example,	 Benjamin	Berger	 and	 James	 Stribopolous	have	written:	“In	 the	 criminal	 justice	 context,	 adopting	 a	 precautionary	 approach	 to	 risk	management	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 relinquishment	 of	 the	 burdens	 of	 judgment	 and	the	responsibility	 to	vindicate	 important	 legal	values	and	principles.	As	 the	Supreme	Court	 has	 underscored	 in	Antic,	 the	 guiding	 concept	 in	 bail	 --	 the	one	 that	gives	effect	 to	 the	 fundamental	values	of	 the	system,	 including	 the	presumption	of	innocence	--	is	not	the	precautionary	principle,	but	the	ladder	principle.”	153		These	rungs	have	helped	courts	analyze	and	respond	to	the	several	considerations	at	 play	 during	 a	 bail	 hearing.	 However,	 a	 bail	 plan	 is	 only	 as	 successful	 as	 the	amount	 of	 information	 given	 to	 the	 court	 about	 the	 accused	 and	 the	 allegations.	Thus,	understanding	the	specific	and	individualized	factors	for	each	accused	that	a	court	has	to	account	for	is	an	important	exercise.																																																											151	Tunney,	supra	note	148	¶	30.	See	also	Martin	L.	Friedland,	“Criminal	Justice	in	Canada	Revisited”	(2004),	48	C.L.Q.	419	at	433-434.	152	Ibid,	¶	30,	quoting	from	Martin	L.	Friedland,	“Criminal	Justice	in	Canada	Revisited”	(2004),	48	C.L.Q.	419	at	433.	153	Benjamin	L.	Berger	&	James	Stribopoulos,	"Risk	and	the	Role	of	the	Judge:	Lessons	from	Bail",	in	Benjamin	Berger,	Emma	Cunliffe	&	James	Stribopoulos	eds.,	
To	Ensure	that	Justice	is	Done:	Essays	in	Memory	of	Marc	Rosenberg	(Toronto:	Thompson	Reuters,	2017).	
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2.2.iv		Some	Considerations	During	a	Bail	Hearing	There	 are	 many	 factors	 a	 bail	 court	 has	 to	 consider.	 Often	 times	 the	 analysis	involves	the	potential	penalty	for	an	offence,	or	the	strength	of	the	evidence	against	an	accused	person.154	For	the	purposes	of	this	discussion,	we	will	look	at	some	of	the	considerations	most	prevalent	in	cases	with	a	mentally-ill	accused	person.		Perhaps	most	persuasive	to	a	Crown’s	argument	for	detention	is	proof	of	a	criminal	record,155	especially	 one	 that	 is	 lengthy,	 recent,	 includes	 serious	 offences,	 and	offences	that	are	similar	to	the	charges	currently	before	the	court.	Breaches	of	court	orders,	especially	previous	bail	conditions,	are	also	heavily	inspected,	and	can	cause	a	 court	 to	 detain	 out	 of	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 accused	 will	 not	 be	 compliant	 with	 a	proposed	plan	of	supervision	and	the	conditions	of	release.			Another	consideration	is	whether	the	accused	is	already	on	bail	or	on	probation.	If	they	are,	it	signals	to	the	court	that	the	accused	is	less	likely	to	follow	terms	placed	on	them.	By	virtue	of	section	524(1)	of	the	Criminal	Code,156	an	alleged	breach	of	a	bail	order	shifts	the	onus	to	the	accused	for	their	subsequent	bail	hearing.	The	same	is	 true	 if	 the	 accused	 is	 thought	 to	 have	 committed	 a	 new	 or	 different	 indictable	offence	 while	 out	 on	 bail.	 This	 section	 was	 one	 of	 the	 reverse-onus	 provisions	considered	 in	Morales,	 and	 like	 the	 reverse-onus	 applied	 to	 drug	 traffickers,	 was	upheld	by	 the	court	as	 constitutional,	 since	 it	operated	only	when	 the	bail	 system	appeared	not	to	be	working	properly.157				An	 oft-cited	 reason	 for	 detention	 on	 the	 secondary	 ground	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	alleged	 offence.	 For	 reasons	 that	 have	 not	 always	 been	 well	 explained	 or	
																																																								154	Supra,	note	36	at	3-4	–	3-8.	155	The	Crown	can	lead	evidence	of	a	criminal	record	via	section	518(1)(c)(i)	of	the	
Criminal	Code.	156	Supra,	note	5	s.	524(1).	157	Morales,	supra	note	95.		
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supported,158	courts	 have	 held	 that	 accused	 alleged	 to	 have	 committed	 certain	offences	 are	 seen	 to	have	 a	 propensity	 for	 committing	 further	 offences.	 This	 logic	has	been	employed	in	drug	trafficking	cases,159	burglaries,	160	and	domestic	violence	cases.161	In	the	case	of	domestic	charges,	a	“cycle	of	violence”	is	often	present	in	the	relationships	 between	 accused	 and	 complainants.	 This	 relationship	 is	 further	complicated	by	 the	desire	of	some	complainants	 to	continue	 the	relationship	even	after	the	alleged	criminal	behavior,	or	because	the	sharing	of	children	makes	a	clean	split	from	the	accused	person	difficult.	In	domestic	cases,	a	specific	person	is	often	the	 subject	 of	 the	 safeguards	 implemented	 via	 the	 bail	 conditions,	 and	 only	 if	meaningful	 conditions	 can	 be	 met	 to	 protect	 that	 person,	 is	 bail	 seen	 as	appropriate.162			Considering	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence	 at	 the	 bail	 stage	 can	 also	 be	 helpful	 to	 an	accused	person	seeking	bail.	Courts	have	released	accused	where	the	effect	of	their	detention	would	 be	more	 punitive	 than	 the	 sentence	 they	would	 receive	 if	 found	guilty	of	the	offence.163	Like	the	“incorrigible	petty	thief”	described	by	Justice	Clarke	in	Young,164	the	courts	have	signaled	that	minor	crimes	should	not	be	the	concern	of	most	bail	courts.	Despite	this,	we	still	see	a	number	of	petty	crimes	bogging	down	our	bail	courts.																																																										158	A.	Ashworth,	The	Criminal	Process	–	An	Evaluative	Study,	2nd	ed.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1998)	at	215-216.	The	author	points	to	statistical	research	that	demonstrates	that	the	conclusion	reached	in	Phillips,	supra	note	53	that	burglars	are	more	likely	to	commit	future	burglaries	is	a	“considerable	exaggeration”.		159	R.	v	Groulx	(1974),	17	CCC	(2d)	351	(Que	SC).	160	Phillips,	supra	note	57.	161	Examples	of	this	proposition	in	domestic	violence	cases	are	endless.	For	just	a	few	examples,	see	R.	v	B.(F.F.)(1991),	275	APR	267	(NS	CA);	R.	v	E.(T.R.),	2011	ABQB	766;	and	R.	v	Hawryliuk,	2012	ONSC	867.	162	Supra,	note	36	at	3-19.	Domestic	cases	are	often	ripe	for	mental	health	intervention,	given	the	prevalence	of	mental	health	disorders	amongst	domestic	offenders.	We	will	consider	this	further,	below,	when	we	discuss	the	types	of	offences	and	offenders	who	could	greatly	benefit	from	early	intervention	of	the	criminal	justice	system	as	it	relates	to	their	mental	health	needs.		163	R.	v	Walsh,	(1984),	11	WCB	31	(Nfld	SCTD).	 	164	Young,	supra	note	142.		
		
	
36	
	The	 ties	 one	 has	 to	 a	 community	 are	 often	 considered	 as	 well,	 where	 primary	ground	considerations	are	at	play.	The	theory	here	is	that	a	person	with	“roots”	to	a	community	is	less	likely	to	abscond	from	their	criminal	matter,	as	they	would	have	to	walk	away	from	a	number	of	relationships	or	social	attachments.165	Hundreds	of	years	of	many	accused	persons	returning	to	court	to	face	their	charges	suggests	that	these	social	connections	are	likely	valid	considerations	for	bail	courts.		In	the	context	of	mentally	ill	accused,	however,	the	problem	with	this	consideration	becomes	nearly	immediate:	mentally	ill	persons	are	less	likely	to	have	the	kinds	of	roots	 that	 a	 court	 might	 look	 for,	 like	 employment,	 a	 stable	 home,	 property	ownership,	or	a	close	group	of	friends	or	family	members	to	call	on	for	support.	This	means	 that	mentally	 ill	 persons	are	more	 likely	 to	be	detained	under	 the	primary	ground,	as	an	indirect	result	of	their	mental	illness.		A	 final	 consideration	 to	 help	 determine	 whether	 bail	 should	 be	 granted	 on	 the	secondary	 grounds	 is	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 accused	 person.	 The	 court	will	 consider	whether	 drugs	 or	 alcohol	 were	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 allegations.166	If	 they	 were,	 some	evidence	 of	 the	 accused	 person	 dealing	with	 the	 issue	 if	 it	 is	 an	 addiction	would	assist.	If,	instead,	the	behavior	was	seen	as	a	one-time	issue	for	someone	who	does	not	have	addiction	issues,	that	may	also	assist	the	court	in	releasing.			Stability	 is	 especially	 important	 in	 the	 context	 of	 our	 discussion	 of	 mentally	 ill	accused	 persons.	 As	 Justice	 Trotter	 rightfully	 points	 out,	 it	 is	 “inappropriate	 to	detain	 an	 accused	 because	of	 a	 mental	 disorder	 or	 illness”.	 If	 the	 accused	 person	continues	 to	 pose	 a	 risk	 on	 account	 of	 their	 mental	 illness,	 and	 they	 refuse	 to	address	 the	 issue,	 some	 courts	 have	 seen	 detention	 as	 the	 only	 alternative.167	Dr.	Bloom	 and	 Justice	 Schneider	 have	 written	 about	 this	 issue,	 stating	 that	 “bail-																																																								165	Supra,	note	36	at	3-8.	166	Ibid.	167	R.	v	Rondeau	(1996),	108	CCC	(3d)	474	(Que	CA).	
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worthiness	 of	 a	 mentally	 disordered	 accused	 may	 depend	 on	 whether	 he	 has	sufficient	psychiatric	supervision	in	place”.168		Since	 an	 accused	 person’s	 stability	 is	 a	 consideration,	 one	 might	 hope	 to	 see	programs	available	to	assist	those	persons	in	stabilizing	themselves.	Like	preparing	for	a	trial,	accessing	community	resources	becomes	infinitely	more	difficult	for	the	accused	person	who	spends	their	entire	day	in	custody.	While	some	accused	might	have	already	begun	accessing	these	services	before	coming	 into	custody,	a	greater	number	of	them	will	not	have.	Therefore,	it	seems	common	sense	that	our	criminal	justice	 system	would	 be	 interested	 in	 providing	 assistance	 or	 resources	 to	 those	who	have	not	already	made	these	connections.			Instead,	we	need	to	realize	that	our	system	is	 ill-equipped	to	help	those	struggling	with	mental	health	issues.	This	is	especially	true	during	the	pre-trial	stages,	like	bail,	where	guilt	or	innocence	has	not	yet	been	adjudicated.	Unless	the	person	has	been	found	 guilty	 and	 finds	 themselves	 at	 the	 sentencing	 stage,	 there	 are	 few	rehabilitative	 options	 available	 to	 the	 courts.	 An	 assessment	 for	 “not	 criminally	responsible	on	account	of	a	mental	disorder”	is	one	such	option,	and	an	assessment	for	 “fitness”	of	 the	accused	 is	 another.	These	options	are	not	used	often,	but	offer	some	options	 for	 the	Courts	 to	 consider.	 Some	other	 fixes	 exist	 as	well,	which	we	will	explore	 in	turn.	While	getting	help	 for	a	young	person	during	the	bail	stage	 is	likely	more	promising	than	 for	an	adult	 in	 the	same	position,	 there	are	still	places	for	improvement	within	our	youth	system.	First,	though,	we	turn	to	the	intersection	of	mental	health	and	our	criminal	justice	system	from	the	lens	of	the	adult	accused	person.			
																																																								168	Hy	Bloom	&	Richard	D.	Schneider,	Mental	Disorder	and	the	Law,	(Toronto:	Irwin	Law,	2017)	at	153.	
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Part	3	
	
The	Problem:	Adult	Accused	and		
Mental	Health	Assessment	Options	
	“Criminalization	is	another	facet	of	the	narrative	of	mental	health	and	criminal	justice.	Testimony	before	the	Hyde	Inquiry	from	front-line	police	officers	and	other	witnesses	illuminated	the	fact	that	people	having	problems	with	their	mental	health	in	the	community	often	find	themselves	‘drawn	into	the	justice	system.’	Witnesses	to	the	Inquiry	made	a	direct	link	between	the	inadequacy	of	mental	health	services	in	the	community	and	through	the	health	care	system	and	the	criminalization	of	persons	with	mental	illness.”169	-Justice	Anne	Derrick		This	discussion	is	not	the	first	to	consider	the	overlap	of	mental	health	and	criminal	justice,	and	it	certainly	will	not	be	the	last.	The	relationship	between	the	two	is	so	long	and	storied,	that	like	the	laws	on	bail,	properly	documenting	its	history	is	likely	an	 impossible	 task.	 Instead,	 this	 discussion	 will	 consider	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	history,	only	to	the	extent	necessary	to	have	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	current	options	available	to	mentally	ill	accused	persons.	We	will	then	look	at	those	options,	limited	as	they	are	–	including	the	“not	criminally	responsible	for	reason	of	mental	disorder”	and	“fitness”	assessments,	the	impact	on	mens	rea	considerations,	mental	health	courts,	and	the	potential	application	of	the	Mental	Health	Act.170			
3.1	A	Brief	History	of	Mental	Health	and	Criminal	Justice		3.1.i	The	Lieutenant-Governor	System	
	To	 understand	 this	 intersection,	 we	 again	 begin	 in	 England.	 In	 the	 19th	 century,	following	a	murder	attempt	on	King	George	III,	James	Hadfield	was	tried	by	a	jury.	Mr.	Hadfield	had	 incurred	a	brain	 injury	during	battle,	 causing	him	 to	 suffer	 from																																																									169	Anne	Derrick,	“’We	Shall	not	Cease	from	Exploration’:	Narratives	from	the	Hyde	Inquiry	about	Mental	Health	and	Criminal	Justice”	(2010)	33	Dalhousie	Law	Journal	35	at	7.		170	Mental	Health	Act,	RSO	1990,	c.	M.7	[the	“Mental	Health	Act”]	
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delusions	and	fits	of	rage.	With	only	the	options	of	“guilty”	or	“not	guilty”,	the	jury	acquitted	him	with	the	additional	note	“…he	being	under	the	influence	of	insanity	at	the	time	the	act	was	committed.”171	Dissatisfied	with	the	prospect	of	returning	Mr.	Hadfield	into	the	community,	the	court	instead	ordered	him	to	be	returned	to	prison	for	the	ongoing	risk	of	danger	he	posed	to	public	safety.	This	decision	prompted	the	
Criminal	 Lunatics	Act172	in	 Britain.	 This	 act	 added	 a	 third	 option	 to	 the	 potential	verdicts	 allowable	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 avoid	 Mr.	 Hadfield’s	 situation	 from	 happening	again	–	the	verdict	of	“not	guilty	by	reason	of	insanity”173	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	“NGRI”).	If	this	verdict	was	given	to	an	accused	person,	they	would	be	placed	in	an	asylum	instead	of	in	jail.			In	Canada,	a	similar	approach	was	taken.	Until	1992,	section	542(2)	of	the	Criminal	
Code174	allowed	 for	 a	 “lieutenant-governor”	 warrant	 for	 those	 found	 NGRI,	 while	section	543(7)175	allowed	for	the	accused	to	be	detained	if	they	were	unfit	to	stand	trial	on	account	of	their	insanity.	The	name	for	these	warrants	was	such	because	the	person	was	 to	be	kept	 in	custody	“until	 the	pleasure	of	 the	 lieutenant	governor	of	the	 province	 is	 known”.176	These	 provisions	 gave	 absolute	 discretion	 to	 the	lieutenant-governor.	The	choices	open	to	them	included	the	ability	to	discharge	the	person	 “if	 satisfied	 it	 was	 in	 the	 accused’s	 best	 interests	 and	 not	 contrary	 to	 the	public	interest”,177	or	to	keep	them	at	the	asylum.	If	a	discharge	was	to	be	granted,	it	could	be	done	with	conditions,	or	absolutely.		In	addition	 to	 the	absolute	discretion	given	 to	 the	 lieutenant-general,	a	number	of	other	criticisms	of	the	system	emerged.	Timing	was	an	issue,	as	there	were	no	time																																																									171	R.	v	Hadfield	(1800),	27	State	Tr.	1281	(UK	HL).		172	Criminal	Lunatics	Act,	SC	1892,	c	29.		173	Joan	Barrett	&	Riun	Shandler,	Mental	Disorder	in	Canadian	Criminal	Law,	(Toronto:	Thomson	Carswell,	2006)	at	1-1.	174	Supra,	note	5	s.	542(2)	(since	replaced	by	section	614(2),	and	further	still,	repealed	in	1991).		175	Ibid,	s.	543(7)	(since	replaced	by	section	615(7),	and	further	still,	repealed	in	1991).	176	Supra,	note	173	at	1-2.	177	Ibid.	
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limits	to	make	the	order,	or	to	review	the	order	made.178	Once	a	finding	of	NGRI	or	unfitness	was	made,	detention	of	the	accused	was	automatic	without	any	procedural	rights	 to	make	 submissions	 or	 adduce	 evidence	 of	 their	 current	mental	 health.179	Additionally,	 there	were	 no	 appeal	 right	 from	 these	warrants.180	The	 focus	 of	 this	regime	 was	 on	 custody,	 and	 not	 treatment,	 leaving	 accused	 persons	 exposed	 to	intrusive	 and	 unwanted	medical	 treatments.	 This	 fact,	 and	 the	 potentially	 never-ending	 detention	 in	 an	 asylum,	 meant	 the	 defence	 was	 rarely	 raised	 by	defendants.181	In	1969,	Provincial	Review	Boards	were	added	to	the	Criminal	Code	to	consider	the	cases	 of	 those	 held	 in	 custody	 pursuant	 to	 the	 NGRI	 and	 fitness	 provisions.182	Despite	this	new	mechanism,	the	problems	persisted	as	the	lieutenant-governor	was	not	bound	by	the	Board’s	recommendation.183	In	1976,	a	commission	was	chartered	to	 analyze	 the	 regime,	 ultimately	 making	 42	 recommendations.184	This	 led	 to	 the	Department	 of	 Justice	 carrying	 out	 additional	 studies	 and	 consultations,	 which	resulted	 in	 the	Mental	 Disorder	 Project	 in	 1982.185	Following	 2	 years	 of	 research,	and	the	simultaneous	release	of	the	Charter,	the	project	released	its	draft	report	in	1984	 to	 identify	 several	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 legislation.	 They	 recommended	changes	 to	 bring	 the	 law	 in	 compliance	with	 the	Charter,	 where	 arguments	were	already	being	raised	under	sections	7	 -	 the	right	 to	 life,	 liberty	and	security	of	 the	person,	9	-	the	right	not	to	be	arbitrarily	detained,	12	-	the	right	not	to	be	subjected	to	cruel	and	unusual	treatment,	and	15(1)	-	the	right	to	equal	protection	under	the	law.186	The	 first	major	 call	 for	 change	 related	 to	 the	 indefinite	 confinement	 of	 the	
																																																								178	Ibid.	179	Ibid,	at	1-3.	180	Ibid.	181	Ibid.	182	Currently	found	in	supra,	note	5	s.	672.38.	183	Supra,	note	173	at	1-4.		184	Law	Reform	Commission	of	Canada,	Mental	Disorder	in	the	Criminal	Process	(Ottawa:	1976).	185	Supra,	note	173	at	1-5,	186	Ibid	at	1-4	–	1-5.	
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unfit	accused	without	a	requirement	for	the	Crown	to	establish	a	prima	facie	case.187	The	 second	 recommendation	was	 to	 stop	 the	 automatic	 detention	 of	 those	 found	NGRI	without	evidence	that	they	pose	a	risk	of	danger	to	the	public.188	Legislation	to	address	these	issues	was	drafted	in	1986,	but	came	to	a	halt	due	to	the	controversy	surrounding	cost	implications	for	the	new	processes.189	It	was	not	until	R.	v	Swain190	in	 1991	 that	 the	 government	 was	 forced	 to	 make	 it	 a	 top	 priority.	 While	 Swain	assisted	 with	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 lieutenant-governor	 system,	 many	 issues	continue.	
3.1.ii	Swain	and	the	Criminal	Code	Amendments	
Swain	brought	to	the	forefront	the	issues	with	the	NGRI	system.	In	1983,	Mr.	Swain	had	 committed	 a	 bizarre	 attack	 on	 his	 wife	 and	 two	 infant	 children,	 resulting	 in	charges	 for	 assault	 and	 aggravated	 assault.	 He	 was	 initially	 detained	 at	 the	Penetanguishene	 Mental	 Health	 Centre	 where	 he	 was	 given	 medications	 which	improved	his	health.	He	was	released	on	bail	and	remained	out	until	May	1985.	At	trial,	the	evidence	showed	that	at	the	time	of	the	attacks,	Mr.	Swain	appeared	to	be	fighting	with	the	air	and	talking	about	spirits.	He	testified	at	trial	that	he	believed	he	was	 acting	 to	 protect	 his	 family	 from	 devils	 by	 carrying	 out	 certain	 acts.191	The	Crown	raised	NGRI	as	a	result	of	this	evidence,	and	Mr.	Swain	was	found	to	be	NGRI	on	 all	 counts.	 Because	 of	 the	 automatic	 detention	provisions	 of	 the	NGRI	process,	Mr.	Swain	was	 immediately	detained,	despite	having	been	on	bail	until	 that	point,	and	despite	his	filing	of	a	constitutional	challenge	to	the	validity	of	the	section.	Mr.	Swain	 appealed	 this	 decision	 all	 the	 way	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 where	 section	542(2)	was	found	to	be	unconstitutional	for	violating	both	section	7	and	section	9	of	the	Charter,	neither	of	which	could	be	saved	by	section	1	of	the	Charter.	Chief	Justice	Lamer,	for	the	majority,	wrote	that	under	the	current	legislative	scheme,	he	“could																																																									187	Ibid	at	1-5.		188	Ibid.	189	Ibid.		190	Swain,	supra	note	2.		191	Ibid	at	954-955.	
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not	 imagine	 a	 detention	 more	 arbitrary”	 because	 the	 detention	 was	 “automatic,	without	 any	 rational	 standard	 for	 determining	 which	 individual	 insanity	 acquittees	should	be	detained	and	which	should	be	released”.192	The	Court	acknowledged	 that	some	detention	following	a	verdict	of	NGRI	may	be	necessary,	but	it	was	essential	to	limit	 this	 to	no	 longer	 than	necessary	 to	determine	 the	ongoing	dangerousness	of	the	accused.193		The	government	was	given	 six	months	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 striking	down	of	 section	542(2)	of	the	Criminal	Code,	by	way	of	a	transitional	period.	This	resulted	in	Bill	C-30,194	which	overhauled	the	entire	regime.	The	1992	amendments	gave	way	to	Part	XX.1	of	the	Criminal	Code,195	which	included	95	sections	to	create	a	complete	set	of	laws	 dealing	 with	 the	 issues	 of	 NCR	 and	 fitness.	 While	 the	 substantive	 test	 for	criminal	responsibility	was	not	changed,	it	did	expand	the	availability	of	the	defence	to	summary	offences.196	The	procedural	changes	included	the	presumption	that	the	accused’s	release	or	detention	status	prior	to	the	verdict	would	continue,	pending	a	disposition	hearing.	A	right	to	a	disposition	hearing,	followed	by	yearly	hearings	to	continue	assessing	the	accused’s	situation	if	an	absolute	discharge	was	not	granted,	were	 also	 introduced.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 amendments	 attempted	 to	 provide	 a	more	rational	and	humane	method	of	dealing	with	mentally	ill	persons,	with	a	focus	on	treatment	while	still	protecting	public	safety.197	The	former	lieutenant-governor	system	was	 abolished,	 and	 instead,	 new	 “not	 criminally	 responsible	 for	 reason	 of	mental	disorder”	and	“fitness”	provisions	were	introduced.		
																																																								192	Ibid	at	1012.	193	Ibid	at	1018.	194	An	Act	to	Amend	the	Criminal	Code	and	to	Amend	the	National	Defence	Act	and	the	
Young	Offenders	Act,	SC	1991,	c	43.	195	Supra,	note	5	Part	XX.I.	196	Supra,	note	173	at	1-11.	197	Ibid	at	1-9.	
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Of	particular	interest	to	this	discussion,	the	new	provisions	allowed	an	assessment	for	NCR	or	fitness	to	be	ordered	at	any	stage	of	the	proceedings.198	There	no	longer	needed	 to	 be	 reasonable	 grounds	 deriving	 from	 medical	 evidence,	 which	 often	meant	that	in	the	pre-1992	system,	the	issue	was	only	coming	up	at	the	trial	stage.	Instead,	 this	now	allowed	an	accused’s	assessment	 to	be	ordered	as	early	as	 their	first	 appearance	 post-charge.	 It	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 to	 have	 an	 accused	assessed	as	 early	 as	possible	where	 there	was	 concern	 that	 they	did	not	have	 the	requisite	mens	rea	to	commit	the	offence	on	account	of	their	mental	disorder.		The	1992	amendments	also	codified	the	test	for	fitness,	which	had	been	previously	undefined.	Section	2	now	defines	unfit	as:	
“unable	on	account	of	mental	disorder	 to	conduct	a	defence	at	any	stage	of	the	proceedings	before	a	verdict	is	rendered	or	to	instruct	counsel	to	do	so,	and,	in	particular,	unable	on	account	of	mental	disorder	to			(a)	understand	the	nature	or	object	of	the	proceedings,			(b)	understand	the	possible	consequences	of	the	proceedings,	or			(c)	communicate	with	counsel.”199		The	 new	 fitness	 provisions	 provided	 a	 limited	 power	 to	 the	 court	 to	 order	involuntary	treatment,	including	medication,	for	the	purposes	of	getting	the	accused	back	 to	a	state	of	 fitness.	This	could	be	done	on	an	 in-patient	or	out-patient	basis.	This	is	a	unique	provision,	as	it	is	the	only	time	a	criminal	court	can	compel	a	person	to	take	medication	under	the	Criminal	Code.200	This	authority	does	not	even	exist	for	those	found	NCR.201	In	the	NCR	context,	if	the	accused	consents,	only	then	may	such	treatment	be	provided	during	the	course	of	the	assessment.	
	
																																																								198	Ibid	at	1-12.		199	Supra,	note	5	s.	2.	200	Supra,	note	173	at	2-11.	201	Ibid	at	1-12	and	2-8;	see	also	supra,	note	5	s.	672.19.	
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Since	 Part	 XX.1	 was	 introduced,	 the	 federal	 and	 provincial	 levels	 of	 government	have	 continued	 discussions	 related	 to	 provisions	 that	 had	 not	 originally	 been	proclaimed	 in	1992	due	 to	 time	constraints	and	controversy.202	There	was	also	an	acknowledgment	that	there	were	other	areas	in	need	of	reform.203	To	this	end,	the	courts	 continue	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 dialogue.	 For	 example,	 the	 1992	case	of	R.	v	Parks204	saw	the	case	of	an	accused	who	was	acquitted	of	murdering	his	mother-in-law,	and	the	attempted	murder	of	his	father-in-law.	He	was	found	to	have	been	 in	 a	 state	 of	 non-insane	 automatism	 while	 sleepwalking,	 which	 was	 not	considered	a	 “disease	of	 the	mind”.	As	a	 result,	he	was	acquitted	outright,	 causing	controversy	across	the	country.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	agreed	with	the	trial	judge’s	decision	 to	only	put	 to	 the	 jury	 the	defence	of	automatism,	 finding	 that	no	policy	 reason	 prevented	 non-insane	 automatism	 from	 being	 a	 full	 defence.205	The	court,	 did	 however,	 suggest	 legislative	 reform	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 defence.	 Such	legislation	was	drafted	and	 tabled	 the	 following	year,	but	a	change	 in	government	ultimately	resulted	in	the	amendments	not	being	pursued.206			The	new	regime	was	also	tested	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	the	1999	case	of	
Winko	v	Forensic	Psychiatric	Institute.207	The	court	found	that	Parliament	had	regard	to	the	twin	goals	of	protecting	public	safety	and	treating	the	offender	fairly,	meaning	they	were	 to	 be	 treated	with	 the	 “utmost	 dignity	 and	 afforded	 the	 utmost	 liberty	compatible	 with	 his	 or	 her	 situation.”208	Winko	 was	 an	 important	 decision	 for	Parliament,	 as	 it	 confirmed	 their	 new	 provisions	 were	 passing	 constitutional	muster.	What	Winko	did	change,	though,	was	a	recasting	of	the	test	for	an	absolute	discharge	 in	 positive	 terms.	 Now,	 there	 must	 be	 a	 finding	 that	 the	 accused	 is	 a	
																																																								202	Ibid	at	1-16.	203	Ibid.	204	R.	v	Parks,	[1992]	2	SCR	871	[Parks].			205	Ibid.		206	Supra,	note	173	at	1-16.	207	Winko,	supra	note	1.		208	Ibid	¶	42.		
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significant	threat	to	the	safety	of	 the	public,	otherwise	an	absolute	discharge	must	be	granted.209			In	2002,	Parliament	designated	a	committee	to	undertake	a	review	of	Part	XX.1.210	This	committee	made	a	number	of	recommendations,	which	the	government	mostly	endorsed	 in	 their	 response.	 In	 response	 to	 Parks,	 they	 agreed	 that	 no	 changes	needed	to	be	made	to	the	mental	disorder	definition,	and	that	there	was	no	need	to	codify	automatism.211	These	consultations	resulted	in	Bill	C-10,	introduced	in	2004.	One	of	the	amendments	addressed	the	concern	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	R.	
v	Demers,212	by	permitting	a	stay	of	proceedings	for	an	accused	person	found	to	be	permanently	 unfit.	 It	 also	 expanded	 the	 powers	 of	 Review	 Boards	 to	 allow	 the	ordering	of	psychiatric	assessment,	adjourn	hearings,	and	extend	the	time	to	review	an	accused’s	disposition.213			The	 result	 of	 Part	 XX.1	was	 to	 also	provide	 guidance	with	 respect	 to	 the	 order	 of	assessments	and	bail	hearings,	with	the	former	taking	precedence	over	the	latter.	By	way	 of	 section	 672.17	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code,214	the	 Court	 is	 prohibited	 from	determining	 bail	 during	 the	 period	 that	 the	 assessment	 order	 is	 in	 place.215	Interestingly,	 section	 672.16	 also	 provides	 a	 statutory	 presumption	 against	 the	assessment	being	conducted	while	the	accused	is	detained	in	custody.	The	accused’s	custody	to	complete	the	assessment	only	circumvents	the	presumption	if:	(a)	the	court	is	satisfied	that	on	the	evidence	custody	is	necessary	to	assess	the	 accused,	 or	 that	 on	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 medical	 practitioner	 custody	 is	desirable	to	assess	the	accused	and	the	accused	consents	to	custody;																																																										209	Supra,	note	173	at	1-17.		210	Standing	Committee	on	Justice	and	Human	Rights,	Review	of	the	Mental	Disorder	
Provisions	of	the	Criminal	Code	(Ottawa:	June	2002).		211	Supra,	note	173	at	1-19.	212	R.	v	Demers,	[2004]	2	SCR	489.		213	Supra,	note	173	at	1-20.	214	Supra,	note	5	at	s.	672.17.	215	See	also	R.	v	Laidley	(2001),	302	AR	275	(Alta	QB),	confirming	that	if	an	assessment	is	conducted	pre-bail,	the	issue	of	bail	should	be	determined	following	its	completion.		
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(b)	 custody	of	 the	accused	 is	 required	 in	 respect	of	any	other	matter	or	by	virtue	of	any	other	provision	of	this	Act;	or		(c)	 the	 prosecutor,	 having	 been	 given	 a	 reasonable	 opportunity	 to	 do	 so,	shows	 that	 detention	of	 the	 accused	 in	 custody	 is	 justified	 on	 either	 of	 the	grounds	set	out	in	subsection	515(10).216		In	 the	situation	of	a	 reverse-onus	offence,	 the	onus	moves	 to	 the	accused	 to	show	cause	 why	 his	 detention	 is	 not	 necessary	 during	 the	 assessment.217	Despite	 the	presumption,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 practice	 that	most	 assessments	 ordered	 before	 a	bail	hearing	result	 in	 the	accused	being	kept	 in	custody	during	 the	period	of	 their	assessment.218	This	 is	confirmed	by	researchers,	who	have	found	that	over	95%	of	these	 assessments	 are	 conducted	 in	 custody.219	The	 presumption	 seems	 to	 only	benefit	 those	 who	 have	 already	 been	 given	 bail	 prior	 to	 the	 assessment	 being	ordered.			For	 those	 accused	 who	 are	 being	 remanded	 in	 custody,	 one	 benefit	 to	 an	 NCR	assessment	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 confined	 in	 a	 therapeutic	 setting,	 as	opposed	to	a	custodial	setting.	Most	people	see	the	wisdom	in	a	mentally	ill	person	being	confined	in	a	hospital,	rather	than	a	 jail	cell,	 if	 they	are	to	be	confined	at	all.	However,	the	reality	of	our	system,	and	certainly	that	of	the	Ontario	example,	is	that	our	hospitals	are	under-funded	and	under-resourced.	The	result	has	been	a	number	of	 accused	 persons	 being	 detained	 in	 custody	 at	 detention	 centers,	 rather	 than	hospitals,	while	they	have	waited	for	a	bed	to	open	up	at	the	hospital.	This	issue	has	come	up	time	and	time	again	since	the	1992	amendments	came	into	force.			
																																																								216	Supra,	note	5	at	s.	672.16.	217	Supra,	note	173	at	2-19.	218	A	few	examples	of	this	exist	in	my	private	practice.	See:	R.	v	Toth	(26	July	2017),	London	17-48825	and	17-8443	(Ont	Prov	Ct)	[Toth];	and	R.	v	Farrugia	(26	September,	2018),	London	18-6884,	18-8138	and	18-8328	(Ont	Prov	Ct)	[Farrugia].		219	Supra,	note	173	at	2-19;	and	J.D.	Gray,	“Protected	Statements’	and	Credibility	under	Section	672.21(3)(f)	of	the	Criminal	Code”,	[2000]	44	CLQ	71	at	72.		
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In	 R.	 v	 Hussein,220	two	 different	 accused	 were	 ordered	 to	 be	 assessed.	 They	 had	waited	 23	 days	 and	 29	 days	 respectively	 in	 a	 detention	 facility	 prior	 to	 being	transferred	to	the	hospital,	and	so	they	applied	for	habeus	corpus.	This	application	is	made	when	a	person	believes	they	are	being	unlawfully	detained.	If	successful,	the	court	will	order	their	release	from	unlawful	detention.	In	Hussein,	the	court	agreed	that	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 holds	 in	 the	 detention	 centers,	 without	 assurances	 that	 the	assessments	 would	 happen	 within	 the	 30-day	 time	 frames	 allowable,	 was	 to	arbitrarily	 detain	 them.	 The	 court	 took	 issue	with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 accused	were	being	detained	while	waiting	to	be	assessed,	as	opposed	to	detention	to	actually	be	assessed.	In	keeping	with	this	finding,	their	detentions	were	held	to	violate	sections	7	and	9	of	the	Charter.			To	 remedy	 the	 issue,	 the	 Ontario	 government	 made	 promises	 in	 2006	 for	 more	forensic	hospital	beds.221	Despite	this,	there	has	been	an	ongoing	saga	since	Hussein	of	bed	shortages.	In	2007,	in	R.	v	Rosete,222	Justice	Schneider	referred	to	the	Centre	for	Addiction	and	Mental	Health	in	Toronto’s	evidence	that	their	center	runs	at	103	–	105%	of	 its	capacity,	with	wait	 times	as	high	as	six	weeks.	This	 is	because	 their	forensic	 psychiatric	 beds	 have	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 uses,	 including	 in-custody	assessments	pursuant	to	the	Mental	Health	Act,	treatment	orders	in	respect	of	unfit	accused,	 hospital	 assessment	 orders	 under	 the	 fitness	 and	 NCR	 provisions,	 and	some	other	narrow	 forensic	 assessment	 options.223	The	 last	 decade	has	 seen	 little	improvement	 to	 the	 situation,	 with	 psychiatric	 beds	 continuing	 to	 be	 in	 high	demand,	 while	 being	 underfunded.224	In	 recent	 years,	 transfer	 of	 accused	 to	hospitals	 for	 these	 assessments	 has	 seemingly	 ceased	 to	 be	 the	 norm.	 Now,	 the	assessments	are	often	completed	via	a	video	link	at	the	jail	with	the	psychiatrist	or																																																									220	R.	v	Hussein	(2004),	191	CCC	(3d)	113	(Ont	SCJ)	[Hussein].	221	Supra,	note	173	at	2-22.	222	R.	v	Rosete,	2006	CarswellOnt	2428	(Ont	CJ),	appealed	to	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal	
R	v.	Rosete,	[2007]	OJ	No	3273.	223	Supra,	note	173	at	2-23.	224	Office	of	the	Auditor	General	of	Canada,	2016	Annual	Report	of	the	Office	of	the	
Auditor	General	of	Ontario,	ch	3	(Ottawa:	OAG	2016). 
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assessor	 from	 the	 hospital.	 This	 resource	 issue	will	 be	 discussed	 again	 later,	 as	 it	plays	a	predominant	consideration	in	any	calls	for	reform	of	the	system.		
	To	this	point,	much	of	our	discussion	thus	far	has	focused	on	fitness	and	NCR.	This	is	due	to	their	long	history	as	defined	concepts	within	the	criminal	justice	system.	But	to	be	sure,	mental	health	and	the	criminal	justice	system	collide	more	often	than	just	the	 times	 that	 fitness	or	NCR	 issues	are	present.	The	 times	 they	are	not	 at	play	 is	often	when	the	courts	stumble	around	the	issue	the	most,	as	there	is	little	guidance	otherwise	provided	by	the	Criminal	Code.	As	we	have	already	seen	in	Parks,	 issues	regarding	the	mens	rea	element	of	an	offence	can	come	up,	such	that	the	person	has	a	complete	defence	to	the	charge.	Other	times,	the	combination	of	factors	will	simply	be	a	feature	to	consider	for	sentencing.	In	the	following	section,	we	will	first	review	what	situations	are	expressly	provided	for	in	the	Criminal	Code.	We	will	also	look	to	some	other	options	potentially	open	 to	accused,	 like	 the	mental	health	 courts	and	the	Mental	Health	Act.	Understanding	 what	 is	 covered	 will	 assist	 our	 discussion,	such	that	we	can	then	focus	on	what	is	not	accounted	for	and	where	there	is	room	for	improvement.		
3.2	What	Is	(and	Is	Not)	Provided	in	the	Legislation	“Many	officers	come	to	understand	that	the	Criminal	Code	is	the	Mental	
Health	Act	of	last	resort,	but	unlike	the	Mental	Health	Act,	it	has	enough	teeth	to	hold	onto	the	patient	for	long	enough	to	offer	the	prospect	of	some	meaningful	intervention.	They	consequently	charge	the	patient	in	the	hope	
that	he	will	get	trapped	in	the	filter	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	Clinicians	see	many	police	synopses	of	arrests	of	likely	mentally	disordered	accused	conclude	with	words	to	the	effect	‘this	accused	should	be	held	for	a	psychiatric	evaluation.”	(emphasis	is	mine)225		If	we	know	that	some	police	officers	charge	those	they	believe	to	be	suffering	from	a	mental	illness	in	the	purposeful	hope	of	“trapping	them”	in	the	criminal	justice	filter,	then	we	need	to	be	vigilant	about	offering	services	to	those	accused	persons	to	achieve	the	intended	effect	of	helping	them.	While	this	approach	by	police	and	the																																																									225	Supra,	note	168	at	161.	
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courts	should	be	avoided	entirely,	it	is	incumbent	on	our	justice	system	to	balance	the	harm	done	by	such	arrests	by	at	least	providing	the	help	to	the	accused	person	the	police	officer	was	looking	for.	Unfortunately,	it	is	probably	not	a	far	stretch	to	argue	that	those	making	decisions	on	bail	also	sometimes	detain	accused	persons	with	mental	health	issues	as	a	means	of	“assisting”	them.	Therefore,	we	need	to	start	seriously	considering	what	options	we	have	to	truly	help	these	persons.	
	
3.2.i	Section	672.11	of	the	Criminal	Code	To	answer	 the	question	of	 “what	 can	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	offer	mentally-ill	accused	persons?”	we	can	begin	with	what	we	know	for	sure	thus	far:	accused	can	be	assessed	under	section	672.11	of	 the	Criminal	Code	 for	questions	of	 fitness	and	NCR.	As	we	have	come	to	learn,	fitness	assessments	answer	the	question	of	whether	an	accused	is	able	to	conduct	a	defence.226	An	implicit	requirement,	then,	is	that	the	accused	be	presenting	at	the	time	of	their	court	appearance,	as	unfit.			NCR	assessments	are	 interested	 in	diseases	of	 the	mind,227	occurring	at	the	time	of	
the	 commission	 of	 the	 offence,	 that	 may	 exempt	 a	 person	 from	 criminal	responsibility.228	Section	16(1)	provides	that	a	person	is	not	criminally	responsible	for	otherwise	criminal	behavior	 if	 their	mental	disorder	rendered	them	“incapable	of	appreciating	the	nature	and	quality	of	the	act	or	omission,	or	of	knowing	that	 it	was	wrong”.229	Courts	 have	 been	 asked	 to	 define	 “disease	 of	 the	mind”,	 with	 one	court	 explaining	 “…in	 a	 legal	 sense	 “disease	 of	 the	 mind”	 embraces	 any	 illness,	disorder	or	abnormal	condition	which	impairs	the	human	mind	and	its	functioning,	excluding	 however,	 self-induced	 states	 caused	 by	 alcohol	 or	 drugs,	 as	 well	 as	transitory	mental	states	such	as	hysteria	or	concussion”.230																																																											226	Supra,	note	5	s.	2.	227	Ibid,	s.	2	“mental	disorder”.	228	Ibid	s.	672.11(b).	229	Ibid	s.	16(1).	230	R.	v	Cooper,	[1980]	1	S.C.R.	1149. 
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Also	provided	for	in	section	672.11	is	the	ability	to	assess	a	female	person	charged	with	the	death	of	her	newly-born	child,	 to	determine	 if	 there	was	a	disturbance	of	the	 balance	 of	 her	mind,231	and	 another	 option	 to	 determine	whether	 a	 finding	 of	“high-risk”	 should	 be	 revoked	 against	 an	 accused.232	Two	 further	 assessment	options	 are	 add-ons	 to	 the	 NCR	 and	 fitness	 regimes,	 allowing	 for	 assessments	 to	either	 determine	 the	 appropriate	 disposition	 for	 an	 accused	 following	 an	 NCR	 or	“unfit”	finding,233	or	to	assess	whether	matters	should	be	stayed	against	an	accused	following	a	verdict	of	unfit	to	stand	trial.234		The	assessments	under	section	672.11	have	been	litigated	such	that	we	now	know	the	 section	 to	 provide	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 an	accused	can	be	assessed	for	their	mental	health	under	the	Criminal	Code.235	Courts	have	 specifically	 held	 that	 the	 section	 does	 not	 allow	 an	 order	 for	 assessment	 to	determine	whether	the	accused	suffers	from	a	specific	mental	disorder.236	Another	court	 has	 allowed	 the	 assessor	 to	 make	 a	 diagnosis	 during	 a	 section	 672.11	assessment,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 original	 purpose	 of	 the	 assessment	 fits	 one	 of	 the	enumerated	 provisions.237	These	 cases	 clearly	 demonstrate	 the	 courts	 inability	 to	read	into	the	Criminal	Code	an	option	for	the	accused	to	be	assessed	for	 issues	not	directly	raised	by	section	672.11.			Common	 sense,	 and	 a	 single	 day	 observing	 at	 a	 local	 court	 house,	 tells	 us	 though	that	 mental	 health	 issues	 are	 prevalent	 a	 lot	 more	 often	 than	 those	 enumerated	times.	 As	 Dr.	 Bloom	 and	 Judge	 Schneider	 have	 pointed	 out,	 “there	 are	 other	
																																																								231	Supra,	note	5	s.	672.11(c).	232	Ibid	s.	672.11(d.1).	233	Ibid	s.	672.11(d).	234	Ibid	s.	672.11(e).	235	R.	v	Snow	(1992),	76	CCC	(3d)	43	(Ont.	Gen.	Div.)	236	R.	v	Gray	(2002),	169	CCC	(3d)	194	(BSSC).	237	R.	v	Bernardo	[Psychiatric	Assessment	Ruling]	(1994),	50	CRR	(2d)	332	(Ont.	Gen.	Div.)	¶	13	[Bernardo].	
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junctures	 at	 which	 it	 can	 be	 most	 important”.238	So	 what	 about	 the	 rest	 of	 our	mentally	ill	accused	persons?	What	options	are	there	for	them?			
3.2.ii	Mens	Rea	Considerations		First,	we	can	consider	whether	the	person’s	mental	illness	might	impact	the	Crown’s	ability	 to	 prove	 the	mens	 rea	of	 the	 offence.	 	 While	 individuals	 are	 presumed	 to	intend	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 actions,239	mental	 illness	 can	 be	 relevant	 to	 an	accused’s	mental	intentions,	even	if	it	does	not	negate	their	intentions	such	that	NCR	is	available	to	them.	It	has	been	written	that	“criminal	responsibility	is	not	an	all	or	nothing	matter”.240	In	 a	1963	 case	of	R.	v	More,	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 Canada	was	willing	 to	 recognize	 that	 evidence	 of	 a	mental	 illness	was	 relevant	 to	 the	 issue	 of	whether	 the	 accused	 had	 the	 capacity	 to	 formulate	 the	 requisite	 intent	 for	 the	offence	charged.241	In	More,	 the	 issue	became	relevant	 in	determining	whether	the	accused	 had	 committed	 capital,	 or	 deliberate,	 murder.242	The	 court	 held	 that	evidence	 of	 his	 depressive	 psychosis	 should	 have	 been	 left	 with	 the	 jury	 with	 a	stronger	 emphasis	 from	 the	 trial	 judge,	 such	 that	 it	 may	 have	 left	 them	 open	 to	believe	 the	 shooting	 of	 his	 wife	 was	 impulsive	 rather	 than	 planned.	 This	 was	significant	 because	 lack	 of	 planning	 or	 deliberation	 meant	 that	 he	 would	 have	instead	only	been	found	guilty	of	non-capital	murder.	243	This	distinction	would	have	allowed	for	more	liberal	parole	rights	for	Mr.	More.			Similarly,	in	R.	v	Jacquard,244	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	confirmed	the	ability	of	a	person’s	mental	 disorder	 to	 negate	 the	mens	rea	 needed	 for	 first	 degree	murder.																																																									238	Supra,	note	168	at	153.	239	Supra,	note	173	at	6-1.	240	Ibid	at	6-2.		241	R.	v	More,	[1963]	3	CCC	289	(SCC)	[More].	242	In	today’s	Criminal	Code,	capital	murder	is	first	degree	murder.	See	section	231(2).	243	In	today’s	Criminal	Code,	non-capital	murder	is	second	degree	murder.	See	section	231(1).	244	R.	v	Jacquard,	[1997]	1	S.C.R.	314. 
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Too,	 in	 McMartin	 v	 the	 Queen,245	the	 courts	 confirmed	 the	 impact	 of	 mental	disorders	on	questions	of	mens	rea.	Negation	of	the	mens	rea,	and	even	sometimes	the	actus	reus,	has	been	confirmed	to	be	possible	for	a	myriad	of	offences,	and	not	just	 the	most	 serious	 like	murder.246	This	 is	 important	 because	 it	 means	 a	 lower	level	of	culpability	should	attach	to	the	accused	person.	It	also	means	that	they	are	more	likely	to	receive	a	sentence	that	is	in	keeping	with	their	specific	circumstances,	namely	having	a	mental	illness.			While	it	is	welcomed	news	that	a	person	would	not	be	held	responsible	for	a	crime	for	which	 they	 did	 not	 have	 the	 requisite	mens	rea,	 this	 does	 little	 to	 address	 the	underlying	mental	 illness	 that	 allowed	 for	 them	 to	be	 found	not	 guilty,	 or	 at	 least	only	guilty	of	a	 less	serious	crime.	 It	 is	anticipated	that	some	may	say	 it	 is	not	 the	role	of	the	criminal	justice	system	to	provide	this	help.	Those	persons	would	argue	that	 the	 role	 is	 to	 establish	 guilt	 and	 punish	 those	 who	 are	 found	 to	 be	 guilty.	However,	 this	 narrow	 approach	 to	 the	 system	 needs	 to	 be	 re-imagined	 if	 we	 are	interested	 in	 truly	 reducing	 crime	 and	 being	 a	 just	 society.	 These	 missed	opportunities	 to	help	mentally	 ill	 persons	who	 find	 themselves	 intertwined	 in	 the	criminal	 system	 means	 that	 we	 are	 implicitly,	 and	 hopefully	 unintentionally,	allowing	for	further	crime.	Only	finding	someone	guilty	for	a	lesser-included	offence,	without	further	assisting	them	with	the	root	cause	of	their	problem	continues	to	be	problematic.	 Sentencing	 judges,	 like	 those	 who	 decide	 bail,	 are	 also	 lacking	 in	options	to	help	those	mentally	ill	persons	they	found	to	be	guilty.	
	
																																																									245	McMartin	v	The	Queen,	[1964]	SCR	484.	246	R	v	Sesay,	2018	MBPC	39	(CanLII),	speaking	about	offences	generally.	See	also	R	v	
Hayden,	1990	CanLII	7307	(NB	QB),	which	left	open	the	potential	for	mental	disorder	to	negate	mens	rea	for	attempted	murder,	but	on	the	specific	facts	of	this	case,	it	did	not.	 		
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3.2.iii	Sentencing	Considerations		Another	 time	 that	 mental	 health	 considerations	 play	 a	 part	 is	 during	 sentencing	considerations.247	Not	 only	 do	 they	 get	 considered	 for	 the	 judge	 in	 coming	 to	 an	appropriate	 sentence,	 but	 they	 can	 also	 drive	 the	 recommendations	made	 during	that	 sentence.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 court	 believes	 that	 an	 offender’s	mental	 health	played	a	part	 in	their	offending	behavior,	probation	with	terms	for	counseling	will	likely	be	ordered.	A	court	may	also	be	more	inclined	to	avoid	a	custodial	sentence,	or	to	grant	an	otherwise	more	lenient	sentence,	if	they	believe	the	offender	can	be	rehabilitated	on	account	of	the	impact	their	mental	health	played	at	the	time	of	the	offence,	rather	than	the	underlying	reason	for	the	criminality	being	non-medical.			While	sentencing	judges	have	more	power	to	order	offenders	into	counseling	as	part	of	their	sentence,	courts	have	confirmed	several	times	that	there	is	no	jurisdiction	to	order	 a	 psychiatric	 assessment	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 sentencing.248	The	 downfall	 to	this,	 of	 course,	 is	 that	 if	 psychiatric	 evidence	does	not	 already	exist	 at	 the	 time	of	sentencing,	 the	 court	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 try	 and	 craft	 a	 sentence	 that	 is	 not	 fully	informed,	and	based	on	speculation.			The	ability	of	a	court	to	order	counseling	and	assessments	through	their	sentences	is	 certainly	 a	 start	 to	 helping	 those	 mentally	 ill	 persons	 who	 are	 found	 guilty	 of	committing	criminal	offences.	This	does	nothing,	though,	to	help	those	same	guilty	people	 at	 the	 earliest	 possible	 opportunity	 upon	 entry	 into	 the	 criminal	 justice	system.	The	time	between	a	charge	being	laid,	and	resolution	of	that	charge	either	by	guilty	plea	or	finding	of	guilt	at	trial	can	be	months,	sometimes	years.	Indeed,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	held	that	up	to	18	months	at	the	provincial	court	level,	
																																																								247	Supra,	not	173	at	6-21.	248	See	R.	v	Lenart	(1998)	123	CCC	(3d)	353	(Ont.	C.A)	at	363-64	[Lenart];		
R.	v	Simanek,	[2000]	OJ	No	5594	(Ont.	SCJ),	affirmed,	[2001]	OJ	No	4187	(Ont	CA),	leave	to	appeal	refused,	[2001]	SCCA	No	627	(SCC);	and	R.	v	Snow	(1992)	76	CCC	(3d)	43	(Ont.	Gen.	Div.)	at	51.			
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and	 30	 months	 at	 the	 Superior	 Court	 level	 is	 presumably	 appropriate.249	These	types	of	 time	 lapses,	 for	an	diagnosed	or	untreated	mentally	 ill	offender,	 can	have	negative	 and	 dire	 consequences.	 While	 we	 may	 hope	 that	 the	 accused	 has	 good	counsel	to	assist	them	with	getting	the	help	they	need	independently	of	the	criminal	justice	 system,	 this	 ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 Canadians	 continue	 to	 go	unrepresented	each	year	in	our	justice	system.	It	also	ignores	the	inability	for	many	accused	 to	 afford	 the	 type	 of	 counseling	 or	 treatment	 they	 need,	 which	 often	 is	unable	to	be	mitigated	by	the	mere	fact	that	they	do	have	counsel.	When	courts	do	order	counseling	as	part	of	their	sentence,	the	assistance	ordered	may	be	misguided	if	 the	 court	 does	 not	 have	 information	 otherwise	 available	 to	 them	 about	 the	offender’s	mental	health.	Further	in	the	process,	the	Probation	Officer	given	carriage	of	a	mentally	ill	person’s	file	may	also	be	ill	informed	on	how	to	better	assist	them	as	it	 relates	 to	 setting	 them	 up	 with	 the	 proper	 counselling.	 Further,	 we	 miss	 the	opportunity	to	help	those	who	are	struggling	with	undiagnosed	or	untreated	mental	health	issues	who	may	never	be	found	guilty	of	an	offence,	either	because	they	are	innocent,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	of	 evidence	 for	 conviction,	or	because	 their	 charges	were	otherwise	diverted	or	withdrawn.	These	missed	opportunities	will	play	a	prevalent	role	in	this	discussion	as	we	continue	on.		
3.2.iv	 Mental	Health	Courts		Another	option	to	explore	is	mental	health	courts.	They	are	a	relatively	new	feature	of	our	 justice	 system.	 In	1994,	 there	were	no	mental	health	 courts	 in	existence	 in	North	America.	However,	by	2004,	more	than	100	of	these	specialized	courts	were	in	existence.250	This	number	is	likely	higher	by	now.251			
																																																								249	R.	v	Jordan,	[2016]	1	SCR	631.	250	Mark	Heerema,	“An	Introduction	to	the	Mental	Health	Court	Movement	and	Its	Status	in	Canada”,	[2005]	50	CLQ	255.	251	For	example,	London,	Ontario	only	had	their	mental	health	court	begin	in	2006.	
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Mental	health	 courts	were	a	 response	 to	 the	deinstitutionalization	of	 a	number	of	mentally	 ill	 persons	 in	 the	 1980’s	 and	 1990’s.252	Movement	 away	 from	 in-patient	hospitals	for	the	mentally	ill	placed	a	burden	on	the	criminal	justice	system	resulting	from	 the	 over-criminalization	 of	 those	 who	 would	 have	 otherwise	 been	 in	hospital.253	The	attempt	being	made	by	mental	health	courts,	then,	is	to	“redirect	the	misplaced	 responsibility	 [on	 the	 courts]	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 mental	 healthcare	services	back	to	the	mental	health-care	system,	where	it	belongs”.254		Mental	health	courts	have	a	number	of	commendable	objectives.	They	aim	to	divert	those	 who	 have	 been	 charged	 with	 minor	 to	 moderate	 offences	 by	 offering	 an	alternative	 option	 like	 counselling.	 Diversion	 of	 mentally	 disordered	 accused	persons	 has	 been	 a	 formal	 option	 since	 at	 least	 1994	 in	 Ontario.255	They	 also	attempt	to	expedite	the	pre-trial	process	of	assessing	an	accused’s	 fitness	to	stand	trial.	 Mental	 health	 courts	 can	 often	 provide	 some	 treatment	 for	 the	 operating	mental	 health	 disorder	 underlying	 the	 criminal	 behavior.	 In	 doing	 these	 things,	these	 courts	 are	 trying	 to	 slow	 the	 “revolving	 door”	 that	 often	 begins	 when	 an	accused’s	mental	health	is	the	driving	force	behind	their	criminality.256	It	should	be	noted	 that	 because	 there	 is	 no	 playbook	 for	 how	 each	 mental	 health	 court	 is	 to	operate,257	these	objectives,	and	the	ability	to	carry	out	those	objectives,	often	varies	from	mental	health	court	to	mental	health	court.			The	 move	 towards	 therapeutic	 justice	 was	 a	 welcomed	 one.	 It	 reflected	 the	realization	 that	 “the	 traditional	 response	 to	 aberrant	 behavior,	 where	 it	 is	substantially	 the	 product	 of	 mental	 disorder,	 is	 both	 ineffective	 and																																																									252	Richard	D.	Schneider	et	al.,	Mental	Health	Courts:	Decriminalizing	the	Mentally	Ill,	(Toronto:	Irwin	Law,	2007)	at	2	and	42.	253	Ibid.	254	Ibid.		255	Ontario	Ministry	of	the	Attorney	General,	“Diversion	of	Mentally	Disordered	Accused”,	Crown	Policy	Manual	(Toronto:	Ministry	of	the	Attorney	General,	1993)	loose-leaf.	256	Ibid.		257	Ibid	at	6.		
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inappropriate”.258	This	 shift	 allowed	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 move	 towards	problem-solving,259	all	in	an	effort	to	avoid	the	recidivism	rates	that	were	rising	as	a	result	of	the	non-therapeutic	model.	The	issues	that	mental	health	courts	are	able	to	assist	 with,	 in	 addition	 to	 addressing	 the	 mental	 health	 concerns	 of	 the	 accused,	included	 often-accompanying	 issues	 like	 homelessness,	 substance	 addictions,	 and	joblessness.260	The	 therapeutic	nature	of	 these	courts	also	recognizes	 that	accused	and	their	victims	are	regularly	tangled	in	familial	relationships,	and	so	their	victim	is	still	 likely	to	want	their	 loved	one	dealt	with	in	a	compassionate	way,	with	dignity	and	respect.261		Treatment	 of	 the	 accused	 through	 these	 courts	 includes	 a	 number	 of	 options,	including	 psychological	 therapy,	 skills	 training,	 access	 to	 social	 services,	 and	medication	where	 that	 option	 is	 being	 consented	 to	 by	 the	 accused.262	In	 offering	these	 options,	 the	 court	 recognizes	 the	 common	 sense	 premise	 that	 the	 reduced	recidivism	 linked	 to	 rehabilitation	of	mentally	 ill	 persons	makes	our	 communities	safer.263		The	 courts	 are	 also	 recognizing	 that	 in	many	 cases	 involving	mentally	 ill	accused,	the	person	would	not	be	engaging	in	criminal	activity	but-for	their	mental	illness.264	They	 recognize	 that	 not	 all	 crime	 is	 the	 result	 of	 rational	 choice.	 These	courts	 are	 signals	 to	 the	 government	 that	 the	 “tired	 mantra	 of	 ‘getting	 tough	 on	crime’	voiced	in	the	last	half-century	has	been	an	ineffective	and	superficial	solution	to	the	issues	or	problems	that	were	causing	individuals,	like	the	mentally	ill,	to	come	into	contact	with	the	criminal	justice	system”.265			
																																																								258	Ibid	at	3.	259	Ibid	at	4.		260	Ibid.	261	Ibid.	262	Ibid	at	6.	263	Ibid	at	7.	264	Ibid.		265	Ibid	at	40.	
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Mental	health	courts	have	confirmed	that	the	law	has	therapeutic	qualities,	which	if	administered	properly,	could	help	 improve	the	 lives	of	mentally	 ill	accused.266	The	problem,	though,	is	that	even	with	the	introduction	of	these	specialty	courts,	it	may	be	 that	 the	 law	 is	 still	not	being	administered	properly.	This	argument	 follows,	as	some	significant	criticisms	of	these	courts	do	exist.			First,	 there	 is	 a	 major	 disparity	 in	 the	 services	 offered	 to	 mentally	 ill	 accused	persons	 simply	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 geographical	 location.	 While	 some	 larger	 cities	have	these	mental	health	courts,	 like	London	and	Toronto,	a	staggering	number	of	jurisdictions	 do	 not.	 This	 includes	 other	 large	 cities	 and	 small	 jurisdictions	 alike.	Thus,	if	no	mental	health	court	exists	in	the	jurisdiction	that	the	accused	is	charged	in,	they	are	unlikely	to	benefit	from	the	same	therapeutic	model	that	their	counter-part	 in	 a	 different	 city	 could.	 This	 disparity	 could	 potentially	 be	 the	 source	 of	
Charter	litigation	in	the	future,	although	that	analysis	is	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	discussion.		Another	 criticism	 is	 that	 these	courts	are	not	 run	daily,	 sometimes	only	operating	once	a	week.267	So	while	the	court	is	available	to	assist	the	accused	person	as	their	case	progresses	through	the	system,	they	are	not	necessarily	running	on	the	day	a	particular	 accused	 is	 arrested	 and	 first	 found	 interacting	 with	 the	 system.	 In	 the	context	of	bail,	 this	 leaves	accused	without	access	 to	 the	 therapeutic	 team	–	often	comprised	of	psychiatrists,	nurses,	and	social	workers	–	 that	could	otherwise	help	them	 put	 together	 a	 care	 plan,	 including	 appointments	 for	 assessments	 and	counselling,	sufficient	to	convince	a	bail	court	of	their	ability	to	be	released.		These	courts	also	suffer	from	issues	relating	to	Crown	discretion.	Each	jurisdiction	that	does	have	one	of	these	courts	will	have	its	own	procedure,	sometimes	formal,																																																									266	Ibid	at	43.	See	also:	David	B.	Wexler	&	Bruce	J.	Winick,	“Therapeutic	Jurisprudence	as	a	New	Approach	to	Mental	Health	Law	Policy	Analysis	and	Research”	(1991)	45(5)	U.	Miami	L.	Rev.	at	983.	267	In	London,	they	run	once	weekly	on	Wednesdays.	
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about	 who	 can	 appear	 before	 the	 court.	 In	 this	 way,	 disparity	 can	 exist	 even	between	the	jurisdictions	that	do	offer	this	option.	Eligibility	for	the	court	is	often	a	two-factor	consideration,	determined	by	the	Crown	assigned	to	the	court.			The	first	 factor	asks:	does	the	accused	have	the	right	kind	of	mental	 illness?268	For	example,	“serious	mental	disorder”	has	included	“anxiety	not	otherwise	specified”	in	some	 cases,	 while	 this	 same	 diagnosis	 has	 been	 denied	 entry	 to	 the	 court	 in	others.269	Personality	 disorders	 are	 often	 determined	 not	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 the	court.270	And	perhaps	most	 frustratingly,	 even	 though	 concurrent	mental	 disorder	and	 substance	 abuse	 disorders	 appear	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	 court,	 accused	with	 this	diagnosis	are	still	often	prevented	entry	to	the	court.	This	occurs	when	the	mental	health	court	team	of	experts,	often	just	on	review	of	medical	documentation	without	ever	assessing	the	individual	in	person,	believes	that	the	substance	abuse	disorder	prevails	 over	 the	 concurrent	mental	 disorder,	 thus	making	 them	 ineligible	 for	 the	court.271			The	 second	 factor	 then	 asks	whether	 the	 type	 of	 offence	 is	 eligible	 for	 the	 court.	Offences	of	a	domestic	nature	are	often	precluded272	–	even	though	mental	health	is	known	 to	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	 criminality	 of	 those	who	 perpetrate	 domestic	violence.	 This	 exception	 is	 particularly	 unfortunate,	 given	 our	 knowledge	 that	domestic	abusers	engage	in	a	cycle	of	violence,	meaning	they	are	likely	to	re-offend.																																																									268	Attached	to	this	thesis	as	Appendix	“A”	is	a	sample	Application	to	the	“Adult	Therapeutic	Court”	(otherwise	known	as	a	mental	health	court)	in	London.	It	shows	that	an	accused	can	only	qualify	for	the	court	if	they	are	suffering	from	a	serious	mental	disorder,	developmental	disabilities,	a	dual	diagnosis	described	as	mental	illness	and	a	co-occuring	developmental	disability,	concurrent	disorders	of	mental	illness	and	a	co-occuring	substance	abuse	disorder,	acquired	brain	injury,	dementia,	and	fetal	alcohol	spectrum	disorders.	269		For	an	example,	see	R.	v	Rougoor,	(August	1,	2018),	London	17-50789	(Ont	Prov	Ct).	270	For	an	example,	see	R.	v	Davis,	(August	22,	2018),	London	18-8005	(Ont	Prov	Ct).	271	R.	v	Byrnes	(September	6,	2018),	London	18-8192,	18-8193,	18-7642,	and	18-7611	(Ont	Prov	Ct);	and	R.	v	Robinson	(October	19,	2018),	London	18-8886	&	18-9575	(Ont	Prov	Ct).	272	I	know	this	based	on	my	own	dealings	with	the	therapeutic	court	in	London.	
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Offences	that	are	seen	as	“too	serious”,	 like	assault	with	a	weapon,	have	also	been	deemed	ineligible	before.	The	problem	with	this	condition	of	entry	is	that	mentally	ill	 persons	 commit	 crimes	 of	 varying	 degrees,	 and	 those	 committing	 the	 more	serious	 crimes	 are	 sometimes	 most	 in	 need	 of	 the	 therapeutic	 attributes	 of	 the	mental	 health	 court.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 a	 distinction	 exists	 between	divertible	offences	in	the	mental	health	courts	–	rightfully	reserved	for	more	minor	offences	where	public	safety	is	less	in	issue273	–	and	use	of	the	mental	health	courts	for	 guilty	 pleas	 of	 more	 serious	 charges.	 It	 is	 the	 latter	 which	 our	mental	 health	courts	may	want	 to	 consider	 loosening	 the	 eligibility	 requirements,	 although	 this	may	not	 prove	 to	 be	 overly	 helpful	 to	 the	 accused	person.	While	 the	 judge	 in	 the	mental	 health	 court	 will	 likely	 be	 better	 versed	 in	 mental	 health	 issues	 and	 the	criminal	law,	the	mental	health	court	judges	are	still	bound	by	the	same	limits	as	all	other	 sentencing	 judges.	 The	 people	who	 use	 these	 courts	 for	 guilty	 pleas,	 unlike	those	 who	 are	 diverted,	 are	 not	 assessed	 and	 connected	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 Often	times,	no	additional	treatment	is	offered	at	all.	Therefore,	mental	health	courts	may	sometimes	 be	 seen	 as	 only	 paying	 lip-service	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 mental	 health	 and	crime.		Another	important	note	is	that	mental	health	courts	are	only	open	to	those	who	are	willing	to	accept	responsibility	for	the	offence	with	which	they	are	charged.	If	they	do,	either	diversion	is	offered,	or	a	guilty	plea	can	be	conducted	in	the	mental	health	court	–	both	of	which	aim	to	then	mitigate	the	impact	on	the	accused’s	outcome	by	accounting	 for	 their	 mental	 health	 issues.	 However,	 those	 who	 do	 not	 accept	responsibility	 for	 the	offence,	perhaps	because	 they	are	 innocent,	 or	because	 they	are	too	ill	to	see	their	own	criminality,	are	not	eligible.	This	means	that	where	a	trial	is	being	set,	accused	persons	continue	to	go	without	the	supports	of	the	therapeutic	model,	 simply	 because	 they	 wish	 to	 put	 the	 Crown	 to	 their	 onus	 of	 proving	 the	offence	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt.	 	 This	 is	 problematic.	 Unintentionally,	 mental	health	courts	are	providing	a	disincentive	to	an	accused	who	chooses	to	go	to	trial.	It																																																									273	Supra,	note	168	at	158.	
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leaves	an	entire	group	of	accused	persons,	some	of	whom	will	not	actually	be	guilty	of	 anything,	 without	 recourse	 for	 treatment	 options	 when	 interacting	 with	 our	criminal	justice	system	anyways.			Some	might	argue	that	this	is	not	the	goal	of	the	justice	system.	But	when	we	know	that	mentally	 ill	persons	seem	to	be	 “drawn	 into	 the	criminal	 justice	 system”,274	it	seems	 negligent	 for	 us	 to	 not	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 legally	 innocent	 persons	who	are	also	mentally	ill	will	interact	with	our	system.	In	this	way,	we	are	missing	opportunities	 to	 assist	 these	persons.	 The	question	 that	might	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	this	suggestion	is	whether	accused	persons	should	be	forced	to	accept	the	offers	of	help,	were	 they	made	available	by	 the	 courts.	This	 is	 a	 complex	and	controversial	topic	that	likely	extends	outside	the	reach	of	this	discussion.	For	our	purposes,	it	is	being	suggested	that	the	assessment	and	treatment	be	entered	into	voluntarily,	as	it	is	more	likely	to	be	successful	under	those	conditions.			
3.2.v	 The	Mental	Health	Act	
	The	final	place	one	might	turn	to	if	they	are	mentally	ill	and	find	themselves	in	our	justice	system	is	the	applicable	provincial	mental	health	legislation.	In	Ontario,	this	is	 the	 Mental	 Health	 Act.275	In	 fact,	 this	 legislation	 may	 very	 well	 seem	 like	 the	answer	to	many	of	the	issues	discussed	thus	far.	In	section	21(1),	the	court	is	given	the	power	to	order	an	assessment,	as	it	reads:	21	(1)	 Where	 a	 judge	 has	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 a	 person	 who	 appears	before	 him	 or	 her	 charged	 with	 or	 convicted	 of	 an	 offence	 suffers	 from	mental	 disorder,	 the	 judge	 may	 order	 the	 person	 to	 attend	 a	 psychiatric	facility	for	examination.276		Section	22(1)	is	also	promising,	as	it	allows	for	admission	to	a	psychiatric	hospital	for	up	to	two	months,	as	follows:	22	(1)	 Where	 a	 judge	 has	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 a	 person	 in	 custody	who	appears	 before	 him	 or	 her	 charged	 with	 an	 offence	 suffers	 from	 mental																																																									274	Supra,	note	168.	275	Supra,	note	170.	276	Ibid	s.	21(1).	
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disorder,	 the	 judge	may,	 by	 order,	 remand	 that	 person	 for	 admission	 as	 a	patient	to	a	psychiatric	facility	for	a	period	of	not	more	than	two	months.277		However,	a	 few	problems	quickly	surface,	proving	that	 the	promissory	qualities	of	this	legislation	are	not	yet	the	answer.	First,	we	must	consider	section	23.	It	requires	the	 judge	 considering	 section	 21	 or	 22	 not	 to	 make	 such	 order	 until	 they	 have	“…ascertain[ed]	 from	the	senior	physician	of	a	psychiatric	 facility	that	the	services	of	the	psychiatric	facility	are	available…”.278	As	we	have	already	discussed	briefly,	a	major	problem	with	the	assessment	options	under	the	NCR	and	fitness	legislation	is	the	lack	of	available	beds	in	forensic	psychiatric	hospitals.	Availability	of	services	is	likely	an	issue,	then,	under	the	Mental	Health	Act	provisions	as	well.		A	second	issue	relates	to	the	fact	that	mental	health	legislation	is	not	consistent	or	uniform	from	province	to	province.	While	this	opportunity	may	make	itself	available	in	Ontario,	it	is	not	necessarily	available	in	other	provinces.	It	has	been	pointed	out	that	 this	 issue	 needs	 to	 be	 litigated	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada,	 so	 that	 all	provinces	 may	 be	 subjected	 to	 the	 same	 rules.279	The	 other	 answer,	 as	 we	 will	discuss	 more	 in	 depth	 in	 Part	 5	 of	 our	 discussion	 below,	 is	 for	 the	 federal	government	 to	 make	 amendments	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 which	 could	 provide	consistency	nation-wide.		Leaving	 these	 assessment	 options	 to	 the	 provincial	 government	 has	 also	 led	 to	conflicting	case	law	about	whether	provincial	legislation	can	be	invoked	in	criminal	proceedings.280	In	Ontario,	 inclusion	of	the	words	“charged	with	or	convicted	of	an	offence”	seems	to	clearly	signal	that	this	legislation	is	meant	to	apply	in	the	criminal	context.	 Yet,	 not	 all	 courts	 agree	 on	 this.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 see	 cases	 like	
Lenart,281	where	 the	 Ontario	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 allowed	 for	 the	 Mental	 Health	 Act																																																									277	Ibid	s.	22(1).	278	Ibid	s.	23.	279	Supra,	note	173	at	2-5.	280	Ibid.	281	Supra,	note	248.	
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assessment	 provisions	 to	 operate	 such	 that	 a	 thirty-day	 remand	 in	 a	 psychiatric	facility	for	the	purposes	of	an	assessment	was	allowed.	This	was	notable	because	it	was	over	 the	objections	of	defence	 counsel	 that	 this	was	ordered.	The	 report	 that	resulted	from	Mr.	Lenart’s	assessment	was	also	allowed	to	be	used	at	the	sentencing	stage.	Similarly	in	R.	v	Neverson,282	an	Ontario	provincial	court	relied	on	the	Mental	
Health	Act	 to	 remand	an	 accused	 to	 a	psychiatric	 facility	 for	 two	months	 in	 a	 bail	review	application.	On	the	other	hand,	R.	v	Lawrie283	had	a	provincial	court	find	that	the	Mental	Health	Act	did	not	confer	any	authority	to	compel	an	accused	to	submit	to	an	assessment	for	bail	considerations.	The	concern	of	the	court	in	Lawrie	seemed	to	be	the	coerced	nature	of	such	an	order	where	the	accused	did	not	consent.	Lawrie	was	endorsed	by	Justice	Trotter	in	his	book,	The	Law	of	Bail	in	Canada.	He	writes: “While	the	literal	wording	of	some	mental	health	Acts	may	ostensibly	permit	an	 assessment	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 augmenting	 the	 bail	 process,	 this	 is	undesirable.	First,	it	creates	a	situation	whereby	the	powers	of	judges	acting	under	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 are	 determined	 by	 the	 application	 of	 differing	provincial	 legislation.	 Secondly,	 it	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 spirit	 of	 Part	XX.1	of	the	 Code.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 Code	 is	 extremely	 comprehensive	 and	 fails	 to	authorize	 the	 power	 to	 order	 a	 psychiatric	 remand	 for	bail	purposes.	 This	exclusion	must	be	taken	as	deliberate.”284		Joan	Barrett	and	Riun	Shandler	also	agree	with	this	reasoning,	arguing	that	because	the	 Youth	 Criminal	 Justice	 Act	 confers	 powers	 to	 the	 youth	 courts	 to	 order	assessments	for	the	purposes	of	bail	and	sentencing,	it	must	be	that	the	lack	of	this	specific	 power	 under	 the	 Criminal	Code	 is	 intentional.285	They	 also	 point	 out	 that	some	courts	may	allow	the	Mental	Health	Act	to	be	used	for	assessments	relating	to	sentencing,	 as	 opposed	 to	 those	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 bail,	 because	 it	 is	 merely	facilitating	 information	 gathering	 permitted	 under	 the	 Criminal	 Code,286	while	 no	
																																																								282	R.	v	Neverson	(1975)	33	CCC	(2d)	457	(Ont	Co	Ct).	283	R.	v	Lawrie	(1996),	17	OTC	384	(Ont	Gen	Div).	284	Supra,	note	36	at	203-4.	285	Supra,	note	173	at	2-7.	286	See	R.	v	Quintal,	2003	ABPC	79	(Alta	Prov	Ct),	which	held	that	there	was	power	under	s.	721	of	the	Criminal	Code	to	direct	a	forensic	psychiatric	assessment	where	this	will	be	of	assistance	in	determining	a	fit	sentence.	
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such	power	exists	for	the	purposes	of	bail.287		In	R.	v	Knoblauch,	the	Supreme	Court	of	 Canada	 upheld	 the	 ability	 for	 a	 sentencing	 judge	 to	 direct	 an	 accused,	 at	 his	request,	 to	 serve	 a	 conditional	 sentence	 in	 a	 mental	 health	 facility.	 Barrett	 and	Shandler	argue	that	if	this	kind	of	term	is	permissible,	sentencing	courts	must	have	the	power	to	obtain	information	on	the	accused’s	mental	condition	to	craft	the	right	sentence.288			
3.3	The	Shortcomings	of	the	Current	Options	Some	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 options	 currently	 available	 to	 mentally	 ill	 adult	accused	have	already	been	touched	on.	However,	other	shortcomings	also	exist	that	require	 discussion.	 Despite	 an	 attempt	 to	 move	 towards	 rehabilitation	 and	 a	therapeutic	 model	 of	 justice,	 the	 research	 shows	 that	 we	 still	 have	 a	 growing	number	of	mentally	ill	accused	persons	in	the	prison	system.289	This	means	that	the	efforts	 we	 have	 mad	 thus	 far	 are	 not	 adequate.	 A	 goal	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 to	consider	what	other	options	the	government	should	consider	in	order	to	reduce	this	statistic.	 One	 such	 option,	 the	 section	 34	 assessment	 option	 available	 to	 youth	accused	under	the	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		
3.3.i	Lack	of	Resources	and	Funding	An	 ongoing	 issue	 with	 the	 current	 options	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 resource	 and	 bed	 space	available	 in	 psychiatric	 hospitals.	 This	 is	 problematic	 because	 even	 the	 most	attractive	 option	 available	 under	 the	Mental	Health	Act,	 allowing	 for	 assessments	where	 fitness	 and	NCR	 issues	 are	 not	 present,	 disallows	 a	 court	 from	making	 the	order	unless	a	bed	is	available.	If	facilities	are	already	operating	over	capacity,	there	is	little	likelihood	of	a	bed	becoming	available	without	a	court	moving	straight	to	the	ordering	 of	 that	 bed	 being	 made	 available.	 It	 seems	 that	 even	 where	 courts	 are	ordering	persons	to	attend	for	assessments	for	NCR	and	fitness	purposes,	hospitals	are	 breaching	 such	 orders	 on	 account	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 available	 beds.	 A	 detailed																																																									287	Ibid.	288	R.	v	Knoblauch,	[2000]	2	SCR	780	SCC.	289	Supra,	note	173	at	1-27.	
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discussion	 of	 this	 issue	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 Janet	 Lieper,	 who	 has	 since	 been	appointed	 to	 the	bench.	She	points	 to	 the	need	 for	 counsel	 to	bring	habeus	corpus	applications	more	and	more	frequently	in	order	to	force	hospitals	to	make	room	for	their	clients.290	In	response,	 these	applications	are	criticized	by	 the	hospitals:	 they	see	this	tactic	as	unethical	on	account	of	the	“jumping	of	the	queue”	that	results	for	that	client.291	As	we	have	moved	 farther	away	 from	the	Hussein	case,	 the	more	we	are	 seeing	 section	 672.11	 assessments	 not	 being	 done	 in	 forensic	 hospitals	 at	 all.	Instead,	 accused	 are	 being	 detained	 at	 detention	 centers	 where	 assessments	 are	often	 then	 occurring	 via	 video	 link.292	This	 practice	 completely	 removes	 the	 little	therapeutic	benefit	 that	was	previously	derived	from	an	assessment	under	section	672.11.	The	situation	is	not	likely	to	improve	during	the	current	regime	of	provincial	government	 in	Ontario,	as	recently	an	announcement	was	made	that	will	cut	$330	million	for	mental	health	care	funding.293		
3.3.ii	The	Non-Confidentiality	of	the	Current	Court	Ordered	Assessments	Problems	also	arise	from	the	potential	use	that	a	Crown	may	make	of	an	assessment	report	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 bail,294	where	 that	 assessment	was	 either	 done	 against	the	wishes	of	the	accused,	or	where	the	accused	does	not	consent	to	the	contents	of	the	report	being	shared.	The	assessments	ordered	under	section	672.11	can	be	done	over	the	wishes	of	an	accused	person,	and	where	the	assessment	is	ordered	before	bail	has	been	considered,	the	information	contained	in	the	report	may	be	relevant	to	their	 suitability	 for	 bail	 and	 potential	 terms	 of	 bail.	 Any	 statements	made	 by	 the	accused	 during	 the	 process	 are	 given	 a	 qualified	 privilege,	 meaning	 they	 are	 not	automatically	 admissible.	 However,	 these	 statutory	 exclusions	 under	 section																																																									290	Supra,	note	16.	291	Ibid	at	18.		292	Toth	and	Farrugia,	supra,	note	218.	293	Ontario	Health	Coalition,	Release:	Doug	Ford	cuts	hospital	beds	and	funding	–	calls	
it	an	increase	(3	October	2018),	online:	Ontario	Health	Coalition	<http://www.ontariohealthcoalition.ca/index.php/release-doug-ford-cuts-hospital-beds-and-funding-calls-it-an-increase/>.	294	Supra,	note	173	at	2-8.	
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672.21(2)	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 do	 not	 include	 bail. 295 	In	 support	 of	 the	inadmissibility	of	statements	made	during	psychiatric	assessments,	it	has	been	said	that	“the	Canadian	judicial	system	is	based	on	the	adversarial,	not	the	inquisitorial,	model.	 Fairness	 to	 the	 accused	 requires	 that	 the	 Crown	 produce	 independent	evidence	of	the	actus	reus.	The	psychiatric	assessment	must	not	become	an	adjunct	to	the	investigatory	arm	of	the	prosecution”.296	This	approach	respects	the	accused’s	right	 against	 self-incrimination,	 and	 the	 ongoing	 need	 of	 the	 Crown	 to	 prove	 the	charge.		In	response	to	the	public	nature	of	these	reports,	the	answer	often	given	is	for	the	accused	 to	seek	a	private	assessment	outside	of	 the	court-ordered	options.	Such	a	report	is	confidential	and	covered	by	rules	of	privilege	when	commissioned	by	the	defence.	If	a	report	comes	back	with	unfavorable	comments,	the	defence	can	choose	to	 never	 disclose	 it,	 or	 disclose	 it	 with	 redactions.297	The	 problem	 with	 this	suggestion	is	the	fact	that	accused	persons,	especially	those	who	are	mentally	ill,	are	not	 always	 able	 to	 afford	 private	 assessments	 and	 reports.	 Those	 accused	 who	retain	counsel	using	Legal	Aid	Ontario	will	likely	still	struggle	to	accomplish	this,	as	such	assessments	are	not	always	authorized	under	the	current	Legal	Aid	certificate	program,	 like	 in	 summary	 cases.298	Where	 authorization	 is	 not	 automatic,	 counsel	can	ask	for	authorization	for	a	special	disbursement	to	cover	this	option.	Discretion	remains	 with	 Legal	 Aid	 Ontario	 as	 to	 whether	 they	 will	 grant	 the	 disbursement,	which	 is	 not	 often	promising	 given	 the	 constraints	 on	 Legal	Aid	Ontario’s	 budget.	Some	 scholars	 have	 also	 pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 95%	 of	 such	 assessments	 are	completed	in	custody,	creating	yet	another	barrier	from	them	exercising	the	right	to	a	private	assessment	and	report.299																																																											295	Supra,	note	5	s.	672.21(2).	296	S.	A.	Tacon,	“A	Question	of	Privilege:	Valid	Protection	or	Obstruction	of	Justice?"	(1979)	17.2	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal	332-354.	297	Supra,	note	173	at	2-29.	298	Legal	Aid	Ontario,	Disbursements	Handbook,	online:	Legal	Aid	Ontario	<https://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/info/manuals/disbursements%20handbook.pdf>.	299	Supra,	note	173	at	2-29.	
		
	
66	
The	other	answer	to	this	problem	is	the	accused’s	right	to	remain	silent.300	Part	XX.1	encourages,	 but	 does	not	 require,	 the	person	 to	 participate	 in	 the	process.301	This	may	be	short-sighted,	though.	There	will	be	times	when	an	accused	wants	to	make	use	of	the	opportunity	to	be	assessed	by	a	psychiatrist	and	have	recommendations	made	as	to	how	to	better	their	mental	health.	They	may	be	concerned	about	making	admissions	during	 that	 assessment,	 though,	 that	will	 hurt	 their	 court	 case.	 If	 they	instead	 opt	 to	 remain	 silent	 and	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 assessment,	 they	 are	 also	missing	 the	 opportunity	 of	 seeing	 a	 professional	 who	 might	 otherwise	 not	 be	available	to	them	to	assist	them	with	their	underlying	disorder.				A	 final	 option	 has	 been	 carved	 out	 by	 the	 court	 in	 R.	 v	 Bernardo,302	where	 they	accepted	that	under	the	section	672.11	provisions,	the	psychiatrist	may	be	directed	to	not	create	a	report	to	be	disclosed	to	the	court,	and	thus	the	Crown.	Instead,	the	psychiatrist	was	directed	to	report	back	to	the	defence.			
3.3.iii	The	Need	for	Capping	Provisions	in	the	NCR	Regime	A	major	concern	of	the	current	XX.1	provisions	contained	in	the	Criminal	Code	is	the	fact	that	an	NCR	accused	could	be	detained	indefinitely.	Those	who	are	not	offered	an	 absolute	 or	 conditional	 discharge	 are	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 the	 Review	 Board	overseeing	 their	 case.	 Only	 once	 the	 Review	 Board	 determines	 them	 not	 to	 be	 a	significant	risk	of	serious	physical	or	psychological	harm	to	members	of	the	public,	may	they	be	released.	At	times,	privileges	can	be	granted	to	those	who	are	ordered	detained	 by	 the	 Review	 Board	 that	 allows	 for	 community	 living,	 however,	 the	Review	Board	retains	jurisdiction	over	the	accused	in	such	situations.	These	types	of	orders	 also	 allow	 for	 renewed	 detention	 at	 the	 hospital,	 should	 the	 NCR	 patient	breach	the	conditions	placed	on	them.		The	major	criticism	of	 this	system	 is	 that	an	NCR	accused	may	 in	 fact	be	detained																																																									300	R.	v	Saameh,	[2006]	OJ	No	646	(ON	CA).	301	Supra,	note	173	at	2-28.	302	Bernardo,	supra	note	237.		
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against	his	will	 longer	than	if	he	had	been	found	guilty	of	the	offence	and	served	a	criminal	 sentence.	 This	 is	 seen	 as	 such	 an	 issue,	 that	 prominent	 defence	 lawyers	have	written	about	the	need	to	avoid	NCR	assessments	as	often	as	possible.303	 Parliament	 had,	 in	 fact,	 turned	 their	 mind	 to	 this	 issue	 when	 they	 were	 first	considering	the	1992	amendments	that	resulted	in	Part	XX.1.	“Capping”	provisions	had	 been	 drafted,	 which	 were	 designed	 to	 guard	 against	 the	 NCR	 accused	 being	detained	for	periods	longer	than	if	they	had	been	criminally	sentenced.304	The	result	of	 the	NCR	provisions	being	extended	 to	summary	offences	heightened	 the	risk	of	disparities	 between	 the	 potential	 periods	 of	 detention.305	Bill	 C-30	 would	 have	capped	 the	 detention	 available	 in-hospital	 for	 NCR	 accused	 to	 the	 maximum	sentence	 available	 for	 the	 index	 offence.	 There	 were	 three	 capping	 categories	drafted.	The	first,	for	murder	and	other	life	imprisonment	offences,	also	held	the	cap	at	life.	Indictable	“designated	offences”	would	have	hospital	detention	capped	at	the	shorter	of	either	10	years	or	the	maximum	period	of	imprisonment	for	the	offence.	Finally,	 the	 residual	 category	 of	 “all	 other	 circumstances”	would	 have	 allowed	 for	capping	 at	 either	 2	 years	 or	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	 imprisonment	 available,	whichever	 was	 shorter.306	These	 caps	 would	 still	 likely	 have	 caused	 disparity,	 as	most	offenders	do	not	receive	the	maximum	available	sentence	available	under	the	
Criminal	Code.	However,	this	provision	would	have	been	more	fair	than	the	current	regime	which	has	no	such	capping	requirement.		These	 provisions	 were	 the	 source	 of	 considerable	 controversy	 when	 the	 1992	amendments	 were	 being	 considered.	 The	 most	 obvious	 problem	 with	 capping,	advanced	mostly	by	mental	health	professionals	and	law	enforcement	officers,	was	the	potential	of	having	an	accused	released	 into	 the	public	where	 they	still	pose	a	significant	threat.	Civil	 libertarians	argued	that	involuntary	certification	provisions	
																																																								303	Supra,	note	12.		304	Supra,	note	173	at	1-14.	305	Ibid.	306	Ibid.	
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within	provincial	mental	health	legislation	could	guard	against	such	risks.307	In	the	end,	the	capping	provisions	were	not	proclaimed,	and	our	system	has	been	left	with	the	current	system	of	indeterminate	detention	following	an	NCR	finding.		
3.3.iv	Lack	of	Assistance	for	Other	Mentally	Ill	Accused	The	 remaining	 criticisms	of	 the	 current	 system	consider	 the	 cracks	 caused	by	 the	checkered	 options	 that	 are	 available	 to	 mentally	 ill	 accused.	 As	 we	 have	 already	noted,	 the	 nation-wide	 application	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 does	 not	 address	 those	mentally	 ill	 accused	 persons	 whose	 illness	 falls	 short	 of	 the	 NCR	 or	 fitness	provisions.	There	is	also	the	problem	with	these	provisions	of	timing,	in	that	even	if	an	accused	is	severely	mentally	ill,	they	may	not	present	as	such	either	at	the	time	of	the	 commission	 of	 the	 offence	 in	 the	 case	 of	 NCR	 considerations,	 or	 when	 they	appear	before	the	court	in	the	case	of	fitness	considerations.			The	mental	health	courts,	as	admirable	as	 they	are,	have	their	own	set	of	worries.	Perhaps	most	concerning	is	the	fact	that	they	are	not	available	across	the	country	in	every	 jurisdiction	 where	 an	 accused	 person	 might	 find	 themselves	 charged.	Uniformity,	along	with	the	expansion	of	eligibility	requirements,	is	needed	to	ensure	that	the	greatest	number	of	accused	persons	can	be	assisted.	There	is	also	a	lack	of	clear	 guidelines	 as	 to	 who	 can	 use	 the	 court.	 This	 sometimes	 leads	 to	 accused	persons	avoiding	the	court	all	together,	because	of	the	run-around	they	face	to	gain	access	to	the	court.	The	more	difficult	it	is	to	get	into	these	courts,	the	more	likely	an	accused	is	to	become	disheartened	by	the	process.	This	potentially	causes	them	to	turn	 to	 a	 non-therapeutic	 option	 that	 is	 quicker,	 like	 a	 guilty	 plea	 in	 the	 regular	courts.	 Eligibility	 requirements	 are	 likely	 the	 result	 of	 limited	 resources.	 Limited	resources	 mean	 a	 need	 to	 use	 resources	 wisely.	 By	 imposing	 eligibility	requirements,	 the	 courts	 are	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 people	who	may	 access	 the	court.																																																											307	Ibid.	
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However,	 for	 the	 reasons	 we	 have	 already	 explored,	 some	 of	 these	 eligibility	requirements	 either	 appear	 arbitrary	 or	 are	 applied	 arbitrarily,	 or	 they	 actually	seem	counter-intuitive	like	in	the	cases	of	domestic	offences	or	serious	offences.	In	the	 example	 of	 a	 domestic	 abuser	 who	 is	 assaulting	 his	 wife	 because	 of	 his	 own	mental	 health	 issues,	 it	would	 seem	 such	 a	 person	 could	 greatly	 benefit	 from	 the	assistance	of	this	specialty	court.	Another	criticism	lies	in	the	fact	that	these	courts	do	not	have	the	ability	to	help	accused	persons	who	wish	to	fight	their	charges,	as	the	 court	 offers	 no	 services	 unless	 an	 accused	 person	 accepts	 some	 form	 of	responsibility.	 The	 therapeutic	 court	 system	 is	 also	 limited,	 just	 like	 any	 other	criminal	 court,	 in	 the	 type	 of	 assessments	 or	 therapy	 it	 can	 send	 an	 accused	 for	under	the	Criminal	Code.	Like	the	other	courts,	they	can	only	send	an	accused	for	an	assessment	 under	 the	 existing	 legislation.	 No	 special	 legislation	 or	 assessment	opportunities	 are	 available	 to	 these	 courts,	 simply	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 specialty.	This	means	that	availability	of	services	to	accused	persons	working	with	the	mental	health	court	is	still	dependent	on	the	resources	being	available	generally.		We	then	have	the	potential	of	the	Mental	Health	Act	in	Ontario.	Despite	its	promise,	we	face	the	reality	that	this	Ontario-specific	legislation	will	not	assist	those	in	other	provinces.	If	other	provinces	do	not	have	mental	health	legislation	that	specifically	account	for	the	option	of	assessments	in	the	criminal	context,	then	a	person	charged	there	 is	 still	 without	 this	 option.	 Even	 in	 Ontario,	 where	 the	 provisions	 seem	 to	explicitly	 consider	 application	 of	 an	 assessment	 option	 in	 a	 criminal	 context,	 we	continue	 to	 see	 a	 lack	 of	 reliance	 on	 the	Mental	Health	 Act.	 This	 is	 because	 the	conflicting	case	 law	has	 likely	caused	practitioners	to	move	away	from	reliance	on	this	legislation,	and	because	of	the	difficulty	busy	practitioners	encounter	trying	to	secure	a	bed.		Speaking	to	Justice	Derrick	in	the	Hyde	Inquiry	in	2001,	the	then-Executive	Director	of	 the	 Canadian	 Mental	 Health	 Association	 in	 Toronto	 had	 this	 to	 say	 about	 our	justice	system’s	interaction	with	mental	health:		“We	 have	 failed	 in	 this	 country	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	 array	 of	 mental	
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health	services	that	will	both	keep	people	out	of	the	justice	system	and,	when	they	 get	 involved	with	 the	 justice	 system,	will	 respond	 adequately	 to	 their	needs	...and	that	will	take	a	number	of	things.	It	will	take	increased	funding,	it	will	 take	a	wider	array	of	 services	and	supports	being	available,	 and	 it	will	take...	 increased	 collaboration	 between	 the	 justice	 system	 and	 the	 mental	health	 system	 to	 improve	 outcomes	 for	 people	who	 are	 living	with	mental	illness.”308	So,	the	question	that	is	left	for	our	discussion	is	this:	how	do	we	possibly	solve	this	problem?	A	problem	that	has	existed	in	modern-day	Canada	for	at	least	17	years	since	Swain.	A	problem	that	seems	to	be	so	caught	up	in	the	usual	political	issues	of	limited	resources.	A	problem	that	is	so	obvious	to	those	actors	within	the	criminal	justice	system,	that	our	lack	of	attention	to	the	issue	seems	abhorrent.		The	humble	suggestion	of	this	author	is	that	we	look	for	inspiration	to	section	34	of	the	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act.309	Accordingly,	the	YCJA	will	be	our	next	area	of	review.		 	
																																																								308	Supra,	note	173	at	8.	309	Supra,	note	7.		
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Part	4		
The	Solution:	Youth	Accused	and	Mental	Health		
Assessment	Options			 “It	is	significant	that	the	YCJA	states	clearly	that	the	youth	criminal	justice	system	must	emphasize	rehabilitation	and	reintegration	whereas,	in	the	Criminal	Code,	s.	718	states	only	that	assisting	in	rehabilitation	is	one	of	the	objectives	of	sentencing…	It	is	questionable	if	this	is	enlightened	sentencing	policy	for	Canada	in	the	21st	century,	given	that,	arguably,	the	best	way	to	ensure	our	long	term	protection	is	to	focus	on	rehabilitation	of	all	persons	who	commit	crimes,	recognizing	that,	in	some	cases,	it	may	not	be	possible.	A	consideration	of	rehabilitation	should	be	routinely	canvassed	during	all	sentencing	hearings	because	only	a	small	percentage	of	offenders	will	remain	in	in	prison	for	the	rest	of	their	lives.	Developing	and	implementing	programming	that	has	proven	effective	in	reducing	criminality	is	unquestionable	in	Canada’s	long-term	public	interest.”310		To	 be	 sure,	 Parliament	 has	 long	 made	 its	 intentions	 known	 that	 youth	 crime	legislation	 is	 to	purposefully	 focus	on	 rehabilitation	more	 so	 than	 the	 comparable	adult	 legislation,	 given	 the	 belief	 that	 young	 persons	 are	 more	 amenable	 to	rehabilitation.311	The	 introduction	 of	 the	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act312	signaled	 this	renewed	emphasis	on	rehabilitation	for	young	persons,	as	it	was	less	predominant	in	 the	earlier	days	of	 the	Young	Offenders	Act,313	and	the	 Juvenile	Delinquents	Act314	before	that.	Rehabilitation,	as	an	explicit	objective	for	young	persons,	has	also	been	affirmed	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada.315		Before	comparing	the	youth	situation	to	the	adult	situation,	 it	 is	 important	to	note	that	 bail	 rules	 are	 also	 statutorily	 different	 for	 youth.	We	will	 first	 explore	 these	differences.																																																									310	Sherri	Davis-Barron,	Canadian	Youth	&	the	Criminal	Law,	(Markham:	LexisNexis	Canada	Inc.,	2009)	at	154-155.	311	Department	of	Justice,	A	Strategy	for	the	Renewal	of	Youth	Justice	(Ottawa:	Ministry	of	Supply	and	Services,	1998).	312	Supra,	note	7.		313	Young	Offenders	Act,	RSC	1985	c	Y-1.	314	Juvenile	Delinquents	Act,	SC	1908	c	40.	315	R.	v	D.B.,	[2008]	SCJ	No	25	(SCC).	
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4.1	Youth	Bail	Principles	The	 YCJA	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 bail	 provisions	 in	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 apply	 to	 young	persons,	“except	to	the	extent	that	these	provisions	are	inconsistent	or	excluded	by	the	YCJA”.316	Sections	29	through	31	then	go	on	to	make	it	more	difficult	to	detain	a	young	person	at	the	pre-trial	stage,	compared	to	an	adult	accused.317		For	example,	section	29(1)	denies	the	ability	of	a	court	to	detain	a	young	person	in	pre-trial	as	a	substitute	for	child	protection,	mental	health,	or	social	measures.	Given	our	review	of	the	general	bail	 laws,	and	the	need	for	the	Crown	to	show	cause	for	detention	on	 the	primary,	 secondary,	 or	 tertiary	 grounds,	 this	might	 seem	 like	 an	obvious	proposition.	However,	 it	was	 likely	required	as	a	reaction	 to	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	ruling	 in	R.	v	J.J.M.318	in	1993,	where	 the	majority	held	 that	 it	was	appropriate	 to	 order	 a	 young	 person	 to	 two	 years	 of	 open	 custody	 for	 three	property	offences	and	a	breach	of	probation.	They	agreed	this	was	appropriate,	 in	part,	because	the	young	person’s	home	life	was	intolerable,	and	they	were	in	need	of	guidance.	While	section	39(5)319	was	introduced	after	this	ruling	for	the	sentencing	context,	29(1)	addresses	this	potential	issue	in	the	bail	context.		Sections	 31(1)	 and	 (2)	 put	 a	 further	 obligation	 on	 the	 court	 to	 inquire	 as	 to	 the	availability	of	a	responsible	person	who	can	take	care	of,	and	exercise	control	over,	the	young	person.	The	young	person	has	to	be	willing	to	be	placed	in	that	person’s	care.320	An	ethical	problem	with	section	29	then	arises,	because	some	communities	lack	 the	 social	 supports	 and	 stable	 housing	 needed	 for	 young	 persons	 who	 are	unable	or	unwilling	to	go	home.321	The	result	is	that	courts	are	unable	to	detain	the	young	person,	but	they	are	also	short	of	options	for	referrals	to	keep	them	safe.	For																																																									316	Supra,	note	7	s.	28.	317	Supra,	note	310	at	184.	318	R.	v	J.J.M.,	[1993]	SCJ	No	14	(SCC).	319	Supra,	note	7	s.	39(5).	320	Supra,	note	7	s.	31(1)-(2).	321	Supra,	note	310	at	186.	
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this	reason,	it	has	been	argued	that	perhaps	the	YCJA	should	permit	for	temporary	detention	 of	 young	persons	 at	 the	 pre-trial	 stage,	where	 it	would	 be	 in	 their	 best	interests.	322		 Examples	 of	 “best	 interests”	 include	 using	 such	 a	 measure	 during	 a	harsh	winter,	or	where	they	appear	to	pose	a	safety	risk	to	themselves.323			What	makes	the	youth	bail	regime	significantly	different	than	the	adult	counter-part	is	 the	 presumption	 contained	 in	 section	 29(2).	 It	 requires	 the	 court	 to	 presume	detention	is	not	necessary	on	the	secondary	ground	unless	the	“gateway	to	custody”	has	been	opened.324	This	can	be	proven	by	the	Crown	if	they	can	show	that,	upon	a	future	 finding	 of	 guilt	 for	 the	 charges	 laid,	 the	 young	 person	would	 be	 open	 to	 a	custodial	 sentence.	 This	 gateway	 is	 opened	 when	 they	 have	 committed	 a	 violent	offence,325	have	 failed	 to	 comply	 with	 multiple	 non-custodial	 sentences,326	or	because	the	offence	charged	is	indictable	with	a	sentence	of	two	years	or	more	and	they	have	a	pattern	of	extrajudicial	sanctions	or	findings	of	guilt.327	We	must	keep	in	mind	that	these	presumptions	are	rebuttable.328		Another	difference	under	the	youth	regime	is	the	ability	for	a	bail	decision	made	by	a	Justice	of	the	Peace	to	be	automatically	reviewable	by	a	Youth	Court	Justice	with																																																									322	Ibid.	323	Ibid.	324	Ibid,	s.	39(1)(a)-(c).	325	See	R.	v	C.D.;	R.	v	C.D.K.,	[2005]	SCJ	No	79,	where	the	Supreme	Court	defined	violent	offence	to	mean	an	offence	in	which	the	young	person	causes,	attempts	to	cause,	or	threatens	to	cause	bodily	harm;	bodily	harm	includes	physical	or	psychological	harm.	326	See	R.	v	C.C.	(29	June	2018),	Chatham	18-Y84	(Ont	Prov	Ct),	where	the	court	confirmed	section	39(2)(b)	requires	the	young	person	to	have	breached	more	than	one	non-custodial	youth	sentence.	See	also	R.	v	A.M.,	[2007]	NJ	No	76	at	paras	31	and	33	(NL	Prov.	Court.)	and	R.	v	J.S.,	[2004]	OJ	No	754	(Ont	CJ)	for	the	proposition	that	it	needs	to	be	breaches	of	two	different	non-custodial	sentences	to	lose	the	presumption.	327	These	findings	can	be	from	the	YCJA	regime,	or	the	YOA	regime.	Supra,	note	306	at	186.	See	also	R.	v	S.A.C.,	[2008]	SCJ	No	48	(SCC),	which	required	the	findings	to	be	ones	that	were	entered	prior	to	the	commission	of	the	offence	for	which	the	young	person	is	being	sentenced.	328	Supra,	note	310	at	186.	
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two	days’	notice,	or	consent	of	the	other	party.329	In	this	way,	the	YCJA	supersedes	the	bail	review	provisions	otherwise	provided	in	the	Criminal	Code.	The	youth	court	Justice	is	not	required	to	consider	a	review	of	the	Justice	of	the	Peace’s	decision,	like	a	bail	review	would	require.	Instead,	they	are	able	to	hold	a	bail	review	de	novo.	The	youth	court	Justice’s	decision	can	then	be	reviewed	by	a	higher	court	per	the	usual	bail	 review	 provisions	 of	 section	 520.330	Also	 notable	 is	 the	 right	 to	 automatic	review	 of	 bail	 refusal	 every	 30	 days	 for	 summary	 offences,	 or	 every	 90	 days	 for	hybrid	and	pure	indictable	offences,	except	for	murder.331		Returning	 to	 the	 theme	of	 rehabilitation,	 it	 is	worth	mentioning	 that	 the	YCJA	was	successful	 in	 limiting	 sentenced	 custody	 since	 its	 inception.	However,	 the	 effect	 it	had	on	pre-trial	detention	was	not	as	positive.	This	was	an	important	criticism	of	the	legislation,	as	Nicholas	Bala	pointed	out	that	“[t]he	sudden	and	unplanned	removal	of	 youth	 from	 their	 community	 and	 family	 that	 results	 from	remand	makes	 this	 a	highly	disruptive	experience	for	the	youth	and	may	increase	their	 likelihood	of	re-offending	 by	 exposing	 them	 to	 negative	 peer	 influences	 and	 possible	 gang	recruitment”.332	This	 criticism	 was	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 amendments	 that	happened	 in	 2012,	which	were	 intended	 to	 restrict	 the	 use	 of	 pre-trial	 detention.	The	amendments	appear	to	be	having	the	desired	effect	of	reducing	the	numbers	of	youth	detained	on	remand.333		The	extra	protections	provided	for	youth	accused	in	the	YCJA	paint	a	clear	picture	of	a	statute	that	is	trying	to	balance	the	right	of	accused	persons	in	Canada,	the	goal	of	protecting	our	young	people,	and	the	equally	 important	goal	of	holding	our	young	persons	responsible	for	their	offending	behavior.	The	legislation	still	struggles	with																																																									329	Supra,	note	7	at	33	(1)	-	(3).	330	Ibid,	s.	33(5)	–	(9).	331	Supra,	note	310	at	191.	332	Nicholas	Bala,	“Changing	Professional	Culture	and	Reducing	Use	of	Courts	and	Custody	for	Youth:	The	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act	and	Bill	C-10”	(2015)	78	Saskatchewan	Law	Review	127	–	180.	333	Ibid.	
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the	 availability	 of	 resources,	 like	 our	 adult	 system.	 As	 a	 safe-guard,	 it	 includes	sections	like	29(1)	to	prevent	persons	from	“impoverished	backgrounds	or	severely	dysfunctional	 families,	or	who	are	suffering	 from	mental	 illnesses…	end[ing]	up	 in	custody	simply	because	they	are	homeless	and	there	is	nowhere	in	the	community	for	 them	to	go”.334	To	 fill	 this	gap,	we	often	see	many	more	state	actors	come	 into	play	 at	 youth	 bail	 hearings,	 like	 child	 protection	 workers	 –	 but	 this,	 too,	 is	dependent	on	available	resources.		Given	 the	 explicitly	 different	 intentions	 between	 the	 youth	 and	 adult	 criminal	legislations,	both	in	the	stated	purpose	of	the	YCJA	and	the	bail	provisions	under	the	
YCJA,	 it	 may	 seem	 like	 a	 fruitless	 exercise	 to	 compare	 the	 assessment	 options	available	 to	 these	 two	 categories	 of	 accused.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case:	 as	 so	 many	scholars,	 judges,	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 have	 pointed	 out,	 rehabilitation	 of	 an	offender	 –	 regardless	 of	 age	 –	 should	 be	 a	 top	 priority	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 reduce	recidivism.335	Because	 most	 offenders	 find	 themselves	 returning	 back	 to	 their	community	while	on	bail,	 or	after	 they	have	 finished	serving	a	 custodial	 sentence,	we	 are	 doing	 ourselves	 a	 disservice	 if	we	 do	 not	 ensure	 that	 person	 has	 the	 best	chance	for	a	successful	reintegration.			As	my	argument	will	unfold	in	the	following	chapter,	providing	these	opportunities	to	 all	 accused,	 and	 not	 just	 those	 who	 are	 actually	 sentenced,	 will	 help	 to	 avoid	future	 offending	 as	 well.	We	 continuously	miss	 opportunities	 to	 help	mentally	 ill	accused	persons,	with	the	result	in	many	instances	being	that	persons	return	to	the	system	 with	 new	 charges,	 often	 times	 while	 still	 out	 on	 bail.	 Sometimes,	 these	charges	become	increasingly	serious.	If	recidivism	is	our	shared	goal,	then	we	need	to	 focus	 our	 efforts	 on	 the	 processes	 that	 have	 been	 statistically	 proven	 as	
																																																								334	Ibid,	at	291.	335	M.	W.	Lipsey	&	D.	B.	Wilson,	“The	Efficacy	of	Psychological,	Educational,	and	Behavioural	Treatment:	Confirmation	from	Meta-Analysis”	(1993)	American	
Psychologist	48	at	1181-1209.  	
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successful,	like	rehabilitation.	The	earlier	we	start	these	initiatives,	the	better	for	all	involved.			So,	what	can	 the	YCJA	offer	us	 in	 terms	of	best	practices?	As	we	will	now	explore,	section	34	of	this	Act	is	informative.	
	
4.2	Assessment	Options	for	Mentally	Disordered	Young	Persons		Like	 their	 adult	 counter-parts,	 young	 accused	 persons	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 rely	 on	section	672.11	of	the	Criminal	Code	for	assessments	relating	to	fitness,	NCR	and	the	other	enumerated	grounds.	Like	adult	accused,	the	Crown	must	prove	the	requisite	
mens	 rea	 for	 all	 offences	 charged,	 which	 may	 not	 be	 possible	 on	 account	 of	 the	young	person’s	mental	 health.	 Youth	 accused,	 too,	 have	 the	 options	 of	 specialized	mental	 health	 courts,336	and	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	Mental	Health	Act,	 to	 the	 extent	that	each	are	applicable.			Yet,	 despite	 these	 options,	 Parliament	 still	 saw	 the	 wisdom	 in	 section	 34,	 which	reads	as	follows:	
34	(1)	A	youth	justice	court	may,	at	any	stage	of	proceedings	against	a	young	person,	by	order	require	that	the	young	person	be	assessed	by	a	qualified	person	who	is	required	to	report	the	results	in	writing	to	the	court,		
(a)	with	the	consent	of	the	young	person	and	the	prosecutor;	or		
(b)	on	its	own	motion	or	on	application	of	the	young	person	or	the	prosecutor,	if	the	court	believes	a	medical,	psychological	or	psychiatric	report	in	respect	of	the	young	person	is	necessary	for	a	purpose	mentioned	in	paragraphs	(2)(a)	to	(g)	and		
(i)	the	court	has	reasonable	grounds	to	believe	that	the	young	person	may	be	suffering	from	a	physical	or	mental	illness	or	disorder,	a	psychological	disorder,	an	emotional	disturbance,	a	learning	disability	or	a	mental	disability,		
(ii)	the	young	person’s	history	indicates	a	pattern	of	repeated																																																									336	Some	jurisdictions	have	a	specialized	mental	health	court	for	youth.	In	London,	it	is	called	the	Youth	Therapeutic	Court.	
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findings	of	guilt	under	this	Act	or	the	Young	Offenders	Act,	chapter	Y-1	of	the	Revised	Statutes	of	Canada,	1985,	or		
(iii)	the	young	person	is	alleged	to	have	committed	a	serious	violent	offence.		As	 we	 can	 see,	 this	 provision	 allows	 for	 assessments	 relating	 to	 mental	 health	concerns.	It	can	be	ordered	with	or	without	the	young	person’s	consent,	allowing	for	assessments	 in	 situations	where	 the	 court	 has	 reason	 to	 be	 concerned	 about	 the	young	person’s	mental	stability.	What	is	particularly	noteworthy	is	the	inclusion	of	the	wording	“at	any	stage	of	proceedings	against	a	young	person”.	This	means	that	the	order	 can	be	made	as	early	as	 the	arraignment	date	when	 the	accused	 is	 first	brought	before	the	court,	and	can	assist	with	issues	directly	relating	to	bail.	Either	the	 Crown	 and	 the	 accused	 can	 jointly	 make	 the	 request,	 or	 the	 court	 on	 the	application	 of	 either	 party	 can	 make	 the	 order	 if	 they	 believe	 it	 will	 assist	 in	determining	issues	of	release	from	custody,	pursuant	to	section	34(2)(a).337			Unlike	the	assessment	options	provided	for	in	the	Criminal	Code,	young	persons	are	explicitly	 protected	 in	 the	 YCJA	 relating	 to	 any	 comments	 made	 during	 the	assessment	process.	Section	147(1)	creates	a	general	presumption	that	statements	made	during	assessment	are	 inadmissible	absent	the	consent	of	the	young	person,	with	few	exceptions	contained	in	section	147(2).338		While	the	presumption	of	the	YCJA	 is	 for	these	assessments	to	be	completed	while	out	of	custody,339	there	is	an	ability	for	the	person	to	be	detained	for	up	to	30	days	under	section	34(3).	The	wording	allows	for	remand	to	“any	custody	that	[the	court]	directs”,	which	 likely	means	hospitalized	custody	or	custody	 in	a	 traditional	youth																																																									337	Supra,	note	7	s.	34(2)(a).	This	section	discusses	release	or	detention	decisions	made	under	section	33	by	a	youth	justice	following	a	s.	515	Criminal	Code	bail	decision	made	by	a	non-youth	justice.	In	this	way,	the	ability	for	a	section	34	order	to	be	ordered	where	only	one	party	consents	is	likely	limited	to	situations	of	second	bail	hearings	before	Judges,	and	not	Justices	of	the	Peace.	338	Ibid,	s.	147(1)	–	(2).	339	Ibid,	s.	34(4).	
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detention	 center.	 Criminal	 defence	 lawyers	 and	 scholars	 alike	 point	 out	 the	 often	futile,	 and	 sometimes	 oppressive,	 nature	 of	 involuntary	 treatment	 and	hospitalization.340	This	 is	one	of	the	main	criticisms	of	the	current	NCR	and	fitness	regimes.	 It	 is	 arguably	 even	more	 concerning	where	 an	 accused	 person	might	 be	ordered	to	be	hospitalized	under	a	section	34	order	without	having	consented	to	it.	This	may	happen	in	cases	where	the	mental	health	issues	do	not	rise	to	the	level	of	NCR	or	fitness	considerations.	The	wording	of	section	34	is	also	broad	enough	that	a	person	who	is	less	ill	than	what	the	provincial	mental	health	legislation	requires	for	involuntary	 hospitalization	 may	 become	 hospitalized.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 section	 34	order	 is	 not	 ideal,	 and	 should	 include	 a	 requirement	 for	 the	 accused	 person	 to	consent	to	the	assessment.			In	 the	 adult	 context,	 any	 guidance	 to	 be	 gleaned	 from	 section	 34	 orders	 should	consider	 the	 provisions	 that	 only	 allow	 for	 treatment	 with	 an	 accused	 person’s	consent.	While	the	system	should	allow	for	opportunities	for	people	to	get	help	for	their	mental	 health	 issues,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 able	 to	 force	 them	 to	 do	 so.	 Criminal	legislation	that	captures	accused	persons,	as	well	as	those	found	guilty,	should	not	have	 more	 power	 to	 order	 involuntary	 hospitalization	 than	 the	 provincial	regulations	 given	 explicit	 power	 over	 this	 issue.	 The	 federal	 legislatures	 might	consider	revising	the	YCJA	to	also	align	with	this	philosophy.		Section	 34	 orders	 come	 with	 a	 significant	 monetary	 cost.	 Discussions	 with	 the	current	 youth	 court	 Justice	 in	 London,	 Justice	 Harris-Bentley,	 unveils	 that	 these	assessments	are	pegged	at	roughly	$5000.00	each.	No	doubt,	this	is	a	hefty	price	tag,	requiring	the	accused,	Crowns,	and	the	court	alike	to	consider	thoroughly	when	to	request	or	make	such	an	order.			
																																																								340	Supra,	note	12.		
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The	advantages	of	such	an	option	are	also	clear.341	Section	34	orders	allow	the	court	actors	 to	 have	 a	 more	 complete	 and	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	 issues	facing	the	young	person	in	question.	Not	only	do	these	reports	consider	the	mental	health	 components	 of	 the	 young	 person’s	 make-up,	 many	 also	 delve	 into	 other	issues,	 including	 learning	 disabilities,	 familial	 status,	 homelessness,	 truancy	 in	school,	 skills,	 social	 networks,	 and	 addiction	 issues.	 The	 greatest	 benefit	 to	 be	gleaned	from	these	reports	is	the	introduction	of	a	care	plan,	or	a	plan	of	action.	Any	community	resources	that	would	be	helpful	are	suggested	at	the	conclusion	of	these	reports.	There	is	a	clear	effort	made	to	connect	the	young	person	with	the	needed	supports	to	make	rehabilitation	likely.	They	suggest	answers	to	real	problems.	This	includes	giving	them	a	diagnosis,	spelling	out	the	appropriate	course	of	treatment,	advising	where	the	young	person	is	best	placed	for	living	arrangements,	and,	what	other	services	are	available	to	the	young	person	that	have	not	yet	been	considered	or	accessed.			For	criminal	practitioners,	a	significant	hurdle	is	simply	understanding	what	kind	of	mental	disorder	the	accused	person	has.	An	assessment	that	answers	this	question	and	 suggests	 the	 appropriate	 treatment	 is	 therefore	 invaluable,	 at	 least	 insofar	 as	one	of	the	goals	of	the	criminal	justice	system	is	to	facilitate	rehabilitation.	In	many	cases,	 the	 connections	 made	 through	 these	 assessments	 can	 then	 be	 used	 for	ongoing	 treatment.	 The	 continuity	 that	 this	 provides	 to	 a	 young	 person	 facing	mental	 health	 challenges	 is	 particularly	 helpful,	 as	 so	 many	 times,	 the	 person’s	mental	 health	 has	 deteriorated	 to	 the	 point	 it	 has	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 consistent	treatment	providers.	In	other	words,	the	person	has	“fallen	through	the	cracks”.			
																																																								341	The	comments	that	follow	are	the	result	of	personal	observations	of	section	34	reports,	during	my	work	as	a	criminal	defence	lawyer	working	with	youth	clients	in	cases	like	R.	v	T.G.B.	[31	July	2017],	London	16-Y1600,	16-Y1646,	16-Y1651	and	16-Y1658	(Ont	Prov	Ct)	and	R.	v	K.J.	[28	August,	2017],	London	17-Y1399,	17-Y1516,	and	17-Y1337	(Ont	Prov	Ct).	
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Because	adult	accused	are	continuing	to	fall	through	the	cracks,	our	discussion	will	turn	next	to	arguments	relating	to	the	introduction	of	better	assessment	options	for	these	persons.		
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PART	5	
	
A	Comparative	Analysis	and	Thoughts	for	Criminal	Code	Reform		“In	2004/2005,	there	were	on	average	9,600	people	detained	in	pre-trial	custody	awaiting	trial.	This	meant	that	half	of	the	inmates	in	provincial	institutions	were	un-sentenced	remand	prisoners	whereas	in	1995-1996,	such	un-sentenced	prisoners	constituted	only	28	per	cent	of	inmates	in	provincial	institutions.”342	(emphasis	is	mine)	If	we	 tie	 together	 the	 various	 themes	 explored	 thus	 far,	 a	 clear	 picture	 should	 be	emerging.	Starting	with	bail,	we	see	a	current	system	that	is	likely	better	than	it	was	in	 years	 past	 -	 but	 is	 still	 in	 need	 of	 further	 reform.	 Since	 our	 provincial	 jails	 are	housing	up	to	fifty	percent	of	people	who	have	not	yet	been	found	guilty	of	anything,	we	need	to	reassess	our	use	of	pre-trial	detention.	Even	for	those	who	are	convicted,	it	 has	 been	 said	 that	 “[p]risons	 have	 failed	 to	 reduce	 crime,	 don’t	 hold	 offenders	accountable	to	repay	their	victims,	and	do	nothing	to	give	communities	confidence	in	their	criminal	justice	system”.343		Remand	detention	is	even	less	promising,	with	an	explicit	acknowledgement	from	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	that	conditions	are	worse	for	inmates	in	pre-trial	detention,	resulting	in	enhanced	credit	for	sentencing	being	accounted	for	such	time.344	While	the	efficacy	of	prisons	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	discussion,	this	point	is	highlighted	to	show	the	need	for	more	consideration	of	those	who	have	to	spend	time	there	on	a	remand	basis.	Turning	next	to	how	we	can	assist	our	mentally	ill	accused	persons,	we	see	a	lack	of	options.	Too	often,	we	are	detaining	mentally	ill	persons	simply	because	we	do	not	know	what	else	to	do	with	them.345	If	 fifty	percent	of	the	provincial	 jail	population																																																									342	Kent	Roach,	“A	Charter	Reality	Check:	How	Relevant	is	the	Charter	to	the	Justness	of	Our	Criminal	Justice	System?”	(2008)	40	The	Supreme	Court	Law	Review:	Osgoode’s	Annual	Constitutional	Cases	Conference.	343	See	the	quotation	of	Mennonite	Central	Committee,	1997:11	in	Curt	T.	Griffiths,	
Canadian	Corrections,	(Toronto:	Thomson	Nelson,	2004)	at	81.	344	See	supra,	note	5	section	719(3.1),	and	R.	v	Summers,	[2014]	1	SCR	575	¶	70.	345	World	Health	Organization,	Mental	Health	and	Prisons	(Geneva,	Switzerland:	WHO,	2017)	at	1,	online:	World	Health	Organization	<https://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/mh_in_prison.pdf>.	
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are	 people	 on	 remand	 in	 pre-trial	 detention,	we	must	 inquire	 how	many	of	 those	people	 are	 also	 struggling	 with	mental	 health	 issues.	 These	 persons	 are	 likely	 to	spend	 time	 in	 segregation	 on	 account	 of	 their	 mental	 health.	 Segregation	 is	 not	therapeutic,346	and	has	been	deemed	torture	when	it	is	indefinite	and	not	subject	to	due	process.347Even	if	the	practice	is	not	officially	considered	torture,	with	a	mental	illness	it	may	very	well	be	experienced	as	such.	As	has	already	been	pointed	out	in	the	 opening	 paragraph	 of	 this	 section,	 the	 conditions	 for	 remand	 detention	 are	harsher	 than	 sentenced	 detention.	 Less	 programming	 is	 available,	 including	therapeutic	 programs	 and	 access	 to	 doctors.	 As	 Debra	 Parkes	 has	 argued,	 most	prisoners	 come	 from	 disadvantaged	 backgrounds,	 with	 high	 levels	 of	 depression	and	 attempted	 suicide.348	This	makes	 lack	 of	 programming	 especially	 problematic	for	 our	mentally	 ill	 population	who	will	 struggle	with	 their	 health	 every	day	 they	spend	in	custody.		Introducing	 better	 options	 for	 treatment	 of	 our	 mentally	 ill	 accused	 will	 have	 a	positive	effect	on	our	ability	to	safely	and	more	consistently	offer	bail,	thus	adhering	to	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 allowing	 us	 to	 remove	mentally	 ill	 persons	from	remand	custody	more	often.	An	assessment	that	helps	diagnose	a	person	and	offers	treatment	options	can	go	a	long	way	in	the	bail	considerations	the	court	will	be	making	on	 the	primary,	 secondary,	 and	 even	 tertiary	 grounds.	The	 assessment	and	ensuing	rehabilitative	efforts	can	help	to	reduce	crime,	which	thus	reduces	the	length	of	one’s	criminal	record	to	be	later	used	against	them	for	bail	considerations,																																																									346	Sean	Gibson	and	Christopher	Sewrattan,	“Gender	Roles,	Charter	Holes	and	Societal	Goals:	Mentally	Ill	Female	Prisoners	in	Canada”	(2012)	32	Review	of	Legal	and	Social	Issues.	347	Corporation	of	the	Canadian	Civil	Liberties	Association	v.	Her	Majesty	the	Queen,	2017	ONSC	7491	(CanLII)	and	British	Columbia	Civil	Liberties	Association	v	Canada	
(Attorney	General),	2018	BCSC	62	(CanLII).	348	Debra	Parkes,	"A	Prisoners'	Charter?	Reflections	on	Prisoner	Litigation	Under	the	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedom"	(2007)	40:2	UBC	Law	Review	629,	quoting	from	Canadian	Centre	for	Justice	Statistics,	A	One-Day	Snapshot	of	Inmates	in	Canada’s	Adult	Correctional	Facilities	by	David	Robinson	et	al.,	vol.	18:8	(Ottawa:	Canadian	Centre	for	Justice	Statistics,	1998)	at	5.		
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and	 in	 sentencing	 for	 that	matter.	 It	 allows	 for	 the	 person	 to	 create	 ties	 to	 their	community,	 improving	 their	 candidacy	 for	 release	 on	 the	 primary	 grounds.	 Most	significantly,	 it	 can	 stabilize	 the	 person	 such	 that	 they	 no	 longer	 pose	 a	 concern	under	 any	 of	 the	 three	 grounds	 of	 detention.	 Ensuring	 bail	 is	 granted	 as	 often	 as	possible	also	helps	level	the	playing	field	for	accused	persons,	such	that	they	are	less	likely	to	be	convicted	of	a	charge	or	be	sentenced	to	jail	for	that	charge.	This	helps	address	 the	 valid	 concerns	 of	 Professor	 Friedland	 when	 he	 wrote	 about	 this	phenomenon,	as	we	discussed	in	section	2.1.ii	above.	The	lives	of	many	accused	persons	who	make	contact	with	our	justice	system	can	be	impacted	in	a	real	way	by	catching	instances	of	untreated	mentally	ill	persons	and	offering	 treatment.	 It	 can	 reduce	 the	 behavior	 that	might	 otherwise	 lead	 to	more	crime.	Following	this	argument	through	to	its	conclusion,	then,	it	is	highly	likely	that	treatment	 of	 these	 persons	will	 reduce	 our	 costs	 outside	 of	 the	 prison	 setting	 as	well,	including	policing,	court	services,	prosecution	and	legal	aid.		It	has	been	already	said	that:	“…for	 most	 of	 the	 mentally	 disordered	 accused	 who	 come	 through	 the	courthouse	 doors,	 the	most	 efficacious	 and	 appropriate	 course	 is	 to	 divert	accused	 back	 into	 the	 civil	 mental	 health	 system	 from	 which	 they	 have	somehow	become	disconnected	or	insufficiently	well-connected.”349	This	is	a	different	way	of	saying	that	our	system	is	inadequately	equipped	to	assist	these	 people,	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 As	 mentioned	 already,	 our	 legislated	assessment	 options	 under	 the	 Code	 are	 only	 being	 accessed	 by	 those	 who	 are	severely	 ill	 such	 that	 they	 are	 potentially	 NCR	 or	 unfit.	 These	 options	 are	 also	unpalatable	 in	 their	 current	 format,	 as	 they	could	 lead	 to	 indeterminate	detention	for	the	accused	person.	Our	mental	health	courts	are	also	not	an	adequate	response,	either	 because	 accused	 do	 not	 have	 uniform	 access	 to	 a	 mental	 health	 court,	 or	because	even	those	courts	have	their	limitations.	Stepping	in	to	help,	assuming	that	help	is	wanted	and	accepted,	allows	our	justice	system	to	redirect	accused	persons																																																									349	Supra,	note	168.		
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to	the	civil	mental	health	stream.	If	we	know	police	are	laying	charges	through	the	justice	 system	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 get	 them	 help,350	and	 we	 know	 further	 that	 the	government	has	not	 funded	the	medical	side	adequately	 to	provide	this	assistance	without	 the	 justice	 system’s	 intervention,	 then	 we	 have	 an	 ethical	 and	 moral	obligation	to	provide	that	help.		Our	discussion	continued	by	moving	 to	 the	YCJA.	A	review	of	 the	youth	 legislation	signals	some	promise	that	we	are	beginning	to	take	rehabilitative	efforts	seriously.	While	the	focus	on	rehabilitative	and	restorative	 justice	efforts	 largely	depends	on	the	 political	 party	 in	 power,	 even	 our	 previous	 Conservative	 federal	 government	was	able	 to	understand	 the	basic	math.	Nicholas	Bala,	 compared	 the	Conservative	governments	“tough	on	crime	approach”	for	adults,	causing	their	prison	populations	to	drive	upwards,	with	the	youth	approach	to	custody.	He	reasoned	that	“it	seems	clear	that	the	federal	government	does	not	want	Canada	to	return	to	its	high	rates	of	use	of	courts	and	custody	for	youth	criminal	justice,	if	only	for	financial	reasons”.351	The	 most	 promising,	 and	 transferable,	 feature	 of	 the	 YCJA	 is	 the	 section	 34	assessment	 option.	 It	 has	 the	 power	 to	 drive	 real	 rehabilitation.	 The	 diagnostic	opportunities	that	it	affords,	as	well	as	the	ability	to	create	treatment	plans	and	put	supports	 in	 place,	 is	 truly	 remarkable.	 While	 this	 provision	 is	 not	 perfect	 in	 its	operation,	 for	 example,	 allowing	 for	 youth	 to	 be	 forced	 into	 these	 assessments	where	they	do	not	consent,	it	is	certainly	a	promising	example	for	us	to	look	to	for	the	adult	legislation.	The	 obvious	 argument	 that	 such	 a	 proposition	will	 encounter	 is	 the	 ever-present	issue	of	 funding.	One	might	 argue	 that	 if	 the	 courts	have	had	 such	a	difficult	 time	successfully	 getting	 psychiatric	 beds	 ordered	 for	 NCR	 and	 fitness	 assessments,	where	will	these	resources	come	from	for	the	new	patients	that	a	section	34	styled	assessment	 will	 create?	 There	 is	 also	 the	 argument	 that	 these	 assessments	 are																																																									350	Supra,	note	168.	351	Nicholas	Bala,	“Changing	Professional	Culture	and	Reducing	Use	of	Courts	and	Custody	for	Youth:	The	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act	and	Bill	C-10”	(2015)	78	Saskatchewan	Law	Review	127	–	180.	
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costly,	 given	 our	 estimate	 that	 they	 cost	 roughly	 $5000.00	 based	 on	 anecdotal	evidence.	 Where	 would	 this	 money	 come	 from?	 Candidly,	 this	 is	 a	 significant	challenge,	 and	 one	 that	 has	 no	 easy	 fix.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 research	 is	 lacking	 to	determine	 the	 costs	 later	 saved	 by	 our	 community	 following	 section	 34	assessments.	This	is	an	area	that	requires	further	empirical	study,	which	is	beyond	the	purview	of	 this	paper,	but	does	open	up	a	promising	area	of	 research	 for	 this	author	in	the	future.		What	we	can	deduce	from	broader	research	that	has	studied	rehabilitation	and	its	effect	 on	 recidivism	 is	 that	 the	 two	 are	 positively	 connected.	 Custody	 has	 been	proven	time	and	time	again	to	be	expensive	and	unsuccessful,	while	rehabilitation	and	 restorative	 efforts	 do	work	 and	 have	 long-term	 savings.352	While	money	may	have	 to	be	 injected	 in	 these	efforts	at	 the	outset,	 they	give	us	a	 return	 in	 the	end.	This	is	a	better	alternative	to	“tough	on	crime”	legislation,	which	has	been	explained	as	follows:	“…tougher	sentences	hardly	deter	crime,	and	that	while	 imprisoning	people	temporarily	 stops	 them	 from	committing	crime	outside	prison	walls,	it	 also	tends	to	increase	their	criminality	after	release.	As	a	result,	“tough-on-crime”	initiatives	can	reduce	crime	in	the	short	run	but	cause	offsetting	harm	in	the	long	run.”353		To	put	 these	 comments	 into	a	quantifiable	 context,	 research	has	 shown	 that	most	federal	 and	 provincial/territorial	 governments	 spend	 over	 80	 percent	 of	 their	budgets	 on	 custodial	 expenses,	 even	 though	 less	 than	 5	 percent	 of	 sentenced	offenders	 are	 sent	 to	 prison.354	The	 2016-2017	 numbers	 show	 that	 the	 average	
																																																								352	Supra,	note	332;	William	J.	Chambliss,	Corrections,	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Sage	Publications,	2011)	at	237;	and	Curt	T.	Griffiths,	Canadian	Corrections,	(Toronto:	Thomson	Nelson,	2004)	at	106.	353	David	Roodman,	The	Impacts	of	Incarceration	on	Crime,	Open	Philanthropy	Project	<https://www.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_Areas/Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf>	at	130.	354	Curt	T.	Griffiths,	Canadian	Corrections,	(Toronto:	Thomson	Nelson,	2004)	at	86.	
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annual	 cost	 to	 house	 a	 federal	 inmate	 was	 $114,587.00.355	The	 most	 recent	 data	available	for	Ontario	provincial	jails,	where	accused	are	often	held	on	remand,	was	$65,393.00	per	year	in	2013.356	This	cost	is	often	higher	for	female	inmates,357	and	higher	still	 for	segregated	inmates.358	The	cost	to	the	public	 for	a	homeless	person	who	 does	 not	 use	 a	 shelter	 after	 just	 one	 year	 post-incarceration	 is	 almost	$400,000.00.359	These	numbers	are	grim,	especially	when	we	consider	that	in	2000	–	2010,	 annual	public	 spending	per	 capita	went	up	by	23	percent	 for	 corrections,	despite	the	fact	that	crime	went	down	25	percent.360	In	comparison,	it	only	cost	the	Correctional	Service	of	Canada	$18,058.00	annually	to	supervise	an	offender	in	the	community.361			Looking	 to	 the	other	 side	of	 the	 equation,	 being	 the	 suggestion	 to	 address	mental	illness	as	soon	as	practicable,	there	is	a	lack	of	accessible	data	to	tell	us	how	much	it	costs	 to	 instead	 treat	 these	 mentally	 ill	 persons,	 such	 that	 a	 calculation	 of	 cost	savings	 can	 be	 done	 when	 we	 compare	 criminal	 justice	 system	 costs	 with	 this	suggestion.	The	data	that	is	available,	which	has	otherwise	been	highlighted	earlier	in	 this	 discussion,	 does	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 treating	 mentally	 ill	persons	 before	 they	 become	 entangled	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 leads	 to	 an	overall	 savings	 for	 society.	 However,	 this	 is	 an	 area	 that	 is	 ripe	 for	 empirical	research	to	confirm,	on	a	more	nuanced	basis,	that	this	claim	is	true.	
																																																								355	Office	of	the	Parliamentary	Budget	Officer,	Update	on	Costs	of	Incarceration,	(Ottawa:	PBO,	2018)	at	1.	356	Public	Safety	Canada,	The	Monetary	Costs	of	Criminal	Trajectories	for	an	Ontario	
Sample	of	Offenders,	(Ottawa:	PSC	2015)	at	18.	357	Ibid,	at	1.	358	Ibid.	359	Open	Policy	and	Chronicle	Analytics,	Making	Toronto	Safer:	A	Costs-Benefit	
Analysis	of	Transitional	Housing	Supports	for	Men	Leaving	Incarcerations,	online:	The	John	Howard	Society	of	Toronto	<	http://johnhoward.on.ca/toronto/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/09/JHS-Toronto_Making-Toronto-Safer.pdf>.	360	John	Howard	Society	of	Canada,	Media	Release,	“Financial	Facts	on	Canadian	Prisons”	(23	August	2018)	online:	http://johnhoward.ca/blog/financial-facts-canadian-prisons/>.	361	Ibid	at	4.		
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The	numbers	we	do	know	support	the	contention	that	the	less	interaction	one	has	with	our	police,	courts,	and	prison	systems	resulting	from	improved	mental	health,	the	better	off	our	community	is	–	in	terms	of	both	economic	and	social	costs.	While	more	empirical	research	is	needed	to	fully	understand	a	comparison	of	the	costs	of	arrest,	 prosecution	 and	 detention	 versus	 diagnosis	 and	 treatment	 of	 mentally	 ill	accused,	 there	 is	 both	 logic	 and	 an	 ethical	 argument	 to	 be	 made,	 even	 with	preliminary	 data.	 Since	we	 know	 our	 police	 are	 arresting	 people	who	 have	 fallen	through	 the	 cracks	 of	 the	 civil	 mental	 health	 legislation	 and	 services,	 we	 have	 a	responsibility	 to	not	only	 consider	our	other	options	 from	a	 fiscal	 standpoint,	 but	also	to	afford	human	dignity	to	our	mentally	 ill	accused	and	offer	real	opportunity	for	change.	As	Kent	Roach	has	taught	us:	“Parliament	deserves	much	of	the	credit	or	blame	for	the	state	of	our	justice	system.	Indeed,	even	in	those	areas	where	the	courts	have	been	most	active,	most	of	this	activism	can	be	explained	by	the	failure	of	Parliament	to	revise	and	 modernize	 the	 Criminal	 Code.	 Although	 the	 Court	 has	 emerged	 as	 a	stronger	 player,	 Parliament	 still	 plays	 the	 dominant	 role	 in	 our	 criminal	justice	system.”362	The	Courts	have	made	it	clear	that	their	powers	only	extend	so	far,	and	while	many	Judges	 would	 like	 to	 be	 able	 to	 order	 resources	 to	 become	 available,	 this	 is	 not	something	 they	 are	 able	 to	 do.	 In	 a	 different	 context,	 in	Newfoundland	(Treasury	
Board)	 v	 NAPE,363	the	 Court	 accepted	 that	 there	 was	 a	 section	 15(1)	 Charter	infringement	for	 female	nurses	affected	by	the	cutting	of	a	pay	equity	policy.	They	saved	the	contravening	act	under	the	section	1	of	the	Charter’s	Oakes	test,	however,	because	the	government	was	facing	a	budgetary	crisis,	and	the	cuts	were	necessary.	It	 is	possible	 that	 the	Supreme	Court	would	 rule	differently	 today	 in	 a	 case	 about																																																									362	Kent	Roach,	“A	Charter	Reality	Check:	How	Relevant	is	the	Charter	to	the	Justness	of	Our	Criminal	Justice	System?”	(2008)	40	The	Supreme	Court	Law	Review:	Osgoode’s	Annual	Constitutional	Cases	Conference.		363	Newfoundland	(Treasury	Board)	v	NAPE,	2004	SCC	66	(CanLII)	[Nape].	
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resources	 for	mentally	 ill	 accused	persons.	 Indeed,	 Janet	 Leiper	 (as	 she	 then	was,	she	 has	 since	 been	 appointed	 to	 the	 Bench)	 has	 argued	 that	 while	 litigation	 is	subject	to	 limits,	 it	can	still	be	an	effective	mechanism	to	create	a	domino	effect	of	change	for	normally	powerless	groups	of	litigants.364	She	went	on	to	quote	Heather	Barr,	the	plaintiff	counsel	for	prisoners	with	psychiatric	issues,	who	said:	“I	am	no	cheerleader	for	litigation.	There	are,	however,	few	groups	of	Americans	less	popular	and	holding	less	political	power	than	people	with	psychiatric	disabilities	in	jails	and	prisons	.	.	.	As	we	learned	from	the	civil	rights	movement,	the	courts	are	sometimes	the	only	place	where	people	without	political	power	can	have	any	hope	of	protection.365”		We	have	seen	litigation	cause	change	in	the	Canadian	context.	As	we	have	explored,	Part	XX.1	of	the	Criminal	Code	 is	in	existence	because	of	the	very	real	power	of	the	courts	 over	 Parliament	 following	 Swain.	 But	 we	 must	 remember	 it	 took	 sixteen	years	 from	 the	 time	 the	 lieutenant-governor	 provisions	 began	 being	 assessed	 in	1976	 until	 we	 saw	 the	 overhaul	 of	 the	 NGRI	 system,	 making	 way	 for	 the	 1992	amendments.			Some	might	question	why	Charter	 litigation	is	not	the	focus	of	this	discussion.	It	 is	true	 that	 some	 sections	 of	 the	 Charter	 seem	 apt	 for	 such	 arguments.	 Section	 7	guarantees	the	right	to	life,	liberty	and	security	of	the	person;	Section	9	guarantees	the	 right	 against	 arbitrary	 detention;	 Section	 11(e),	 discussed	 above	 already,	promises	 the	 right	 not	 to	 be	 unreasonably	 denied	 bail;	 Section	 12	 protects	 from	cruel	and	unusual	punishment;	and	finally	section	15	offers	equality	despite	mental	disability.	Certainly	one	may	consider	bringing	a	Charter	application	under	each	of	these	 grounds,	 and	 arguing	 that	 because	 section	 34	 assessments	 are	 available	 for	young	persons	under	the	YCJA	regime,	it	is	discriminatory	and	unreasonable	to	not	have	them	made	available	to	adult	persons.			
																																																								364	Supra,	note	16	at	18.	365	Ibid.	
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If	there	was	a	practitioner	considering	bringing	a	Charter	application	to	try	and	get	help	for	their	mentally	ill	client,	it	is	in	this	context	that	I	would	suggest	bringing	it.	The	existence	of	an	option	available	to	some	–	but	not	all	–	accused	is	likely	the	most	persuasive	way	of	arguing	that	there	is	a	positive	obligation	on	the	government	to	offer	 the	 same	 assistance	 to	 adult	 accused.	 This	 is	 certainly	 a	 stronger	 argument	than	simply	saying	the	court	ought	to	order	an	undefined	form	of	assistance,	as	the	Court’s	natural	question	would	otherwise	be	“with	what	authority?”	If,	 instead,	the	court	has	something	palpable	and	tangible	to	compare	and	contrast,	like	the	existing	section	 34	 assessment	 option,	 then	 a	 Charter	 application	 instead	 would	 ask	 the	questions:	under	section	15,	is	it	inequitable	to	have	such	assessment	and	treatment	options	for	young	persons	but	not	adults?	Under	section	12,	is	it	cruel	and	unusual	punishment	 to	 keep	 someone	 in	 custody	 on	 remand	 who	 might	 otherwise	 be	granted	 bail	 if	 they	 had	 a	 proper	 treatment	 plan?	 Is	 section	 12	 then	 impugned	because	a	young	person	who	gets	such	treatment	may	not	be	held	in	custody,	yet	an	adult	person	would	be,	thus	making	it	cruel	and	unusual?	Is	section	11(e)	violated	because	“reasonable	bail”	can	be	met	with	 the	 introduction	of	government-funded	mental	 illness	 assistance	 where	 the	 accused	 is	 under	 18	 years	 old,	 but	 the	 adult	accused	is	not	given	the	same	opportunity?	Does	section	9	get	breached	because	the	detention	is	otherwise	arbitrary,	since	mental	illness	has	been	acknowledged	by	the	government	as	deserving	of	treatment	before	the	imposition	of	a	sentence	for	young	persons,	but	the	same	has	not	been	acknowledged	for	adults?	Finally,	is	section	7	in	issue	given	that	the	rights,	liberty	and	security	of	an	adult	person	are	at	risk	due	to	the	 absence	 of	 government	 assistance	 to	 address	 mental	 health	 concerns,	 and	therefore	any	potential	bail	concerns,	again	as	we	compare	the	assistance	given	to	youths	but	not	to	adults?			As	 the	above	questions	highlight,	 there	 is	certainly	an	opportunity	 for	 litigation	of	these	 Charter	 issues.	 The	 emphasis	 of	 this	 discussion,	 however,	 is	 that	 litigation	within	 the	 current	 legislative	 regime	 is	 both	 an	 unattractive	 and	 difficult	 option.	First,	the	premise	of	all	of	these	Charter	argument	must	assume	that	the	government	does	owe	a	duty	to	adult	accused	simply	because	they	have	legislated	the	same	duty	
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under	 section	 34	 of	 the	YCJA	for	 young	 persons.	 It	 is	 quite	 plausible	 that	 a	 court	would	find	youth	are	deserving	of	more	protections	by	the	government,	for	the	very	reasons	outlined	by	 the	preamble	of	 the	YCJA,	 and	 thus,	an	absence	of	 these	same	options	for	adults	is	not	necessarily	deserving	of	Charter	critique.	These	arguments	would	certainly	be	unchartered	territory,	and	knowing	whether	a	Court	would	agree	with	that	premise	is	an	impossible	task.			Further,	 finding	 the	 appropriate	 “test	 case”,	 despite	 the	 frequency	 with	 which	mental	health	issues	present	themselves	in	the	system,	will	be	difficult.	Litigation	of	these	types	of	issues	is	complex	–	often	months-long,	if	not	years.	Most	accused	are	charged	 with	 offences	 that	 make	 their	 time	 in	 custody	 just	 short	 enough	 that	litigation	of	such	issues	becomes	moot.	Even	if	charged	with	something	warranting	significant	 incarceration,	 the	 lawyer	 then	 needs	 permission	 from	 the	 accused	 to	make	their	case	the	example.	Litigation	can	be	draining	and	difficult	to	comprehend	for	those	who	are	mentally	well;	much	less	those	who	are	ill.			A	 promising	 decision	 from	 the	 provincial	 level	 of	 court	 –	 for	 example	 in	 Ontario,	either	 the	 Ontario	 Court	 of	 Justice	 or	 the	 Superior	 Court	 of	 Justice	 –	 also	 has	 its	limits.	 It	 usually	 only	 applies	 to	 the	 case	 at	 bar,	 and	 can	 then	 be	 used	with	 some	persuasion	for	other	cases.	However,	it	is	unlikely	to	be	“binding”	on	other	courts	of	lateral	jurisdiction.	If	several	lateral	courts	hear	similar	arguments,	there	may	even	become	inconsistency	in	the	rulings	that	result.	This	has	the	potential	to	lend	more	confusion	to	 the	 issue,	rather	 than	resolving	 it.	To	avoid	contradictory	rulings,	 the	answer	 then	 is	 to	 get	 such	 a	 “test	 case”	 to	 an	 appellate	 level,	 so	 that	 it	may	 set	 a	significant	enough	precedent	for	system-wide	change.	However,	this	option	is	even	more	costly,	and	delayed.	Arguing	something	at	an	appellate	level	often	takes	years.	Finally,	the	uncertainty	for	success	that	such	a	novel	argument	would	bring,	due	to	issues	as	plain	as	“budgetary	constraints”	as	seen	 in	Nape,	means	that	such	a	path	may	be	futile	even	if	the	Court	is	otherwise	sympathetic	to	the	issue.		
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If	it	took	sixteen	years	for	Parliament	to	make	the	changes	necessary	to	the	mental	health	 legislation	 in	 the	 criminal	 context	 the	 last	 time,	what	practitioners	know	 is	we	 cannot	 afford	 to	 wait	 this	 long	 again.	 In	 a	 system	 that	 has	 been	 said	 to	 be	“strained	to	the	limit”	by	the	2002	Standing	Committee	on	Justice	and	Human	Rights	reviewing	Part	XX.1,	even	they	“could	do	no	more	than	to	call	on	federal,	provincial	and	territorial	ministers	responsible	for	justice	to	review	the	resource	issue”.366		In	 the	 same	 spirit,	 it	 is	 the	 humble	 but	 urgent	 call	 of	 this	 author	 that	 we	 ask	Parliament	and	the	provincial	levels	of	government	to	work	together	to	address	this	issue.	We	 first	 need	Parliament	 to	 amend	 the	Criminal	Code	 such	 that	 a	 provision	similar	 to	 the	 YCJA’s	 section	 34	 is	 included.	 A	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 potential	wording	 of	 such	 legislation	 is	 included	 as	 an	 appendix	 to	 this	 discussion.367	This	suggested	provision	has	 taken	 into	 account	 the	numerous	 critiques	of	 the	 current	provisions	under	 sections	672.11	of	 the	Criminal	Code	 and	 section	34	of	 the	YCJA,	such	that	the	goal	of	rehabilitation	is	the	primary	focus,	with	an	attempt	to	reduce	the	 prejudice	 such	 an	 assessment	 might	 cause	 the	 accused	 person.	 Notably,	 the	sample	provision	also	calls	on	a	judge,	as	opposed	to	a	justice,	to	order	the	report.	This	is	intentional,	as	an	effort	to	curb	overreliance	on	these	reports	by	practitioners	absent	 a	 convincing	 dialogue	with	 the	 court.	 In	 this	way,	 it	 is	 the	 attempt	 of	 this	author	to	defeat	any	argument	that	such	legislation	would	have	a	far-reaching	and	unsubstantiated	impact	on	the	public	purse.			This	 draft	 legislation	 will	 have	 no	 teeth,	 though	 without	 the	 provinces	 and	territories	 recognizing	 the	 integral	 role	 they	 plan	 in	 achieving	 safer,	 healthier	communities.	 Our	 provincial	 governments,	 together	 with	 increased	 funding	 from	the	 federal	 governments,	must	 invest	 in	more	 beds,	more	 counselling,	 and	 better	treatment	options	if	we	have	any	hope	of	curbing	the	increasing	number	of	mentally	ill	persons	 finding	 their	way	 into	our	 system.	These	changes	will	 reduce	 the	 long-term	costs	associated	with	continuously	dealing	with	accused	persons	in	our	justice																																																									366	Ibid.	367	See	Appendix	B.	
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system,	 but	 it	 will	 also	 reduce	 the	 financial	 and	 social	 cost	 of	 crime	 on	 our	communities.368		 	
																																																								368	Supra,	note	351.	
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Part	6	
	
Conclusion	
	“Therapeutic	jurisprudence	explicitly	recognizes	that	an	accused	enters	and	leaves	the	criminal	justice	system	an	affected	person.	For	mentally	disordered	accused,	time	spent	entangled	in	the	criminal	justice	system	has	typically	produced	anti-therapeutic	results.	From	being	the	subject	of	abuse,	experiencing	a	lack	of	meaningful	treatment,	and	being	subject	to	higher	rates	of	incarceration,	mentally	disordered	accused	typically	do	not	fare	well.	It	is	now	a	generally	accepted	assertion	that	the	criminal	justice	system	has	failed	the	mentally	ill.”369		In	an	effort	to	repair	our	relationship	between	the	criminal	 justice	system	and	the	mentally	 ill,	 this	 discussion	 started	with	 a	 doctrinal	 review	 of	 the	 laws	 on	 bail.	 It	highlighted	some	areas	for	reform,	and	considered	bail	in	the	context	of	mentally	ill	accused	persons.	We	then	looked	at	the	current	intersection	of	our	criminal	justice	system	 and	mental	 health,	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 an	 adult	 accused	 person.	What	we	discovered	 is	 that	 the	 mentally	 ill	 are	 not	 being	 properly	 accounted	 for	 in	 our	attempts	 to	 reduce	 recidivism	by	addressing	 the	 larger	 societal	 issue	of	untreated	mental	 health	 disorders.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 promising	 provision	 afforded	 to	 youth,	found	 in	 section	 34	 of	 the	YCJA,	 gave	 us	 an	 example	 to	 look	 to	 for	 reform	 of	 our	
Criminal	Code	and	how	we	deal	with	adult	accused.			We	 ended	 our	 discussion	with	 an	 analysis	 showing	 how	 these	 changes	would	 be	beneficial	to	both	our	economic	health,	but	also	our	public	safety.	By	looking	at	the	financial	 and	 social	 costs	 to	be	 saved	when	we	assist	our	mentally	 ill	 persons,	we	can	 make	 a	 persuasive	 argument	 that	 our	 Criminal	 Code	 should	 employ	 a	 new	provision	 for	broader	psychological	assessments.	 It	 is	 the	hope	of	 this	author	 that	our	 society	 can	 continue	 to	 shift	 towards	 the	 restorative	 approach	 to	 crime	 that	rehabilitation	offers,	especially	as	we	deal	with	our	mentally	 ill.	Expanding	on	our	promise	of	nearly	20	years	ago	in	Winko,370	to	treat	accused	with	mental	disorders	
																																																								369	Richard	D.	Schneider	et	al.,	Mental	Health	Courts:	Decriminalizing	the	Mentally	Ill,	(Toronto:	Irwin	Law,	2007)	at	44.	370	Winko,	supra	note	1.	
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with	 the	dignity	and	respect	 they	deserve,	 is	 the	ethical	and	reformative	move	we	can	no	longer	afford	to	ignore.		
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Appendix	A	
	
Adult	Therapeutic	Court	Application	Form	in	London,	Ontario	
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Appendix	B	
	
Suggested	Wording	for	Medical	and	Psychological	Assessment	Provisions	to	be	
Added	to	the	Criminal	Code	
	
s.	X	Psychological	Assessment	
(1)	A	judge	may,	at	any	stage	of	proceedings	against	an	accused	person,	by	order	require	that	the	accused	be	assessed	by	a	qualified	person	who	may	report	the	results	in	writing	to	the	court,		
(a)	with	the	consent	of	the	accused	person	and	the	prosecutor,	on	an	application	setting	out	the	reasons	the	report	is	being	sought,	including,	but	not	limited	to,	the	concern	that	the	accused	person	may	be	suffering	from	a	mental	illness	or	disorder,	a	psychological	disorder,	an	emotional	disturbance,	a	learning	disability	or	a	mental	disability;	or		
(b)	on	its	own	motion	with	the	consent	of	the	accused	person,	or	on	application	of	the	accused	person,	if	the	court	believes	a	psychological	or	psychiatric	report	in	respect	of	the	accused	person	is	necessary	for	a	purpose	mentioned	in	paragraphs	(2)(a)	to	(g)	and		
(i)	the	court	has	reasonable	grounds	to	believe	that	the	accused	person	may	be	suffering	from	a	mental	illness	or	disorder,	a	psychological	disorder,	an	emotional	disturbance,	a	learning	disability	or	a	mental	disability,	or	
(ii)	the	accused	person	is	alleged	to	have	committed	a	serious	violent	offence.		
Purpose	of	assessment		
(2)	A	judge	may	make	an	order	under	subsection	(1)	in	respect	of	an	accused	person	for	the	purpose	of		
	
(a) show	cause	considerations	under	section	515;		
(b) bail	review	considerations	under	section	520;	or		
(c) 	sentencing	 considerations	 where	 the	 Crown	 is	 requesting	 a	sentencing	option	that	would	result	in	a	conviction.		
Custody	for	assessment		
(3)	 Subject	 to	 subsections	 (4)	 and	 (6),	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 an	 assessment	under	 this	 section,	 a	 judge	may	 remand	 an	 accused	 person	 to	 any	 custody	that	 it	 directs	 for	 a	 period	 not	 exceeding	 thirty	 days.			
		
	
110	
Presumption	against	custodial	remand		
(4)	An	accused	person	shall	not	be	remanded	in	custody	in accordance	with	an	order	made	under	subsection	(1)	unless:	
	
(a)	the	judge	is	satisfied	that		
	
i)	 on	 the	 evidence	 custody	 is	 necessary	 to	 conduct	 an	assessment	of	the	accused	person,	or		
	
(ii)	 on	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 qualified	 person	 detention	 of	 the	accused	 person	 in	 custody	 is	 desirable	 to	 conduct	 the	assessment	 of	 the	 accused	 person,	 and	 the	 accused	 person	consents	to	custody;	or			
(b)	 the	 accused	 person	 is	 required	 to	 be	 detained	 in	 custody	 in	respect	 of	 any	 other	 matter	 or	 by	 virtue	 of	 any	 provision	 of	 the	
Criminal	Code.			
Report	of	qualified	person	in	writing		
(5)	For	the	purposes	of	paragraph	(4)(a),	 if	 the	prosecutor	and	the	accused	person	agree,	evidence	of	a	qualified	person	may	be	received	in	the	form	of	a	report	in	writing.			
Application	to	vary	assessment	order	if	circumstances	change		
(6)	A	judge	may,	at	any	time	while	an	order	made	under	subsection	(1)	is	in	force,	on	cause	being	shown,	vary	the	terms	and	conditions	specified	 in	the	order	 in	 any	 manner	 that	 the	 court	 considers	 appropriate	 in	 the	circumstances.		
	
Disclosure	of	report		
(7)	When	 a	 judge	 receives	 a	 report	made	 in	 respect	 of	 an	 accused	 person	under	subsection	(1),		
	
(a)	 the	 court	 shall,	 subject	 to	 subsection	 (9),	 cause	 a	 copy	 of	 the	report	to	be	given	to		
	
(i) the	accused	person, 	
	
(ii) any	counsel	representing	the	accused	person,	and			
(iv)		 the	prosecutor;	and 	
	
(b)	the	court	may	cause	a	copy	of	the	report	to	be	given	to		
	
(i)the	 provincial	 director,	 or	 the	 director	 of	 the	 provincial	
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correctional	facility	for	adults	or	the	penitentiary	at	which	the	accused	person	 is	 serving	a	 sentence,	 if,	 in	 the	opinion	of	 the	court,	 withholding	 the	 report	 would	 jeopardize	 the	 safety	 of	any	person.			
Cross-examination		
(8)	When	a	report	is	made	in	respect	of	a	accused	person	under	subsection	(1),	the	accused	person,	his	or	her	counsel	and	the	prosecutor	shall,	subject	to	 subsection	 (9),	 on	 application	 to	 the	 judge,	 be	 given	 an	 opportunity	 to	cross-examine	the	person	who	made	the	report.		
	
Non-disclosure	in	certain	cases		
(9)	 A	 judge	 shall	 withhold	 all	 or	 part	 of	 a	 report	 made	 in	 respect	 of	 an	accused	person	under	subsection	(1)	from	a	private	prosecutor,	if	disclosure	of	 the	 report	 or	 part,	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 court,	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 the	prosecution	of	the	case	and	might	be	prejudicial	to	the	accused	person.			
Report	to	be	part	of	record		
(12)	A	report	made	under	subsection	(1)	forms	part	of	the	record	of	the	case	in	respect	of	which	 it	was	requested,	unless	the	accused	person	asks	 for	an	order	sealing	the	report	which	the	court	may	order.	
	
Disclosure	by	qualified	person		
(13)	Despite	any	other	provision	of	this	Act,	a	qualified	person	who	is	of	the	opinion	that	an	accused	person	held	in	detention	or	committed	to	custody	is	likely	to	endanger	his	or	her	own	life	or	safety	or	to	endanger	the	life	of,	or		cause	bodily	harm	to,	another	person	may	immediately	so	advise	any	person	who	has	the	care	and	custody	of	the	accused	person	whether	or	not	the	same	information	is	contained	in	a	report	made	under	subsection	(1).			
Definition	of	qualified	person		
(14)	 In	 this	 section,	 qualified	 person	means	 a	 person	 duly	 qualified	 by	provincial	 law	 to	 practice	 medicine	 or	 psychiatry	 or	 to	 carry	 out	psychological	examinations	or	assessments,	as	the	circumstances	require,	or,	if	no	such	law	exists,	a	person	who	is,	in	the	opinion	of	the	judge,	so	qualified,	and	 includes	a	person	or	a	member	of	a	class	of	persons	designated	by	 the	lieu-tenant	governor	in	council	of	a	province	or	his	or	her	delegate.			
Statements	not	admissible	against	accused	
(15)	Subject	to	subsection	(2),	if	an	accused	person	is	assessed	in	accordance	with	an	order	made	under	x(1)	(psychological	assessment),	no	statement	or	reference	to	a	statement	made	by	the	accused	person	during	the	course	and	for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 assessment	 to	 the	 person	 who	 conducts	 the	assessment	or	to	anyone	acting	under	that	person’s	direction	is	admissible	in	evidence,	without	the	consent	of	the	young	person,	in	any	proceeding	before	a	court,	tribunal,	body	or	person	with	jurisdiction	to	compel	the	production	
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of	evidence.			
Exceptions		
(2)	A	statement	referred	to	in	subsection	(1)	is	admissible	in	evidence	for	the	purposes	of		
	
(a) determining	whether	the	accused	person	is	unfit	to	stand	trial;			
(b) determining	 whether	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 accused	person	 was	 disturbed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 commission	 of	 the	 alleged	offence,	if	the	accused	person	is	a	female	person	charged	with	an	offence	arising	out	of	the	death	of	her	newly-born	child;			
(c) determining	 whether	 the	 young	 person	 was,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	commission	of	an	alleged	offence,	suffering	from	automatism	or	a	mental	disorder	so	as	to	be	exempt	from	criminal	responsibility	by	virtue	of	subsection	16(1)	of	the	Criminal	Code,	if	the	accused	puts	his	or	her	mental	capacity	 for	criminal	 intent	 into	 issue,	or	 if	 the	prosecutor	raises	the	issue	after	verdict;			
(d) challenging	the	credibility	of	an	accused	person	in	any	proceeding	if	the	testimony	of	the	accused	person	is	inconsistent	in	a	material	way,	particular	with	a	statement	referred	to	in	subsection	(1)	that	the	young	person	made	previously;	or	
	
(e) establishing	the	perjury	of	an	accused	person	who	is	charged	with	perjury	in	respect	of	a	statement	made	in	any	proceeding.	
	
	 	
		
	
113	
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Review Counsel (Contracted under DeMelo Law Professional 
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Voss 
§ Responsible for mentoring clinic students; ensuring their files 
were correctly completed in order to ensure clients adequately 
represented 
§ Assisted with client intakes to ensure criminal file numbers 
stabilized 
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clinics overarching practice 
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   Associate Defence Lawyer 
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Tenant Board & the Ontario Court of Justice 
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Toth (Re), [2018] O.R.B.D. No. 2449 
R. v. Coutts, [2018] O.J. No. 680 
R. v. Brezden, [2017] O.J. No. 5876 
R. v. J.C.J., [2017] O.J. No. 5764 
Toth (Re), [2017] O.R.B.D. No. 2423 
R. v. Fast, [2016] O.J. No. 5265 
R. v. Oliveros-Callejas, [2016] O.J. No. 88 
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LAW RELATED VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE, RECOGNITION AND 
COMMITTEES 
2019    Criminal Lawyers’ Association – Women in Law Conference -   
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2018 & 2019  Criminal Lawyers’ Association – Mental Health Conference –  
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2017 Osgoode Professional Development – Faculty for CPD 
Presentation on Charter issues 
2016, 2017, & 2019 Women in Criminal Law Conference – Platinum Sponsor 
2015 – Present Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario) - Member 
2013 – Present Criminal Lawyers Association (London Chapter) – Member 
2013 – Present Middlesex Law Association – Member 
2012 – 2013  London Lawyers Feed the Hungry - Volunteer 
2012   Lerners Cup UWO Judge  
§ Judged 2L and 3L students during Lerners mooting competition  
2012    Cherniak Cup UWO Judge  
§ Judged 1L students during Cherniak advocacy competition  
2012    Recipient of the 2012 Fasken Martineau Award in Administrative  
Law  
2011 – 2012  Dispute Resolution Centre – Certificate in Mediation  
2011 – 2013  Juvenile Diabetes Ride for the Cure – Participant through  
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2010 – 2011  Ontario Bar Association – Western Law Ambassador 
2009 – 2011   Western Law Student Ambassador Program 
2010 – 2011  Public Legal Education 
§ Youth Opportunities Unlimited – Present criminal law and 
employment law modules to at-risk youth 
2010   Orientation Week Committee – Chair 
2010    Lerners First Year Mooting Competition   
2009 – 2010   Pro Bono Students Canada 
2009 & 2010   B.L.G. Client Counseling Competition - 2009 Finalist 
 
PROFESSIONAL AND CONTINUING EDUCATION TRAINING  
2019 Criminal Lawyers’ Association – Women in Law Conference 
• Speaker on Mental Health in the profession 
2018 FIUMLAW Academic Conference – Presenter on Mental Health 
Panel; Academic Poster Presented regarding Masters Thesis 
2018 & 2019 Criminal Lawyers’ Association – Mental Health Conference 
• Speaker on “Mental Health and Bail” in 2018 
• Speaker on NCR and impairment since R. v Bouchard-Lebraun 
2014 – 2017 Public Defender’s Retreat – Las Vegas (Yearly Retreat) 
2015 – 2017  Women in Criminal Law – Criminal Lawyers Association 
§ Attended in 2015 & 2016 
§ Speaker at the 2017 March Conference – “Top 5 Cases by Top 
5 Women” – Presented the case of R. v Bingley, [2017] SCJ No 
17 
2016 – 2017 Criminal Lawyers Association Fall CLE Conference  
2014 Women in Criminal Law CLE Session  
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§ “Work-Life Balance” 
2014 Criminal Lawyers Association CPD Session  
§ Drug Treatment Court 
2014 Criminal Lawyers Association CLE Spring Session  
§ Various Topics including Dawson Applications & 
Identification Issues 
2013  2013 Mentoring Dinner 
§ “What you Didn’t Learn in Law School about the Judiciary”  
2012 – 2013   Various In-House Training Sessions at Lerners LLP  
§ Session topics included criminal law, Provincial Offences Act, 
conflicts, interviewing clients, file management, and appeals  
 
OTHER VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE 
2018   St. Joseph’s Hospice – Air 2018 Volunteer 
2017 – Present St. Joseph’s Hospice – Handbags for Hospice Committee Member 
2016 – 2017  MCC 126 – Volunteer Director on the Board of Directors 
2015 – 2017 Power of the Purse – A One Day Women’s Conference - 
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